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This dissertation argues for a melancholic reading of Montaigne’s Essais, through the 
lens of early-modern notions of melancholy and folly, placing Montaigne “in a 
motley” and “in tears,” and hence, fully within his period. As such, Montaigne is seen 
to embody one of the most complex, unique, and critical forms of subjectivity: early-
modern melancholic subjectivity, as it will be surveyed in this dissertation through a 
wide variety of literary and visual concepts and figures that engage and resonate with 
one other, to produce the “world” of early-modern melancholy, rather than just a 
psychological state.  
A reading of Montaigne’s Essais as a melancholic text will demonstrate the 
consistency and unity of a text famous for its heterogeneity and diversity. If these 
diverse parts of the Essais, ranging from cats to fathers, from honesty to cruelty, from 
the act of essaying to the critique of custom, from Montaigne’s views on passions to 
his views on death, can all be read and enveloped within [one] melancholy, then the 
implications are both that melancholy is not a pathology defined by lack, but rather a 
subjectivity, and moreover — a privileged subjectivity, whose insight and critical 
abilities now parallel those of the “privileged” work of the Essais, as a work of 
immense complexity, singularity, value, and meaning.   
  
  
iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
Yael Wender received her BA in Comparative Literature, summa cum laude, and in 
French, magna cum laude, from Tel Aviv University in 2007.  During her bachelor’s 
studies, she was awarded two competitive French language scholarships to study at the 
linguistic centers of Besançon (CLA) and Vichy (CAVILAM), France. She received 
her MA in Romance Studies from Cornell University in 2013, and is completing her 
PhD in Romance Studies at Cornell University. Her interests have shifted from the 
absurd and existentialism to the literary investigation of emotions, specifically those 
pertaining to contemporary discourses of mental health, with a focus on the early-
modern period and the work of Michel de Montaigne. In addition to pursuing her PhD, 
she is currently training to become a certified LI CBT (Low Intensity Cognitive 
Behavioral Therapy) therapist at Wingate Institute in Israel. She is currently a lecturer 
of EAP (English for Academic Purposes) at Ruppin College and has previously taught 
courses in Literature, English, French, and Hebrew at Cornell University, Queens 
College, and The Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my father Dr. Abraham Wender,  
le meilleur des pères qui furent oncques 
 
  
  
v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This dissertation would not have been possible without the support, kindness, and love 
of my committee members, family, and partner. To my committee members, Professor 
Cary Howie, Professor Kathleen Long, and Professor Neil Saccamano, I am grateful to 
your intellectual fierceness, openness, and candidness, which have subtly guided me 
over the years toward a kind of thought and rigor that I can finally call my own.  
Special thanks to Professor Kathleen Long for believing in me through many 
difficult times when I did not believe in myself, for encouraging the Montaigne in me, 
for providing a model for feminism and disability in your work, and lastly for advising 
me through significant parts of this project from its most initial stages.   
To Professor Neil Saccamano for always pushing on my readings, and helping 
me establish an increasingly close relationship with the text and words I examine, to 
exude their full potential. Your unique mixture of philosophy and literature have made 
it possible for me to do the same and combine these two favorite worlds. Finally, 
thank you for always wishing the best for your students and supporting all the 
decisions I have made without judgment and with a smile.  
Finally, to professor Cary Howie who’s honest criticism helped me stay clear 
of intellectual traps and shortcuts that would have curtailed my work. Thank you for 
your intellectual honesty and otherness, and for being accessible to me as a friend in 
addition to being my chair for the past many years.  
To my mother Nurit Wender, whose labor, endurance, care, and constancy, 
were an endless source of inspiration for me. To my older sisters Nomy Wender and 
Shiry Wender, for believing in their younger sister in her eccentric ways, and to their 
  
vi 
husbands Roee Amit and Daniel Moore. Thank you all for allowing me the time and 
space to focus on this journey, also without judgment.  
My father, Dr. Abraham Wender, to whom this dissertation is dedicated, sadly 
did not get to see this project come about, but I would have absolutely not been able to 
see it through without keeping his potential beaming pride and elation in mind at all 
times. This dissertation is dedicated to his humanist heart, and to his mathematical 
style and form.  
Last but not least, thank you, Melissa Mannis, for being in the trenches with 
me, for inhabiting this world of interest with me, and for helping me create the 
complex range of daily conditions that have made it possible for me to sit, write, and 
persist at it.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER ONE: FIGURES OF EARLY-MODERN MELANCHOLY AND FOLLY 11 
INTRODUCTION 11 
I. MELANCHOLY AMBIGUITY 15 
II. MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE. THE “PATHOLOGICAL VISION” OF 
MELANCHOLY: AN ANALYSIS OF ALBRECHT DÜRER’S MELANCOLIA I (1514) 20 
III. FIGURES OF FOLLY: THE FOOL’S CAP & SHIP 25 
IV. PERSPECTIVES OF FOLLY 36 
V. TEARS OF LAUGHTER OR LAMENTATION? THE COMBINED TALES OF 
FOLLY AND MELANCHOLY AS FORMS FOR UNDERSTANDING EARLY-
MODERN SUBJECTIVITY 40 
VI. “WHO IS THE FOOL?”: A QUESTION CONCERNING NORMATIVITY 56 
CONCLUSION 59 
[Figure 1] Albrecht Dürer, Melancolia I, 1514 64 
[Figure 2] Jean de Gourmont, Fool’s Cap Map of the World, ca. 1575 65 
[Figure 3] Haintz-Nar-Meister, The Book Fool, 1494. 66 
[Figure 4] Peter Paul Rubens, Democritus and Heraclitus, 1603. 67 
CHAPTER TWO:HUMORAL THEORY, SKEPTICISM, AND “DIVERTISSEMENT”:  
THREE EARLY-MODERN THEORIES OF MELANCHOLY 68 
I. THE MELANCHOLY HUMOR: “IT’S COMPLICATED” 68 
II. SKEPTICISM 78 
III. PASCAL’S DIVERTISSEMENT: A MELANCHOLIC BIAS 83 
IV. READING PASCAL: A MODEL FOR READING MONTAIGNE’S ESSAIS 91 
CHAPTER THREE: WHY MONTAIGNE RUSHES EVERYONE OFF TO BED: 
IMAGES AT THE LIMIT IN DE L’AFFECTION DES PERES AUX ENFANS 98 
INTRODUCTION 98 
I. THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOLLY 103 
II. BLINDNESS AND FOLLY 114 
III. THE CONCEPTUAL PERSONA OF THE MISERLY FATHER: 123 
IV. THE FROWNING FATHER — “GRIMACE PATERNELLE” 126 
V. “PAR UNE TROP CERTAINE EXPERIENCE” 133 
VI. ADAPTIVE MELANCHOLY 135 
  
viii 
CONCLUSION ‘THE CHILDREN OF THE MIND’ 141 
CHAPTER FOUR: PLAYING WITH MONSTERS 145 
INTRODUCTION 145 
I. A NEW CONTEMPTUS MUNDI, AND NEW VALUES: 152 
II. THE MONSTER AND MELANCHOLY 162 
III. THREE KINDS OF MONSTERS: DE L’AMITIE, D’UN ENFAN MONSTRUEUX, 
MONTAIGNE 168 
IV. THE MONSTER AS AN ANTI-SOCIAL SHIELD 177 
A CONCLUSION TO MONTAIGNE: ESSAYING AND MELANCHOLY 184 
CONCLUSION 190 
WORKS CITED 194 
 
  
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 - Albrecht Dürer, Melancolia I, 1514. 
  
Figure 2 - Jean de Gourmont, Fool’s Cap Map of the World, ca. 1575, woodcut.  
 
Figure 3 - Haintz-Nar-Meister, The Book Fool, 1494, woodcut.  
 
Figure 4 - Peter Paul Rubens, Democritus and Heraclitus, 1603, oil on wood.  
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Tis the grave doctrine of the schools / that contraries can never be / 
consistent in the highest degree / but thou must stand exempt from 
their dull narrow rules. 
JOHN NORRIS1 
 
 
Montaigne’s Essais have been associated with some of the greatest and most 
novel ideas, including the essay genre itself, the invention of the “I” behind them, and 
the human nature that they have been said to model. While Montaigne’s melancholy, 
or rather his “melancholy humor,” has been duly noted, the Essais themselves have 
not been considered a melancholy text.  
 This dissertation argues that melancholy fully structures the Essais, and ties its 
various parts and meanings together, thus far considered incongruent or otherwise 
celebrated in their incongruity. Melancholy offers consistency and unity to an 
otherwise digressive and diverse text through the notion of early-modern melancholy 
read as a “unity and consistency of contraries,” as the introductory quote polemically 
conveys.  
This argument is situated in contrast to the readings of the Essais as a 
digressive and monstrous form, as viewed by psychoanalytic readings, for example in 
the work of Lawrence D. Kritzman; by postmodern readings of the Essais, for 
example in Hassan Melehy’s work; as well as by tendencies to focus on the act of 
writing in Montaigne and the genesis of the Essais themselves, for example in Richard 
                                                
1 John Norris, “To Melancholy,” in A Collection of Miscellanies: Consisting of Poems, Essays, 
Discourses & Letters, 6th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1717), 130. 
 
2 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
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Regosin’s work, all of which focus on lack and loss as the raison d’être of the 
“formless” Essais.  
If Freud marked melancholy as a pathological state of depletion, of loss of 
world and self,2 while Julia Kristeva further emphasized its muteness and the loss of 
language, then, as she writes, melancholy can only be seen as a cause or a trigger for 
writing, but cannot be meaningful in its own right.3 Thus, by arguing against related 
psychoanalytic or genetic accounts of the Essais as the formless result of an initial 
melancholy emptiness, and by arguing instead for melancholy as the meaning and 
matter of Montaigne’s arguments, figures, rhetoric, values and philosophy — this 
dissertation makes the claim that “being” melancholy and “being” meaningful are 
complementary rather than contradictory positions.  
Aligning meaning with melancholy, by aligning the Essais with melancholy, is 
made possible through the mediation of early-modern melancholy, where subject, 
world, body, and mind, are yet to be divided and categorized in the modern sense, and 
before that symbolic moment when, as Michel Foucault writes in the preface to 
Madness and Civilization, “madness and reason no longer communicate with each 
other.”4 Therefore, a select corpus of early-modern writings and visual representations 
that span the “long” sixteenth century and pertain to melancholy or to its close 
                                                
2 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14 (1914-1916), ed./trans. James Strachey, 243-258 (London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1957). 
3 “For those who are raked by melancholia, writing about it would have meaning only if writing sprang 
out of that very melancholia.” Julia Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, trans. Leon S. 
Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 3. 
4 “In the serene world of mental illness, modern man no longer communicates with the madman,” 
Michel Foucault, “Preface,” Madness and Civilization, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1988), x.  
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neighbor, folly, are the chosen theoretical framework for this dissertation, and for 
reading the Essais as a melancholy text.  
This dissertation explores and reveals both early-modern melancholy and 
Montaigne’s Essais as so many figures, images, tropes, and themes that resemble and 
echo each other in an early-modern world, where, as Foucault has poetically described 
it: signs were tied to each other, not to signification, not to things, through networks of 
resemblances and reverberations.5 The majority of the early-modern texts that this 
dissertation closely analyzes are also written by self-avowed melancholics: Marsilio 
Ficino, Sebastian Brant, Albrecht Dürer, Robert Burton, and finally Michel de 
Montaigne, which further allows us to reveal some of these deep and consistent 
affinities, or reverberations, that hold Montaigne’s Essais together in a new and 
compelling way.  
In addition to this early-modern corpus which produced the framework for 
melancholy as a theory for analyzing Montaigne, I am indebted to Olivier Pot’s 
L’inquiétante étrangeté, for breaking with the tradition of viewing the Essais as 
springing from the loss and mourning of Montaigne’s friend La Boétie, in favor of 
understanding Montaigne’s melancholy in line with early-modern notions, such as 
humoral theory. This dissertation is particularly inspired by his suggestion of a parallel 
between Albrecht Dürer’s Melancolia I and Montaigne’s digressive style, and its 
implications for a non-pathological and, in fact, privileged view of melancholy. As 
such, Dürer’s image has proven instrumental to reading the Essais as melancholy, and 
                                                
5 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences, trans. 
Tavistock/Routledge Publishing (New York; London: Routledge Classics, 2005), 33. 
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its imagery and symbolism will consistently run in the background of the other 
readings.  
In addition, Georges Canguilhem’s6 understanding of health and pathology as  
subjective feelings and assessments, rather than objective and abstract measures, as 
well as his understanding of health and pathology as mobile and reactive states, has 
helped me reveal the oscillations and shifts characteristic of melancholy as healthy 
rather than pathologically “fragile,” a characteristic that also provides an alternative 
framework for the variety and diversity of the Essais.  
While the turn away from the digressive, diverse, formless, and free form of 
the Essais might seem like a dangerous move in light of the importance these notions 
impart on political theories and ethics inspired by Montaigne’s Essais, early-modern 
melancholy proves to be a subversive critique in its own right, proving that there is no 
need to break from the subjective or the “abnormal,” in order to produce critical and 
ethical values.  
Finally, a structured and unified view of the Essais could seem to go against 
the grain of Montaigne’s most revered values and philosophies, for example his 
perpetual questioning and skepticism against any one view and any totality, his 
relativism, or his radical acceptance of diversity and difference. All of these stand in 
contrast to the melancholic position as a position of harsh indictments, criticism, and a 
favoring of the self against others. The former values portray a moderate, patient, and 
                                                
6 Georges Canguilhem, On the Normal and the Pathological, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett, (New York: 
Zone Books. 1991); Canguilhem, Georges. Knowledge of Life, trans. Stefanos Geroulanos and 
Daniela Ginsburg, (New York: Fordham University Press. 2008).  
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compassionate Montaigne who, according to M.A. Screech,7 if melancholic by 
“temperament,” keeps his melancholy in check and the madness at bay.  
My readings of Montaigne and his Essais present a “saltier” counterpart to the 
“sweet” version of Montaigne, in a way that resembles Philippe Desan’s recent 
biography on Montaigne, Montaigne: A Life.8 The adjective connotes Montaigne’s 
other, more hidden origins as son of a family of salt fish merchants on the side of his 
father, Eyquem, who bought their nobility, and the name Montaigne, through money 
they earned from selling “salty fish” — an origin which, as Desan argues, Montaigne 
tried to cover up.9 Like Desan, who reads Montaigne more suspiciously, reading his 
secret political agendas through his literary tropes and rhetoric, melancholy presents 
another “saltier” version of Montaigne, one related to a more personal strategy for 
survival and manipulation of reality in the Essais, as well as alluding to the salt of 
Montaigne’s — perhaps invisible — tears.  
 This dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 explores early-
modern folly and melancholy through a diverse range of images and figures, while 
each one produces an important concept or theory that relate to melancholy. Chapter 2 
provides additional background to early-modern melancholy by exploring three early-
modern theories, humoral theory, skepticism and Blaise Pascal’s notion of diversion as 
a critique that resembles folly. My reading of passages and figures from Pascal’s 
                                                
7 M. A. Screech, Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the Essays, new ed. (Lanham, MA: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). 
8 Philippe Desan, Montaigne: A Life, trans. Steven Rendall and Lisa Neal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2017).  
9Adam Gopnik, “Montaigne on Trial: what do we eeally know about the philosopher who invented 
liberalism?” The New Yorker, January 16, 2017. 
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Pensées provides a foretaste for the melancholy readings I will perform of Montaigne 
in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 is a melancholy reading of Montaigne’s values and 
philosophy in the essay De l’affection des peres aux enfans, and Chapter 4, which 
performs a similar melancholy reading of the essay De l’amitie, focuses on the notion 
of the monstrous as another expression of melancholy subjectivity. 
In attempting to stay close to the early-modern modes of thinking and writing I 
have analyzed, this dissertation takes an approach that resembles the sixteenth-century 
paradigm of understanding evoked earlier — through analogies, figures, and 
metaphors, in relation to the texts and to each other, rather than asking the texts to 
answer contemporary questions. Questions such as: What is melancholy? How does it 
occur? How is it different from depression? How, and at what point, is melancholy 
considered a disease? And so on.   
Due to this analogous or discursive approach, the scope of this dissertation 
necessarily extends to topics that appear beyond the scope of melancholy if it were to 
have been studied through a more definitional and rationalist approach. In Chapter 1, 
early-modern melancholy will be understood, and not defined, by exploring it in 
relation to its “neighbors” and the various contexts in which it appears: to folly, to 
other emotions, to motion, to subjectivity, to critique, to universality but also to 
singularity, to name a few. Each section of Chapter 1 will be dedicated to an early-
modern figure or concept that is closely related to melancholy, as melancholy will 
never present as one thing, but will prove consistent nonetheless. 
Chapter 2 will continue this approach by providing additional context to early-
modern paradigms and ways of thinking. The first is humoral theory as a theory that is 
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not based in causality, and which maintains a sense of the occult when it comes to 
knowing and understanding the body and mind; the second theory is skepticism which, 
in a similar manner, maintains that since the world cannot be known, it must be 
observed without judgment, and hence without classification. Both early-modern 
paradigms are more congruent for understanding important questions posed by 
Montaigne scholars than psychoanalytic approaches to the Essais, questions such as 
the role of melancholy in the Essais, Montaigne’s reason for writing the Essais, and 
the mystery concerning certain “abnormal” experiences presented there.  
Chapter 2 continues with a reading of Pascal’s notion of “diversion” as a 
model for reading melancholy in a philosophical text, by which melancholy structures 
its philosophical arguments and accounts for various gaps. It suggests the existence of 
a melancholy subjectivity behind a rigorous worldview, through the theoretical terms 
provided by the various close-readings of chapters 1 and 2.  
Chapters 3 and 4 perform melancholy readings of two of Montaigne’s essays, 
along with other essays and important notions and passages from the work as a whole. 
These readings consist in intertextual close readings of the various “digressions” in the 
essays as consistently melancholy, morbid, and folly, to which Montaigne’s 
philosophy and values become subservient, and yet no less crucial and valuable. The 
interaction and contradictions between the two essays, along with their relations to 
other essays, will aim to present a textual unity and wholeness of the shifts and 
contraries encompassed in one melancholy.  
Through these two chapters, concepts that are widely associated with 
Montaigne’s philosophy and values, particularly self-possession, a stoic acceptance of 
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death, honesty, transparency, the singularity of the self, will be viewed and accounted 
for as part of Montaigne’s melancholy subjectivity. Other notions associated with 
Montaigne, such as moderation, compassion, and acceptance of otherness, will be 
problematized and perhaps contested through this same melancholy subjectivity.  
The kind of reading this dissertation performs also serves to reinforce its own 
argument, as it performs and mimics the kind of melancholy it aims to convey. The 
readings themselves are obsessive, tightly wound, and repetitive of the same “truth,” 
while each repetition reveals that same truth from a different perspective and, as I 
suggest, radical angle, much like a “hermeneutics of suspicion.” In this case, however, 
the texts of early-modern folly and melancholy themselves perform this “hermeneutics 
of suspicion” of the world they observe and engage with. In this world, everyone is 
folly, everyone is melancholy; and the world in its entirety, and in each instance, is 
condemned as mad, miserable, and foolish. Everything worldly and every pursuit, 
particularly the pursuits of knowledge that aim to break away from this omnipresent 
misery and weakness, is subject to the critical gaze of melancholy and the laughing 
face of folly. In this manner, folly and melancholy can be seen as positions of critique, 
positions of a literary criticism, at the same time that critique is being deemed too 
“paranoid,”10 or too contrarian, and perpetuating of negative feelings.11 
In this sense, my readings have been inspired by the re-appropriating of, or 
                                                
10 I am referring to “paranoid reading” and the turn towards more positive, restorative readings in Eve 
Kosofsky, Sedgwick. In Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity. (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 2003).   
11For an excellent discussion on the steering away from a “hermeneutics of suspicion,” to more general 
terms like criticism, as a way to stay away from the image of the critic as an arrogant “nay-sayer,” see 
Rita Felski. “Critique and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion.” M/C Journal 15, no. 1 (2012): 
http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/431.The parallel I draw here 
between early-modern folly and melancholy and the contemporary notion of critique could, I believe, 
be a fruitful one.  
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surfacing of, negative and unhappy feelings or experiences in affect theory and queer 
theory. This work is also closely tied with reflections on disability theory, whose most 
powerful claim is, I believe, addressing the problematic size of its category, and its 
consequent difficulties in defining itself. That “disability” may include an endlessly 
diverse and large group of individuals, that it is a “malleable” and “unstable” category 
where “people slip in and out of disability with the blink of an eye,”12 and where, upon 
scrutiny, the notion of ability is found to be simply incompatible with the human 
experience — is taken as a sign to begin viewing “health,” “independence,” and 
“ability” as entirely misleading and dangerous illusions.  
This dissertation indirectly will reveal that this view is essentially early-
modern, in that the human condition cannot be defined outside the realm of universal 
melancholy, understood as a variety of losses, feelings and pain, or outside of folly — 
understood as an infinite variety of faults and weaknesses. Moreover, the early-
modern texts here will reveal, to the contrary, that those who appear to know the 
most, to be most in control, and most independent, are the most wretched, miserable 
and foolish. In Montaigne’s language they will appear as the most “blind,” and the 
most “impaired,” for the sole reason that they have not seen this human disability.  
This work also stems from a concern with the way in which negative feelings, 
or those that are perceived to be negative or “mood killers,” in Sara Ahmed’s 
language, stick back to those who utter them. For example, expressions of anger make 
the person uttering them “angry,” and feelings of depression make the person feeling 
them person “depressing” to others. According to Ahmed, such people are considered 
                                                
12 Leonard J. Davis, “The End of Identity Politics: On Disability as an Unstable Category,” in The 
Disability Studies Reader, 4th ed., ed. Lennard J. Davis (London: Routledge, 2013), 272. 
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killjoys or affect aliens.13  
In this light, we can even think of criticism, particularly literary criticism, as 
one such “mood killer” in relation to other disciplines and modes of thought whose 
goal it is to move forward, to answer “vital” questions in a positivist manner, to have 
the semblance of providing concrete solutions, as more “agreeable” participants in the 
larger trajectory of “the promise of happiness,”14 from the perspective of academics 
and research. 
Therefore, reading one of the most canonical works of literary complexity and 
philosophical esteem, Montaigne’s Essais, as thoroughly melancholic, provides an 
example of how we can hear negative feelings, and hear their meaning, without these 
feelings leading to the dismissal of their voices, and to the deligitimaizing of their 
utterances.  
 
  
                                                
13 Sara Ahmed, “Happy Objects,” in The Affect Theory Reader, ed. Melissa Gregg and  
Gregory J. Seigworth (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 38-39.  
14 Ahmed, “Happy Objects.”
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CHAPTER ONE: 
FIGURES OF EARLY-MODERN MELANCHOLY AND FOLLY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), Robert Burton asks us to give him “a 
little leave” so he can set before our eyes a “vast infinite Ocean full of incredible 
madness and folly.”15 For a contemporary reader, this promise can read as something 
of a contradiction or a disappointment, given that the term “melancholy” fails to 
appear in the articulated promise of an anatomy of melancholy.  
As many early-modern scholars have noted, the early-modern period abides by 
a paradigm of thought that is far less divided and defined in a way understood to 
modern and contemporary readers and thinkers, including divisions between body and 
mind, between different emotions, between subject and world, between subject matters 
and fields of interest or inquiry.16  
Following this important observation, drawing a distinction between 
melancholy, subjectivity, and the world, and a variety of “neighboring terms” such as 
folly and madness, but also sorrow, misery, and even happiness and joy, is 
anachronistic in relation to early-modern works that aim to deal with or understand 
melancholy. In a similar manner, an attempt to draw distinctions between different 
symptoms, causes, disorders, and cures, is also thwarted by the discursive and 
diverging lists, topics, and examples, whose relation to each other is often not only one 
                                                
15 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K. Kiessling and  
Rhonda L. Blair (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), III, 4, 1, 1.  
16 For the importance of viewing the early-modern body and emotions in relation to the world and the 
environment, see: Gail Kern Paster, Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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of resemblance but also one of contradiction.17  
Therefore, in order to approach early-modern accounts and descriptions of 
melancholy, or any other notion for that matter, a number of assumptions and 
expectations have to be reset in relation to early-modern thought paradigms. The first 
has to do with analogous thinking, and the second with causality, and in a sense, 
suspending the latter in favor of the first. While “bad air” or “sleep” as a cause for 
melancholy might make some sense to a contemporary reader, the idea of “sorrow as a 
chief cause of melancholy,” might be more uncomfortable, because the cause is still 
lacking, especially as it is placed alongside so many other concoctions of causes and 
emotions: sorrow in the midst of laughter, miseries of love, miseries of solitude, 
miseries of study, miseries of ignorance, and on and on.  
Many accounts of early-modern thought therefore raise the significance of 
viewing early-modern notions through the early-modern paradigm of analogous and 
emblematic thinking, according to which the universe is seen as “a vast open book” 
with every entity linked to every other through a network of signs and symbols,18 and 
where, as Foucault writes, “to search for a meaning is to bring to light a 
resemblance.”19 
To provide an anecdote for this difference in paradigm, something this chapter 
will have in abundance, many accounts of early-modern thought offer the anecdotal 
                                                
17 For a discussion on the historical perspective of melancholy as an all-encompassing category of 
mental illness until the advent of psychiatry, see Jennifer Radden, “Medical, Psychological and Moral 
Concepts,” in Moody Minds Distempered: Essays on Melancholy and Depression, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), particularly 152-154.  
18 Allison P. Coudert, “All Coherence Gone.” Religion, Magic, and Science in Early Modern Europe 
and America. (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 4-5. 
19 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences, 33. 
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example of Conrad Gesner, a sixteenth-century Swiss naturalist, whose Historia 
Animalium (1551-1558) was a 4,500-page encyclopedia of animals, including over 
200 hundred elaborate and decorative woodcuts of birds alone. As an expression of 
this “emblematic worldview,” William B. Ashworth writes that for Gesner, observing 
the physiology of the peacock as a way to understand its nature was insufficient — a 
way of thinking that was in general foreign to Renaissance thought. Instead, Gesner, 
as an example for early-modern thought, relied on myth, associations, affinities, 
fables, proverbs, or anything else linking the peacock to the rest of creation: 
To know the peacock, as Gesner wanted to know it, one must know not only what the 
peacock looks like but what its name means, in every language; what is symbolizes to 
both pagans and Christians; what other animals it has sympathies or affinities with; 
and any other possible connection it might have with stars, plants minerals, numbers, 
coins, or whatever.20  
 
Therefore, while many accounts of early-modern melancholy have relied on 
explanations stemming from humoral theory, which often become causal and material 
accounts, I have approached the topic from a literary and figurative approach, in order 
to approximate the analogous paradigm. Consequently, this chapter explores early-
modern melancholy almost uniquely through early-modern figures and tropes, both 
visual and literary, which taken together, convey a sense of melancholy and some of 
its modes: its use as a critique, its neighboring meanings, most notably, folly, its 
subjective expressions and language, its contradictions and movements, its historical 
context when possible, how melancholy relates to society and others, and so on.  
                                                
20 William Ashworth, “Natural history and the emblematic world view,” in Repraisals  
of the Scientific Revolution, reprint ed., ed. David C. Lindberg and Robert S. Westman (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) 332, quoted in Allison P. Coudert, “All Coherence Gone,” in 
Religion, Magic, and Science in Early Modern Europe and America (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 
2011), 6. 
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For this purpose I survey a number of figures ordered in sections, while also 
constantly demonstrating their overlap, and the collapse or engagement of tropes with 
each other, since early-modern subjectivity and concepts tend to operate like the 
Deleuzian “fold” (pli), which I will allude to as a way to talk about the relations 
between different correspondences or affinities. I have also relied on Foucault’s 
understanding of early-modern madness and folly from the “Stultifera Navis” chapter 
in Madness and Civilization, which has proven fruitful for a discussion on melancholy 
as well.  
Section I provides some historical background of melancholy through the 
notion of ambiguity, a concept that is emphasized and heightened in the early-modern 
thinking and work of Marsilio Ficino. Section II is an analysis of the most famous 
visual depiction of early-modern melancholy, Albrecht Dürer’s Melancolia I, which 
provides one way of defining melancholy as a “distorted” or “pathological” vision, an 
analysis and image that permeate and structure the entire first chapter, and the 
following chapters as well.   
Section III is a discussion of Folly through its visual depiction in The Fool’s 
Cap Map of the World and Sebastian Brant’s Ship of Fools, where Folly is presented 
as an overarching critique of the world, and seen as a universal condition. Section IV 
takes folly and melancholy together and shows their mutual involvement, particularly 
as they both relate to “the human condition,” where the conjoined figures of 
Democritus and Heraclitus serve as a metaphor for these two seemingly opposite 
states, and through an analysis of select anecdotes and poems from Burton’s Anatomy 
of Melancholy, shown to shed a light of folly on melancholy and misery. Section V 
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discusses the notion of diversity mainly through Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy, and 
through new and different figures reiterating the relations of ambiguity, tension, and 
oscillation, in connection with melancholy as a radical subjectivity.  
The final section, Section VI, concludes with a discussion of folly and 
melancholy in relation to normativity based in the character of Jaques from 
Shakespeare’s As You Like It, and suggests some ways in which folly and melancholy 
might be relevant to contemporary criticism. Together, these figures, tropes, images, 
and stories, provide multiple ways for discussing melancholy and folly, and ultimately 
for revealing them in Montaigne’s Essais in chapters 3 and 4.  
Rather than defining melancholy in any particular way and applying it to my 
reading of Montaigne, concepts like oscillation, distance, singularity, mystery, 
subjectivity, critique, and distortion, revealed in this chapter in their relation to 
melancholy, will guide the later readings and revelations of Montaigne’s Essais as a 
melancholy text.  
 
I.  MELANCHOLY AMBIGUITY  
 
Early-modern melancholy is a figure of ambiguities, of movement between extremes, 
and of tension. Ficino’s figure of the “melancholy genius” is one that is most 
commonly viewed as enveloping these ambiguities and tensions as a union between 
two kinds of melancholy: the disease of black bile on the one hand, and the inspiration 
of genius on the other; between the lows of suffering and the heights of creativity; 
between mental capacities and bodily suffering.  
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 Traditionally, melancholy has always been conceived of as a condition of 
polarities and ambiguity, a condition of both mind and body, one that could either 
connote special talents, or end in sickness. This polarity is frequently described as the 
manic-depressive quality of melancholy that had vanished with Freud.21 In classical 
pre-Socratic thought and especially in Galenic medicine, melancholy was considered a 
physical disease, residing in the black bile fluid and caused by its excess. And yet it 
always contained a mental component as well, as those who were prone to this excess 
or who frequently experienced it were considered to have a melancholy temperament, 
whereby humors (physical entities) went hand in hand with temperaments understood 
as “personality types.”22 Similarly, melancholy could be a temperament or disposition 
kept in check or maintained, providing an overall healthy state; or, in less successful 
cases, it could lead to a fully debilitating disease.23 
These various ambiguities have always characterized theories of melancholy, 
and are not unique to the early-modern period. Yet, as I will show, early-modern 
melancholy emphasized and raised them to a higher degree, focusing on what these 
tensions and contrarieties feel like, or do, internally — the striving and struggle of the 
“melancholy man,” and the notion of the “genius within,” which would also give way 
to Renaissance depictions and theories of a person’s “natural bent” and inherent, 
natural capacities or talents.24 
                                                
21 Levine, Michael P. The Analytic Freud: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 
1999). 
22 Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History 
of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art, 1st ed. (New York: Basic Books Publishing Company, 1964), 
14-15. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Darrin McMahon, Divine Fury: A History of Genius (New York: Basic Books, 2013). 
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  In Madness and Civilization, Foucault indicates the transition from medieval 
folly to renaissance folly as a transition from objective sin or vice to an internal 
collapse of folly within each man: a process of individual self-reflection into each 
individual’s own faults and flaws.25 A similar collapse could be said of melancholy, 
which also moves inward and threatens to literally tear the subject apart from within. 
As Burton writes, signaling this turn inward: “If there be a hell upon earth, it is to be 
found in a melancholy man’s heart.”26  
While Aristotle had famously asked in his Problem XXX.1 why it is that those 
who are outstanding in philosophy, politics, poetry, or the arts are also affected by the 
disease of black bile,27 he expressed an observation, and separated the two aspects of 
melancholy, which Ficino would later fuse together for his contemporaries: having 
exceptional talent on the one hand, and being prone to the disease, on the other.  
By combining Aristotle’s observation with Platonic frenzy (poetic or divine 
inspiration), Ficino’s “answer” relates the physical disease, and these unique talents, to 
an internal capacity and power of the soul.28 When Ficino affirms, “divine madness is 
never incited in anyone else but melancholics,”29 he ascribes a hidden and internal 
power to melancholic individuals with which this divine illumination interacts, with 
which it is “incited.” 
                                                
25 Foucault, Madness and Civilization, 26-27. 
26 Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, I, 4, I.   
27 “Why is it that all those who have become eminent in philosophy or politics or poetry or the arts are 
clearly of an atrabilious temperament, and some of them to such an extent as to be affected by diseases 
caused by black bile, as is said to have happened to Heracles among the heroes?” Aristotle, Problems 
(London: Aeterna Press, 2015), XXX, I.  
28 On Ficino’s fusion of Aristotle and Plato, see Jennifer Radden, "Ficino: Learned People and 
Melancholy," in The Nature of Melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 88. 
29 Ficino, Three Books on Life, 117. 
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Internalizing both natures or forces — sickness on the one hand, and the 
capacity of the soul on the other — Ficino also asserts that the melancholy sickness 
does not just affect people of talent, as Aristotle observes, but also, the other way 
around: the active pursuits of “great men” can lead to melancholy sickness. Contrary 
to Aristotle’s examples of melancholy men, which consisted mainly of men of action, 
or “heroes,” like Heracles, Ficino’s paradigmatic examples are scholars, much like 
Ficino himself, whose intellectual and mental activity put them at risk of becoming ill 
— “sick and invalid scholars” — to whose pursuits and health his Three Books on Life 
(1489) is dedicated:  
I am the first to attend as a physician sick and invalid scholars […] Gladly approach 
the physician who will dispense to you (God revealing and helping) salutary counsels 
and remedies for the accomplishment of your purpose!30  
 
 Although Ficino provides three causes for the melancholy of scholars — 
celestial, natural, and human — all three causes are in deep correspondence with the 
soul, such that almost all three causes are in fact internal and “human.” The celestial 
cause is the “summoning” of the scholar to study; the natural cause is defined in terms 
of the “difficult” nature of pursuing knowledge, which requires the soul to “remove 
itself from external things to internal things”;31 and finally, the human cause is the act 
of contemplation itself, which in its activity and motion mimics the natural process of 
the build-up of black bile in the blood: “Contemplation with a kind of rigorous 
gathering up, almost seizing, contracts one’s nature like black bile.”32  
 Altogether, melancholy is portrayed as the internal movement of the soul, 
                                                
30 Marsilio Ficino, Three Books on Life, trans. Carol V. Kaske and John R. Clark (Binghamton, NY:  
MRTS, 1989), 109.  
31 Ibid., Three Books on Life, 113-114.  
32 Ibid., 115. 
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towards the planetary heights, and from external to internal things, until finally it is 
“seized” by its own strenuous activity, where its motion is a narrowing and condensed 
“contraction.” In the course of this strenuous form of thinking, described as various 
motions of the soul, the soul can stretch so far outside of the body in order to reach 
“incorporeal truths,” that it practically tears away from the body, causing the 
destruction and disintegration of the corporeal:  
the more they [the learned] apply their mind to incorporeal truth, the more they are 
compelled to disjoin it from the body. Hence their body is rendered as if it were half-
alive and often melancholic.33  
 
 This final near split between soul and body, takes the internal polarity and 
oscillations of melancholy to its extreme, from melancholy as something more akin to 
a manageable temperament, to melancholy as a fully destructive disease. This image 
of a near “tear” looming over the creative or mental activity of the scholar or genius, 
should they strain their mind any further, will also be echoed in Dürer’s image in the 
next section, through a scene whose “balance” is, analogously, hanging by a thread.  
 In Ficino’s personal letters and correspondences, we see that he himself 
experiences melancholy in this manner: as an internal push and pull, an internal 
conflict between its “gifts” at times, and its “curse” at other times, while he attempts to 
reconcile this struggle by accepting the fusion of the two forces that he himself 
theorizes… and by practically forcing himself to see them as interdependent, against 
which the pain of the condition itself constantly pushes back. 	  
 The first portion of the passage below, from a correspondence with his friend, 
Giovanni Cavalcanti, expresses an attempt to take back his complaint against 
                                                
33 Ibid., 115.  
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melancholy, by writing a palinode to Saturn at Cavalcanti’s request, asking him to 
recant. But as soon as Ficino starts recanting, he immediately falls back into pain and 
complaint, asking: “but where have I landed myself?” realizing that, again, he might 
soon have to recant if he does not hold back his feelings. The second portion expresses 
the continued difficulty and hesitation in embracing the ambiguity of melancholy as 
not only a curse but also a “divine gift” (“I will try to find a way out”… “if you must 
have it so”), but which he feels he must do in order to keep his suffering and 
complaining in check, offering a general overview of these internal struggles and 
oscillations:  
Because of that excessive timidity, which you occasionally charge me with, I 
complain of my melancholy temperament, for to me it seems a very bitter thing, and 
one that I can only ease and sweeten a little by much lute-playing; […] Saturn 
methinks gave it to me from the beginning, when in my horoscope he stood in the 
ascendant in the sign of the Water-Bearer…but where have I landed myself? I can see 
already that you will once more, with some justice, oblige me to embark on a new 
palinode on Saturn. So what shall I do? I will try to find a way out, and either I will 
say that melancholy, if you must have it so, does not come from Saturn; or else, if it 
necessarily comes from him, then I will agree with Aristotle, who described it as a 
unique and divine gift.34 
 
 
 
II.  MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE:   
 THE PATHOLOGICAL VISION OF MELANCHOLY:  
 AN ANALYSIS OF ALBRECHT DÜRER’S MELANCOLIA I (1514) 
 
Albrecht Dürer’s image, Melancolia I (1514) [Figure 1], is the most iconic 
representation of the melancholy temperament. In the engraving, a winged 
personification of Melancholy, often referred to as Dürer’s “brooding angel,” or 
“winged genius,” echoing Ficino’s “melancholy genius,” sits dejectedly and rests her 
                                                
34 Ficino quoted in Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of 
Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art, 258. 
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head on her hand, symbolically holding a caliper — an instrument of measurement. In 
Erwin Panofsky’s earlier interpretation of this image in The Life and Art of 
Albrecht Dürer,35 Melancolia I is thought to represent the artist at work, alluded to by 
the various geometrical and artist tools scattered in the room, aligning creativity with 
melancholy, combining inspiration with dejection, much along the lines of Ficino’s 
notion of the “melancholy genius.”36  
 In their later study, Saturn and Melancholia, Raymond Klibansky, Erwin 
Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl offer a more productive and less pathological image of 
Melancolia I, by focusing on the tension and activity of the figure, by reading her pose 
as conveying “hard thinking” instead of dejection, and on the tension between the 
clenched left fist that supports the head [the site of mental activity], and the lethargic 
right fist that is holding the caliper, suggesting another kind of effort and deeper 
motion than the portrait of an artist at work, with the dejected aftermath. As their 
initial analysis goes, it seems as though the figure of Melancholia expresses a 
“psychological unconcern” for all the tools of creation and construction that lie idly at 
her feet, and out of use, which would seem to explain why her gaze dejectedly looks 
away:  
the things on which her eye might rest simply do not exist for her. The saw lies idly at 
her feet; the grindstone with it chipped edge leans uselessly against the wall; the book 
lies in her lap with closed clasps; the rhomboid and the astral phenomena are ignored; 
the sphere has rolled to the ground; and the compasses are “spoiling for want of 
occupation.37 
 
                                                
35 Panofsky, Erwin. The Life and Art of Albrecht Dürer, Princeton Classic Ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005). 
 
36 Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy, 315. 
37 Ibid., 316.  
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 As they futher analyse the image more closely, they reveal that Melancholia is 
far from being asleep, as in earlier medieval depictions of slothful melancholia, but 
rather almost to the contrary, is obsessively preoccupied with something other than the 
unused tools: her internal state of struggle, and interior visions. By giving special 
attention to the clenched left fist supporting the head — the seat of thought, in contrast 
to the lethargic right hand holding the compass, the contrast between the gaze looking 
towards an empty distance, and its intensity, expressing “hard thinking,” but also 
through the figure of the dog “half-starved and shivering on the cold earth” as opposed 
to enjoying sleep and warmth — their analysis generates tension and thereby motion 
between the acts of thinking, attempting, and dejection, immobility, and failure, 
against their earlier and more static analysis.38  
 In an excellent analysis of this image, Wojciech Bałus takes this notion of 
motion and tension to its extreme, by describing the scene as one that is 
simultaneously of immanent destruction and permanent suspension, which he refers to 
as a “dynamism in immobility.”39 Focusing on the polyhedron, a geometrical block, 
somewhat at the center of the image, Bałus portrays a world in motion, or of imminent 
motion, a world on the verge of collapse and destruction as the large block “looms 
bulkily, almost threateningly,” out of balance as if it is about to fall and crush the dog 
below it, while the scope of the crash will be determined by what happens to those 
objects at both sides of the dog.40 The putto is also brushing up against the scales, and 
the wings against the hourglass, with a sense of an approaching clash, while at the 
                                                
38 Ibid., 318-319.  
39 Wojciech Bałus, “Dürer’s “Melencolia I”: Melancholy and the Undecidable,” Artibus et Historiae 15, 
no. 30 (1994): 16.  
40 Ibid., 14.  
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same time, all remains still — the dog is sleeping, the polyhedron is for the moment 
held in place, generating this “dynamism in immobility.”41 
 Finally, in his chapter “L’essayiste et son humeur,” Olivier Pot offers a slightly 
different analysis of the image, which will also play an important role in the 
understanding of melancholy throughout this dissertation. As a paradigm of a 
“distorted perspective,” melancholy for Pot becomes, precisely due to its distortion, 
bias, and idiosyncrasy, the paradigm for subjectivity, in the absence of any “objective” 
or “normal” perspectives.  
 Pot asserts the unique otherness of the melancholy perspective and gaze in 
Melancolia I, beyond its symbolic meaning in the figuration of the suffering genius 
just discussed. In Melancolia I, Pot describes the elusive glancing into that empty 
distance as “anomalous” in the disability sense, as a visual “limp,” a “boîterie,” and a 
“claudication,” and even describes it as “one-eyed” (borgne) or “cross-eyed” (louche), 
in an idiosyncratic distortion and vision that he does not shy away from calling 
“pathological.”42 However, by aligning the subjective (idiosyncratic) with the 
pathological, Pot frees the pathological from its status as “abnormality” or “deviance,” 
and restores it to the level of a normal anomaly, a normal difference, to connote 
Canguilhem’s terms from On the Normal and the Pathological.43  
 In this manner, Pot regards the “pathological vision” (pathologie du regard) of 
the melancholic as a privileged anomaly or impairment of vision. Given the problem 
                                                
41 Ibid., 16.  
42 Olivier Pot, “L’essayiste et son humeur,” in L’inquiétante étrangeté: Montaigne, la pierre, le  
cannibale, la mélancolie (Paris: Slatkine, 1993), 10.  
43 Georges Canguilhem, “A Critical Examination of Certain Concepts: the Normal, Anomaly, and 
Disease; the Normal and the Experimental,” On the Normal and the Pathological, trans. Carolyn R. 
Fawcett, (New York: Zone Books. 1991). 
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of perspective and mimetic crisis experienced in the Renaissance, which 
problematized the relation between the interior and the exterior, natural world — the 
idiosyncratic, biased, subjective position or gaze, becomes the only opportunity to 
catch a kind of original, nascent observation. Therefore, melancholy, as the distorted 
glimpse itself, offers a privileged view of that subjective act, as the only original act 
— a “bit of nature” (morceau de nature) to a nature otherwise inaccessible.44 
 In a sense, it is due to the fact that it is in vision itself, in the act of seeing, 
although distorted, blinded, impaired — not looking at anything in particular in its 
distant, distracted, gaze — that reality and signification are postponed, thus allowing 
for a certain privileged access to truth, or rather, to nature — the nature of observation 
itself.  
 Beyond the distortion of the melancholic gaze, the perspective of the image 
itself presents a subversive composition, one that is at odds with linear perspective and 
the illusion of a perfect image, as invented and praised in the Renaissance. Linear 
perspective, according to Bałus, has to do with “seeing along direct lines of sight,” 
clearly subverted by the figure herself, but also for the spectator for whom the focal 
point (“the convergence at a single point of all lines receding from the viewer”), falls 
not at the center of the image, as it should, but at the upper left hand side, below the 
figure of the dragon-bat, cutting through the two tips of the wings.45 
 Melancolia I, in contrast to other Dürer paintings in which linear perspective 
was perfected, displays instead a broken and oblique (or impaired in Pot’s sense) line 
of sight, from which additional disorder and chaos ensue. Bałus reminds us that 
                                                
44 Pot, “L’essayiste et son humeur,” 12-13. 
45 Bałus, “Dürer’s “Melencolia I”: Melancholy and the Undecidable,” 12.  
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subversion in perspective is not just optical, but a disruption of the perspectiva 
communis. That is, a subversion of the normal way of seeing, represented by linear 
perspective or (to follow Pot) the illusion of one.  
 Contrary to Saturn and Melancholy’s symbolic analysis of the room, its 
objects, and what they represent, Bałus insists on the utter distortion of perspective 
and disorientation of the whole scene, which alludes to the undecided and mysterious 
nature of melancholy itself. For example, the ladder cuts diagonally across the image 
in an awkward manner, distorting perspective but also leading to nowhere or to an 
unknown place, as it is cut off at the top.46 Such an example provides an alternative 
symbol, one of mystery and disorientation, against the clear symbolism of Saturn and 
Melancholy, where the focus falls on the various “tools of creation” like the caliper, 
the saw and nails, the compass and so on.  
 Thus, the different readings or interpretations of the image also suggest a 
contrast between two ways of seeing, or two ways of viewing the image, depending on 
what the gaze — this time the spectator, or interpreter’s gaze [normal/abnormal], falls 
on.  
 
 
III.  FIGURES OF FOLLY: THE FOOL’S CAP & SHIP  
 
 
Jean de Gourmont’s monochrome map, the Fool’s Cap Map of the World (1575) 
[Figure 2], presents a witty retort to what is considered the “first modern world map,” 
and the most accurate and accessible map of the sixteenth century, by placing this very 
                                                
46 Ibid., 14.  
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map inside a fool’s head, and inside the motley (costume) of a fool. Adding to the 
witty combination of map and fool, the image is surrounded by commentaries and 
critiques in the form of a variety of inscriptions related to vanity, folly, and 
melancholy on every end, comprising an abundance of memento mori and vanitas, 
almost as abundant and “charted” as the map itself, whereby the fool’s costume is, like 
the map, covered in these sayings and signs.  
 Across the top of the image is the French translation of the Socratic dictum, 
“Know Thyself” (“Congnois toy toy-mesme”), on top of the fool’s cap reads “O head, 
worthy of purgation,” (the traditional procedure to help cure melancholy), and 
scattered all over the image and motley are the various inscriptions of vanitas: “asse’s 
ears, who’s without them,” “the number of fools is infinite,” “Oh, how vain are the 
worries of men,” and even a short framed piece of writing to the left of the image, that 
mentions the two philosophers, Heraclitus and Democritus, the laughing and weeping 
philosophers which will be the subject of another section in this chapter.  
The Fool’s Cap Map is a figuration of early-modern folly as a critique and 
disavowal of the novelty, knowledge, power and conquest symbolized by the world 
map and globe that it surrounds: A form of contemptus mundi (contempt of the world), 
and also vanitas, or memento mori (remember you must/will die), at the same time 
when these forms of knowledge and power are being canonized, printed, circulated, 
and literally, mapped. In this sense, folly will be understood as a critique of, or a 
critical retort to, the state of the world.  
Following the first modern atlas, Abraham Ortelius’s Theatrum Orbis 
Terrarum (1570), the century’s most familiar image of the world, by just five years, 
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Richard Helgerson describes the Fool’s Cap Map as “a simultaneous production of 
criticism and retort to a relatively mass-produced form of knowledge and mastery in 
the form of the new world map, turned onto itself.”47 This gesture is reflective of the 
early-modern “double-consciousness” in response to modernity and knowledge of 
which maps, and mapmaking, were highly symbolic. As Helgerson notes, mapmaking 
itself was a somewhat ambiguous endeavor of modernity, on the one hand, and 
critique of modernity and its folly and madness on the other:  
If maps were the pre-eminent sign of modernity, they could also be made to speak out 
against the modern. Indeed, their very prominence made them especially available for 
contrarian appropriation. Maps were regularly inserted into interpretive contexts that 
radically altered their meaning, contexts that turned their worldly uses against 
themselves, revealing the folly of both maps and the modernity to which they were so 
actively contributing […] mocking that very project [of maps] and all those who had 
devoted themselves to it.48  
 
 As Helgerson notes, even Ortelius’s original atlas, whose title, Theatrum Orbis 
Terrarum, means “Theater of the World,” included inscriptions of vanitas that 
provided an ingenious critique of its very endeavor and production. The original atlas 
was accompanied by a Latin inscription about human limitation that read: “For what 
can seem of moment in human occurrences to a man who keeps all eternity before his 
eyes and knows the vastness of the universe?” and the following quote from Seneca 
was added to a later edition of the map: “O how ridiculous are the boundaries of 
mortals!”49 Inversely, the Fool’s Cap Map is a critical commentary of the map, but is 
also itself a map, demonstrating that early-modern practices of knowledge and power, 
                                                
47 Richard Helgerson, “The folly of maps and modernity,” in Literature, Mapping and the Politics of 
Space in Early Modern Britain, ed. Andrew Gordon and Bernhard Klein (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 243 (my emphasis).  
48 Richard Helgerson, “The folly of maps and modernity,” 242-243.  
49 Ibid., 243.  
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and their counter-discourse of contemptus mundi, went together hand in hand, to the 
point where the map itself could serve to replace skulls as memento mori in writings 
and paintings.50 These vanitas and memento mori were crucial to early-modern artists, 
writers, and mapmakers as they offered their endeavors a “talismanic insurance 
against that worldly involvement.”51 
The Fool’s Cap Map extends beyond the memento mori or vanitas as this 
“insurance against worldliness,” and beyond a critique and commentary on the novel 
and modern. It is also a symbol of the trope of “universal folly,” as folly is depicted 
here, quite literally, as the face of everything: the folly and madness, which Foucault, 
observes, “involves everyone and everything in a kind of secret complicity.”52  
Where vanitas and memento mori are traditionally intended as reminders of 
worldly vanity, of mortality, and the consequent ethics of humility, early-modern folly 
is of the world: worldliness and folly seem to be one and the same, or seem to fold into 
each other. Accordingly, as Helgerson notes, early-modern eyes would not have seen a 
map inside of a fool’s head, but rather the world inside of the fool’s head.53 
“Universal folly” in this manner evokes an even wider sense of disavowal, a 
more sweeping contemptus mundi. As we will see later through Burton’s Anatomy of 
Melancholy, folly continues to expand onto the world and fully inhabit it, no longer 
just casting a critical shadow upon its most ambitious and modern pursuits, like art, 
knowledge, and conquest. In Burton, the world itself is already made like a fool’s 
head, in a passage that cites this Fool’s Cap Map image: “thou shalt soone perceive 
                                                
50 Ibid., 250-251.  
51 Ibid., 249-250.  
52 Foucault, Madness and Civilization,13.  
53 Richard Helgerson, “The folly of maps and modernity,” 243.  
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that all the world is mad, that it is melancholy, dotes: […] that it is made like a Fooles 
head.”54 
 Foucault similarly marks the early-modern period by a transition that subsumes 
death, fear, and darkness into the lightness of folly and madness. Death, as the threat 
of annihilation and nothingness, is already present in life, if the world and everything 
in it are already folly and madness, already “emptied out”:  
  Death’s annihilation is no longer anything because it was already everything,  
 because life itself was only futility, vain words, a squabble of cap and bells. The  
 head that will become a skull is already empty. Madness is the déjà-là of death.55 
 
 On the one hand, this proximity between death and folly, between maps and 
death, binds everything together in this universality in which not only is everyone 
complicit and part of this shared human lot, but meaning itself folds onto itself, and no 
longer appears as meaningful, or as deep.  
 The Socratic inscription across the image, Know Thyself, might refer to 
knowing this nothingness, and facing this annihilation and emptiness of folly. On the 
other hand, to “know thyself” also means, in a more specific way, to know one’s folly 
— aided by the reflection/image of the world as a fool. This interpretation derives 
from the inscription’s relations to the other ones in the image. For example, seen in 
relation to the inscription across the fool’s cap: “O head, worthy of purgation,” where 
purgation was a form for curing melancholy, to know thyself could also mean to self-
diagnose, to self-care, in the form of self-awareness — the awareness to faults and 
flaws as mentioned in Foucault. With the additional view that maps were forms of 
developing self-, regional, and national identities, the map becomes a metaphor for 
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“seeing oneself,” for self-reflection, in the sense of finding one’s own faults and 
follies.  
 Nonetheless, the image does not provide a specific guidance, and does not 
return a specific image, except for an image of an omnipresent vanity, according to the 
general notion that “no one is exempt from this condition” (Burton), that everyone is 
folly. Yet far from being a blanket statement about the state of the world, the readings 
in this dissertation will illustrate how revealing, finding, and representing follies 
constitute a subjective act and a special capacity for re-ordering the world, re-
presenting it, much like the visual metaphor of Dürer’s chaotic (i.e., re-oredered) 
room, and re-ordered perspective have illustrated.  
 Furthermore, early-modern works convey the importance of, and even sense of 
imminent urgency about, self-identifying as folly. This sense of urgency is strongly 
sensed in Sebastian Brant’s famous work, The Ship of Fools (1494),56 in the 
metaphorical rush to throw everyone on board the ship of fools, not leaving a single 
person on shore. The author imagines a voyage to a “fool’s utopia” — a dream of 
colonizing the world with fools,57 while one of the woodcuts that accompany the 
oration shows men hurrying to catch up with the ship crying “beita, beita” [“wait, 
wait”].58  
Brant’s at times violent language, as the example below shows, expresses what 
appears to be a frustration and anger with people’s inability to see the folly within 
themselves, in their lives and conduct, thinking that folly always lies elsewhere and 
                                                
56 Sebastian Brant. The Ship of Fools, 1494, Vol. 2, ed./trans. by Edwin H. Zeydel (New  
York: Dover Publications, Inc. 1962). 
57 Brant, “Introduction”, The Ship of Fools, 15. 
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with others. The recurring image of “universal folly” in The Ship of Fools is that of the 
“fool’s cap,” which the author offers to tailor and fit to everyone’s size — to any kind 
of fool, from any walk of life: “Fools poor and rich, high-bred and tyke, / Yes, 
everyman will find his like, / I cut a cap for every chap.”59 This holds even for young 
girls, and even if this “fitting” will require force and labor:  
I’ll deck their heads and veils demure / With fool’s cap, though I’m sure it hurts / For 
girls, too, have on idiot’s skirts 
[…] 
Who thinks that he is not affected / To wise men’s doors be he directed, / There let 
him wait until mayhap / From Frankfurt I can fetch a cap.60 
 
Because folly is, or ought to be, a universal “diagnosis,” one whose application 
evokes a sense of urgency and importance — perhaps as a frustrated response to the 
realistic lack of demand to board the ship — the author himself eagerly volunteers to 
be first on board (“on this ship I’m number one”). Opening the canto to his book with 
the noteworthy title, Of useless books, the author is the first self-identified fool in his 
long list of fools:  
In dunce’s dance I take the lead, 
Books useless, numerous my creed, 
Which I can’t understand or read. 
[…] 
If on this ship I’m number one 
For special reasons that was done, 
Yes, I’m the first on here you see 
Because I like my library. 
Of splendid books I own no end, 
But few that I can comprehend;61 
 
It is no coincidence, of course, that the author’s folly is the presumption and 
vanity of knowledge and books, which corresponds with the Fool’s Cap Map and its 
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retort to knowledge. Through the image of the scholar who is overcome with a passion 
for collecting books he cannot read or understand, knowledge embodies the 
ambivalence of an attractive pursuit that is nonetheless “useless” or empty, much like 
the endeavors of mapmaking and mastery of the world as represented in the fool’s 
head, and perhaps like the tools of creation and art in Dürer’s image.  
Therefore, the “special reason” accorded to the “first folly” in Brant’s list is 
not only the author modeling himself as the first to self-identify as a fool and board the 
ship, but also, much like melancholy, due to the special role that folly plays in relation 
and in response to knowledge, or as Foucault notes, the special place folly accords to 
“the very excess of false learning.”62  
The folly associated with “excess learning” also echoes the dangers of “study” 
in melancholy terms, expressed, for example, through Ficino’s notion of 
contemplation as an activity that mimics the build-up of black bile, its drying up of the 
brain (“melancholy adust”), and the damaging straining of the soul associated with it.  
Figure 3 is an image of the engraving accompanying Brant’s chapter, Of 
useless books, noteworthy in this context because it aligns folly and melancholy 
through the dejected gaze of the scholar/artist. In this image, drawing up several 
important parallels with Dürer’s image, the scholar’s gaze is obfuscated by the thick 
glasses he is wearing, and while he is holding a book on his lap, his gaze is directed 
fully above and beyond it, while his right arm dusts his collection of books rather than 
reads them, also implied by Brant’s confession that he cannot read the books he 
cherishes and owns. The books, like Melancholia’s tools, appear to be out of use in 
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their ordinary sense, and the scene is taken over by an incomprehensible, mysterious, 
and “abnormal” relation to the environment.  
As we have seen, Folly takes center stage in the Renaissance, accounting for 
everything and everyone, which is why we find endless “follies” and, as we will see, 
endless “melancholies” too. This diversity and variety, why each person “has their 
own fool’s cap,” is also due to the fact that, as Foucault notes, Folly does not have to 
do with truth and the world, but with man himself: his delusions about himself, his 
limitations, flaws, and primarily his presumption, to which this form of “excess” or 
“false” learning is closely tied.63,64  
The symbol of madness will henceforth be that mirror which, without reflecting 
anything real, will secretly offer the man who observes himself in it the dream of his 
own presumption. Madness deals not so much with truth and the world, as with man 
and whatever truth about himself he is able to perceive.65 
 
 Like the image of the world as a fool, the image of the ship of fools, as an 
overloaded vessel on the verge of tipping over, with as many “follies” and “flaws” as 
there are people, conveys a clear sense that Folly is the only category and “diagnosis” 
relevant to the human condition. This notion is also expressed in Burton’s Anatomy of 
Melancholy, where Melancholy, Madness, and Folly, will interchangeably be just that 
— a general human category of weaknesses, flaws, faults, from which “no living man 
is free.”  
 However, since these weaknesses are not objective moralities or vices, as 
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Foucault observes, the application of Folly, or these overarching, general categories, 
depend on the self-perception and self-reflection of each individual: knowing thyself, 
to go back to the map, means knowing one’s own folly in the larger mirror of the folly 
of the world. The categories themselves, like the overly general image of the world as 
a fool’s head, however, can only serve as very general and symbolic representations, 
able reflect back only “whatever truth about himself he is able to perceive.”66  
 On the other hand, this connection between self-reflection (know thyself), and 
the author’s hope that this will result in a self-identification with folly — boarding the 
ship of fools by whatever weakness or limitation one finds within himself — positions 
presumption as the greatest and ultimate folly, forming a kind of paradoxical relation 
between the openness of the category of Folly, and its strict confines or limits.  
 Through this kind of paradox, presumption is concieved solely as a position in 
which one presumes not to be folly, and not perceive himself as sharing in these 
human limitations. Therefore, while the category of folly, madness, and melancholy is 
general and all encompassing, those who do not join its ranks, are plagued with the 
greatest fault, and become marked, according to a reverse logic: “The fool doth think 
he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool.”67 According to this reversed 
logic, the self-identifying fool, who does not presume to be wise, is in a sense 
protected from this newly conceived type of “ill.”  
 Burton’s description of Melancholy in the Anatomy of Melancholy, also as an 
overarching condition, whereby all humans are full of “cares, woes and miseries,” and 
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Melancholy “is the character of mortality,”68 involves a similar logic of reversal 
excluding those who do not identify with melancholy, or recognize it, while offering 
some protection to those who do “board the ship,” or in Burton’s language below, 
those who are “armed to endure it,” and know it to be a character of life. Melancholy 
and Folly in this manner become kinds of vanitas in their own right.  
And he that knows not this is not armed to endure it, is not fit to live in this world (as 
one condoles our time), he knows not the condition of it, where with a reciprocality, 
pleasure and pain are still united, and succeed one another in a ring.69 
 
 This passage once more evokes the defining ambiguity of melancholy, here 
understood as an expression of “pleasure and pain united with reciprocality.” If 
melancholy is the “bitterness” to happiness, as Burton says, it is because life is “bitter-
sweet,”70 “a succession of pain and pleasure,” thereby igniting the analogy and 
sympathies between melancholy and life or between melancholy and the human 
condition.  
 In Madness and Civilization Foucault demonstrates the relative freedom that 
madness enjoyed until the classical age — from the liminal status of the “ship” to the 
fixed and definite status of the “hospital.” This dissertation, particularly in the 
discussion of Pascal and, in greater detail, Montaigne, will focus instead on what is 
radically harsh and critical of folly, a judgment that conceals an expectation to self-
reflect in a way to find one’s weaknesses, one’s false pursuits, and presumptions: the 
contemptus mundi of folly, its vanitas and memento mori.  Those who do not embrace 
folly, who, as a result are blind to their impairment and limitation, become the true 
                                                
68 Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, I, I, I, 5 
69 Ibid.  
70  Burton’s original phrasing of “bitter-sweet” is in Ancient Greek: “it is all γλυκύπικρον” 
[glukupikron], which most closely translates to “it is all bitter-sweet.” 
  
36 
fools who have alienated themselves from the human condition with which folly, and 
by analogy melancholy, become synonymous.  
 Finally, while the terms, madness, melancholy, folly, often appear 
interchangeably, particularly in Burton’s Anatomy, and particularly when used to 
describe these general, universal states (“a world gone mad”, “a fool’s paradise”, 
“everyone is melancholy, mad, dotes”), the main texts analyzed in this dissertation are 
written by self-professed and “known” melancholics, primarily Montaigne, Ficino, 
Burton, Dürer, and also Brant. This means that their depiction of folly as a contemptus 
mundi, and their critical and condemning focus on those who presume to be wise, and 
who refuse folly, is also a reflection of their melancholic insight and perception, as 
Dürer’s distorted perspective and gaze have already symbolized. Therefore, in the 
complex dynamic between melancholy and folly, it is important to keep in mind that 
in the hands of melancholy, as will be explored in the following chapters, folly might 
seem less “joyous” or less “free” in Foucault’s sense, and more condemning and 
dangerous.   
 
IV.  PERSPECTIVES OF FOLLY 
 
This alternative vision and reality through the distorted vision of the 
melancholic is what enables Burton to display so many different kinds, indeed infinite 
instances, of folly and melancholy. How for example is “being learned” considered to 
be a folly? We have already seen multiple connections between scholars and 
melancholy and folly, but there are countless other images, depending on the 
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perspective and the criticism one wants to convey. In fact Burton will present an 
opposite image of the folly of the scholar to those presented by other melancholics, 
one who in his immobility and silence becomes a mere statue to be admired for no 
apparent reason.  
To do this Burton has to focus and choose a certain quality about scholars and 
learning, something that also relates to the particular values he wants to reveal as 
“normative.” He takes the specific quality of learned men being often silent. If learned 
men are silent, how do we know they are wise? Therefore, if they are admired, it is a 
blind admiration because we cannot assume that their muteness is a sign of them 
“thinking hard,” in complete contrast to the analysis of Melancholia.  
the boys flock around him, and the people stare / so stiff! / so mute! / some statue, you 
would swear.71 
  
As we can see, the folly of the scholar is now a reflection of the folly of his 
admiration, one that is blind and uncritical. Surely at other times, Burton will 
commend study and philosophy, for example for the purpose of diversion and 
focusing the mind on something, even as a means for preventing suffering, like here: 
For if thou do’st not ply thy booke / By candle-light to study bent, / Imploy’d about 
some honest thing, / Envy or love shall thee torment.72 
 
Here, “bending over to study by candle-light” is not portrayed as an image of 
folly, although we can see it has that potential. This is because it is framed in the 
context of other greater and more dangerous forces, like envy and love, and each 
context, environment or relationship will call for a different critique, a different “quid 
pro quo”: a term used by Foucault to denote a full reversal of values through the 
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critique of folly.    
In order to present education as a cause for melancholy, to take another 
example, Burton must present the image of the evil schoolmasters, teachers, and 
parents who are:  
always threatening, chiding, brawling, whipping and striking; by means of which, 
their poore children are so disheartened and cowed, that they never after have any 
courage, a merry houre in their lives, or take pleasure in any thing […] Some frighten 
their children with beggers, bugbears, and hobgoblins, if they cry, or be otherwise 
unruly.73 
 
Education as a cause for melancholy therefore goes off-topic, much in the 
Montaignian style, to portray the follies and cruelties of those who deliver the 
education — a separate topic altogether, but also a golden opportunity for social 
critique and for promoting his views on how children should be brought up and 
educated. Therefore there is no universal contemptus mundi that applies to particular 
values, and each case is a separate “story” or “image.” 
Furthermore, it seems as though if Burton were to present a less extreme and 
elaborate image of wickedness and violence, he would not be able to convey the folly 
itself, i.e., the folly is not a mere natural fact of a “world gone mad.” Certainly 
moderate examples of educators and parents existed, or at the very least, examples 
where violence in education did not prevent children from having “one single merry 
houre in their lives” to follow, as Burton’s extreme depiction in the above passage 
conveys, a liminality that will also define Montaigne’s Essais.  
While it is understandable that poverty can be a cause for melancholy, the 
great “folly” arises not from being poor but rather from the lengths people go to, 
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according to Burton, to avoid being poor, even at the price of taking one’s own life 
and the lives of others: “[we] will dive to the bottom of the Sea, to the bowels of the 
earth”… “will turne to Parasites and slaves, prostitute our selves, sweare and murder, 
rather than endure this insufferable yoke of Poverty.”74  
Suddenly poverty is not related to melancholy or folly at all, but is an 
opportunity to present the folly of the disproportion of human conduct in regards to 
life, honesty, and respect for others. Burton continues to go off-topic by bringing up 
the main reason for which “Poverty” is a source for melancholy — that society deems 
wealth to be so valuable and the wealthy so esteemed that those people, the wealthy, 
can in fact get away with murder, and still be loved, “no matter how he gets it [the 
wealth], of what parentage, how qualified, how virtuously endowed, or villainously 
inclined.”75 
Finally, even to remeber that we have bodies, that we are natural creatures with 
bodily needs and natural limitations amidst all those human pursuits and delusions of 
immortality (i.e., folly), requires the utmost creative imagery and novel representation, 
as depicted by the image with which Montaigne concludes his Essais: “On the loftiest 
throne in the world we are still sitting only on our own ass.” 
Si, nous avons nous beau monter sur des eschasses, car sur des eschasses encores faut-
il marcher de nos jambes. Et au plus eslevé throne du monde, si ne sommes nous assis, 
que sus nostre cul.76  
 
 Pascal will say something similar in many respects, through his notion of 
“divertissement,” which chapter 2 will discuss: 
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A king is surrounded by people whose only thought is to divert him and stop him 
thinking about himself, because, king though he is, he becomes unhappy as soon as he 
thinks about himself.77  
 
To see and depict a king as a fool, an image the following chapter will expand on, is a 
highly selective and socially subversive depiction of folly, whereas a more 
“normative” representation would find folly in the fool, i.e., in the outcast.  
 
V.  TEARS OF LAUGHTER OR LAMENTATION?  
 THE COMBINED TALES OF FOLLY AND MELANCHOLY AS FORMS 
 FOR UNDERSTANDING EARLY-MODERN SUBJECTIVITY  
 
The dejected melancholic gaze in Dürer’s Melancolia I and the “lightness” of Folly 
reflected in the Fool’s Head are two opposing and yet complementing approaches 
captured by the joint appearance of two ancient philosophers in early-modern 
representations and thought: Democritus, known as the laughing philosopher, and 
Heraclitus, known as the weeping philosopher.  
 The pairing of the two philosophers and two positions, in writing and visual 
representations, is said to have originated in the Renaissance, and to have fascinated 
early-modern readers. The early-modern fascination with this couple is notable by 
comparison to their original representation in Lucian’s dialogue Philosophies for Sale 
(Auctio Vitarum), where the two philosophers who were auctioned by the gods 
remained unsold as a “joint purchase” due to their incessant weeping/laughter, which 
was found too abnormal and peculiar to understand.78 Together, they express an 
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“unvarying attitude toward the human scene,”79 particularly through this incessant 
weeping and laughter, and through the distance they assume from this human scene 
(theatrum mundi), which they see as either lamentable or laughable, but either way — 
condemnable.   
 Through this figurative pairing, folly and melancholy are both portrayed as 
consistently removed or distant positions of critique, and the heaviness and the 
solemnity of melancholy (Melancolia I) mixes with the levity and emptiness of folly 
(Fool’s Cap Map) while, in addition, each position itself contains that very mixture. 
For example, as displayed through the internal paradoxes of Melancolia I: the levity of 
the flight versus the heaviness of the pose, the artistic aspiration and its failure, the 
“dynamic immobility,” the angelic bestiality of the figure, examples of mixtures and 
dualities which this chapter will continue to explore.   
 Ficino is known to have owned a mural of the two philosophers flanking a 
world globe in his study, likely resembling Peter Paul Rubens’s later painting of the 
philosophers, Democritus and Heraclitus (1603) [Figure 4]. In his Meditations on 
folly, where he also mentions his mural, Ficino expresses a “combined” understanding 
of the two positions. Both philosophers, he writes, were reacting to the very same 
reality, which Ficino agrees with as “the madness and folly of mankind.”80 For Ficino, 
the fact that one philosopher “ridiculed” and the other “bewailed,” was not so much a 
sign of contradiction or even complementarity, but rather a heightened expression of 
the condemned state of the world — so condemnable that both philosophers, both 
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reactions were so strong, definitive, and consistent.81    
 According to their combined appearance and signification, both melancholy 
and folly become positions of distant spectatorship, made very clear by the visual 
representation [Figure 4], of a “world gone mad.” The reactions to this world may be 
“heavy” or “light”: a brooding, dejected Melancholia, a world verging on destruction, 
or the levity, vanity, and inanity of the Fool’s head, the map, the empty edicts, and the 
various vanitas that accompanied it, a world already “destroyed” or already “emptied 
out by madness,” as noted by Foucault. These differences are indeed smoothed over 
through an overarching critique and contemptus mundi, produced by this extreme 
distance from the world — so distant that it is seen as a globe or world atlas, and the 
people as so many specks or “players” on it, in their myriad forms of madness and 
folly, captured in Rubens’s painting.   
 In the Preface to the Anatomy of Melancholy, which was written under the 
pseudonym of Democritus Junior, Burton provides in poetic form a depiction of 
Democritus as the philosopher devoted to studying human madness and melancholy 
(“the seat of black choler to see”). This depiction bears a striking resemblance to the 
visual scene of Melancolia I, thus blurring the lines between melancholy and folly 
once more:   
Old Democritus under a tree, 
Sits on a stone with book on knee; 
About him hang there many features, 
Of Cats, Dogs and such like creatures, 
Of which he makes anatomy, 
The seat of black choler to see. 
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Over his head appears the sky, 
And Saturn Lord of melancholy.82 
 
In his essay about the two philosophers, De Democritus et Heraclitus, 
Montaigne curiously states his preference for the position of “laughter” to 
“lamentation.” He claims that lamentation tends to “mix” with compassion, and with 
some appreciation for the thing it condemns, and will therefore not maintain enough 
scorn for the faults of humankind:   
 J’ayme mieux la premiere humeur [le rire], non par ce qu’il est plus plaisant de rire 
que de pleurer, mais parce qu’elle est plus desdaigneuse, et qu’elle nous condamne 
plus que l’autre; et il me semble que nous ne pouvons jamais estre assez mesprisez 
selon nostre merite. La plainte et la commiseration sont meslées à quelque estimation 
de la chose qu'on plait; les choses desquoy on se moque, on les estime sans pris. Je ne 
pense point qu’il y ait tant de malheur en nous comme d’inanité; nous ne somme pas 
si miserables comme nous somme viles.83  
 
[I prefer the first humor; not because it is pleasanter to laugh than to weep, but 
because it is more disdainful, and condemns us more than the other; and it seems to 
me that we can never be despised as much as we deserve. Pity and commiseration are 
mingled with some esteem for the thing we pity; the things we laugh at we consider 
worthless. I do not think there is as much unhappiness in us as vanity, nor as much 
malice as stupidity. We are not so full of evil as inanity; we are not as wretched as we 
are worthless.]84  
 
 As Montaigne claims to prefer laughter and inanity to lamenting and misery, it 
might appear that again, in Foucault’s terms, folly takes the rein, and the vanity and 
emptiness of the “squabble of cap and bells” expel the darkness and solemnity with 
which lamentation sees the world. But another aspect to Montaigne’s preference 
relates to Starobinski’s positioning of him as the ultimate spectator of the human 
scene, of which Montaigne’s self-exile from public life, his library tower where he 
wrote his Essais, are common metaphors. 
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 Following Starobinski, Montaigne’s preference for Democritus is also an 
expression of a greater and clearer distance and separation, where crying and 
lamentation risk, perhaps even accidentally, a certain involvement in the form of this 
“commiseration,” causing an accidental mingling or mixture. For Montaigne, as the 
analysis of his melancholy humor in Chapter 2 will show, this “involvement” could be 
a risky endeavor for someone of his melancholy, or melancholy-sanguine, 
temperament, and his more strategic avoidance of “mixture” and involvement with 
humankind will structure the reading of his melancholy in Chapter 4.  
 Thus, this extreme distancing, expressed by his siding with Democritus, serves 
as an example of a moral or ethical Montaignian position revealed as personal, and 
specifically melancholic, as the readings of Montaigne will further explore. When 
Montaigne writes that there is more vanity in us than misery, or unhappiness  — “Je 
ne pense point qu’il il y ait tant de malheur en nous comme d’inanité” — it should be 
seen also as an expression of his own desire or need not to cry like Heraclitus.   
 Similarly to Brant’s lists of fools, cutting a “cap for every chap,” only much 
larger in scope, Burton’s Anatomy sets before us a “vast Ocean of madness and folly”: 
a wide-spanning multitude of examples, lists, and endlessly varied manifestations of it. 
The “secret complicity” of everyone in folly and melancholy, of which Burton 
provides tireless kinds and varieties, produces a comic effect, casting folly over the 
most serious and severe melancholic cases, including death, deadly fears, and even 
suicide.   
The examples and cases listed vary from children to the elderly, from the 
piously religious to secular scholars, from one individual’s phobia of “cracking” or 
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“shattering,” “that they are all glass and will suffer no man to come near them,” to 
others who fear that they are “light as feathers,” some fearing divine punishment, that 
they will be damned and go to hell, that the sky will fall on their heads, or that their 
heads will fall off their shoulders, to yet others who fear becoming ill, fearing this or 
that disease. Some live in perpetual paranoia that they will be “questioned for some 
fact they didn’t do and they shall surely be executed,” others are convinced they have 
swallowed this or that creature, be it a frog, toxic water, or a pin, that will not be 
removed and causes them infinite torment, while others complain of “some loss of 
office,” some loss of reputation, or money, and on and on.85 Some fear death so badly, 
and to such an extent, that they end up killing themselves, “in a contrary humor.” It is 
this rapid movement, expressed for example by the phrase “in a contrary humor,” 
shifting abruptly from a fear of death, to killing oneself, that is one of the paradigmatic 
examples of how melancholy becomes folly, and how melancholy entails rapid and 
comical shifts.  
The loss of a dearest friend or loved one is portrayed in the same breath as an 
“un-triggered” melancholy mood amidst something joyful “after a merry feast, holy 
day or pleasing sport,” or as a result of some degree of solitude, unemployment, a 
minor worry, and again, the list continues. After naming “Death of Friends” as one of 
the chief causes of melancholy, Burton immediately digresses into other minor causes 
of melancholy, which nonetheless cause the same level of offense and injury. The 
death of a friend is placed in the context of “the world as folly,” and does not obtain 
the “special status” we might ascribe to something traumatic. After this “chief cause 
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of melancholy,” he lists in the same breath a mother who “weeps and howls” after her 
children who have merely returned to school after a holiday, and the experience of 
parting from a friend for just several hours “as a cow lows after her calf”:  
at the departure of friends only whom they shall shortly see again, weep and howl, and 
look after them as a cow lows after her calf.86  
 
 Against this staging of a wide and diverse scene of “madness,” radical 
subjectivity takes the fore as its only defining measure, and the defining measure of 
melancholy. That is, each person is melancholy according to how they feel or react, 
independent of objective measures or causes, such that “that which is but a flea-biting 
to one, causeth insufferable torment to another”87 — a short departure from friends is 
equivalent to death, a small rumor can kill, and loss of money can bring instant 
suicide, and vice versa.  
The subjectivity of melancholy, the subjective freedom to feel it, regardless of 
cause and justification, takes the “pathological vision” of the melancholic gaze, its 
idiosyncratic vision, in Pot’s term, to a limit, particularly as it is set alongside a variety 
of other “pathological visions,” other subjectivities and distorted perspectives, further 
emphasizing this idiosyncrasy and subjectivity.  
In Burton it is evident that there can be no distinction, no difference, between a 
“significant” injury and a “minor” one, as the melancholy subject is “free” to feel the 
utmost pleasure or pain independent of “reality.” A reality, which, like the one 
constructed through Dürer’s alternative and skewed perspective, is cast into doubt by 
the very subjectivity of these feelings. Where the subject of Enlightenment is obliged 
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to constancy, whereby sickness, pain, and change are exceptions to be accounted for, 
for the early-modern subject, they are defining characteristics. Compared with this 
constancy, early-modern subjectivity is unsubjugated, as it operates according to its 
own logic, one that is not even traceable to the outside: 
For that which is but a flea-biting to one, causeth insufferable torment to another; and 
which one by his singular moderation and well-composed carriage can happily 
overcome, a second is no whit able to sustain, but upon every small occasion of 
misconceived abuse, injury, grief, disgrace, loss, cross, rumour, etc. (if solitary or 
idle), yields so far to passion, that his complexion is altered, his digestion hindered, 
his sleep gone, his spirits obscured, and his heart heavy […]88 
 
 While this passage might be shown to display some judgment on the part of the 
author in regards to the excessive moaning and complaining, “upon every small 
occasion and misconceived abuse,” the comparison between the different subjectivities 
and reactions precludes any concrete ability to judge or determine if the reaction is 
appropriate. After all, it is not that the injury is compared to that of a “flea-bite.” 
Rather, the “flea-biting injury” only serves as a term of comparison with another 
subject’s reaction or feeling, displaying a range of inter-subjective proportions: “For 
that which is but a flea-biting to one, causeth insufferable torment to another.” That is, 
it is “flea-biting” to one person, but “torment” to another, with the implication that we 
have no way of determining of what nature the injury actually is.  
In this regards, I will note that in contrast to Freud, who placed melancholy in 
terms of loss, pre-Freudian melancholy subjectivity, and one of its recurring themes, is 
as a “groundless fear and sadness,” a fear “without cause.” However, to speak of 
melancholy “without cause” does not mean that any causes or occurrences for 
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melancholy and the emotions associated with it are absent, but rather that they might 
be unknown to the subject, or alternatively that the causes might be “insufficient.”89  
 In Burton, the notions of “cause,” “insufficient cause,” “without cause,” are 
rendered especially complex and intricate, and create their own dynamic, which 
further emphasizes and radicalizes this traditional pre-Freudian understanding of 
melancholy subjectivity. As we have seen through Aristotle’s articulation of 
melancholy, it nonetheless presents as a “problem,” and as something to be 
deciphered, whereas for early-modern melancholy, particularly as expressed by 
Burton, this “investigation” and quest seem irrelevant, and the obscurity (“without 
cause”), gives way to the “anatomical” and yet infinite discourse.  
 A wide range of variations of these looser notions of causality can be noted in 
the Anatomy of Melancholy. “Insufficient cause,” is expressed through examples like 
the “short departure from friends,” or in the melancholy triggered “upon every small 
occasion,” and “misconceived abuse” in the above passage; and something akin to a 
“misplaced cause” is expressed in the springing of melancholy during “a merry feast 
with friends.” The variation of “without cause” altogether, will be fully demonstrated 
through the reading of Burton’s poem below, where moods will shift entirely 
spontaneously, and entirely devoid of any apparent cause, or any mention of one. 
 To this radical subjectivity and the diversity it creates among people, each 
“injury” produces a list of “effects” and “symptoms,” which cannot be predicted and 
are also highly dependent on each individual. The body itself is not clearly delineated, 
and the entire organism can collapse given any “small occasion”… “yielding so far to 
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passion, that his complexion is altered, his digestion hindered, his sleep gone, his 
spirits obscured,” such that, in the end, the melancholy subject is always under threat 
of moving or sliding from a “slight abuse” to a near collapse and death.  
The following anecdote from the Anatomy is one of many stories, anecdotes, 
and tales that capture the infiltration of folly into melancholy and vice versa through 
the internal oscillations of the melancholy subject. Whereas the “mobility” of Dürer’s 
Melancholia was muted, or suspended, or too interior to observe, Burton’s subjective 
oscillations between extreme states will prove rapid and dizzying. Its rapid and 
symmetrical transitions set the tone for Burton’s radical version of melancholy 
subjectivity, as a fully unsolicited (“without cause”), internal dynamic:  
Ausonius relates, in a neat epigram, a story of a melancholy man, who, on going into a 
wood, with intention to hang himself, in order to get rid of the miseries of poverty, 
fortunately found a large bag of money concealed at the foot of the tree, which had 
such an effect upon his spirits, that he flung away the rope, and went merrily home, 
with the treasure under his arm, quite cured of his melancholy: but the man who had 
wished to secrete it, on coming to the spot, and finding it gone, fell into such a sudden 
despondency, that he hanged himself with the very rope which the fortunate finder of 
his treasure had flung away.90 
 
This brief tale achieves the conversion from melancholy into folly on multiple 
levels: the format of the tale itself (the genre) is a primary source for the affect of 
folly. The rhythm of the tale is swift, even hurried, with abrupt shifts and easy or even 
magical resolutions of plot complications — for example, the money is at the exact 
location where the melancholic came to hang himself, the “perfect” or “tragic” timing 
of it all, or the mention that “the very rope” that was abandoned by one, then 
“conveniently” served the other in this perfect inverse symmetry.  
 The potential severity of the “miseries of poverty” depicted here, leading to 
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melancholy and eventually suicide, is emptied out through these abrupt shifts and the 
fickleness of the subject, even when supposedly “consumed” by melancholy. The folly 
of this melancholic man, who came with the intention to kill himself, is that his 
suicidal intention was not so deep or “serious” to begin with, so that upon finding a 
bag of money, after which he flung the rope, he was “quite cured of his melancholy.” 
In inverse symmetry, the man coming to recover his treasure had no previous 
“illness,” no signs of melancholy, except that upon discovering his loss he 
immediately and abruptly “fell into such a sudden despondency” that he killed himself 
using the same rope that the now resurrected melancholic had abandoned with the 
same haste, that is, also instantaneously shifting from a “high” to a “low.”   
 At the same time, it is also important to keep in mind that folly and melancholy 
also perform critiques of the world they observe, as the earlier analyses have 
suggested, in addition to reflecting a subjective and fully internal state. As such, this 
passage too can be seen to mix melancholy subjectivity, in these rapid and 
spontaneous motions, with an astute social critique that will become more and more 
apparent in all the sections and chapters to follow: that poverty involves “miseries”; 
that poverty itself is a form of melancholy; and poverty, in this sense, can kill and 
alternatively, money can save a life (“a melancholy man, who, going on into a wood, 
with intention to hang himself, in order to get rid of the miseries of poverty”).   
These examples and tales demonstrate the “freedom” of Burton’s subjects to 
feel independently of “objective” measures, particularly in light of the endless 
diversity of madness and melancholy, where what torments one, is meaningless or 
pleasurable to another.  His introductory poem to the Anatomy, “The Author’s 
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Abstract of Melancholy,”91 removes the subject from the endlessly diverse context of 
the “vast Ocean of folly and madness,” and takes a look at melancholy within the 
“heart of man.” As an internal experience, melancholy displays an internal ambiguity 
and oscillation between extremes, which resemble and also develop the notions of 
ambiguity and oscillation seen in Ficino’s work.  
Neutralized and removed from almost any external reality, the melancholy 
subject still oscillates between extreme pleasure and extreme pain, entirely 
unprovoked by any “cause” or the slightest indication of a shift. The line: “The scene 
is turn’d, my joys are gone,” is the only sign of a “transition” in the entire poem.  
Each stanza is a frozen moment of the subject with his own internal reality of 
sensations, fantasies, and feelings. More remarkable is the fact that even the interior 
reality and internal perceptions between stanzas that are supposed to reflect opposing 
moments of feeling are practically identical. The only change and reversal is how it – 
that indescernable non-reality – feels: from pleasure and joy, to torment and horror.  
The following lines from the poem represent a sample of the subjective 
“events” of extreme pleasure (left) next to those of extreme pain (right), to show their 
nearly identical articulation, all while producing opposite emotional results:  
 
“Pleasing myself with phantasms sweet,”… 
“Methinks the time runs very fleet.” 
 
“Methinks the time moves very slow”…  
“My thoughts on me then tyrannise,”  
 
“When to myself I act and smile,  
With pleasing thoughts the time beguile,”  
 
“When I lie, sit, or walk alone,  
I sigh, I grieve, making great moan,”  
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“Methinks I hear, methinks I see,  
Sweet music, wondrous melody,” 
 
“Methinks I hear, methinks I see  
Ghosts, goblins, fiends;”  
 
“Friends and companions get you gone,  
'Tis my desire to be alone;”  
 
“’Tis my sole plague to be alone,  
I am a beast, a monster grown,” 
 
 
 Yet these contrary experiences are still conceived and identified as part of the 
same “melancholy,” as they are in Ficino. The subject of the poem himself uses the 
unifying term, melancholy, to name and assess both extremities: once it is sweet 
melancholy, and at another time it is damn’d melancholy, repeated in the poem’s 
refrain:  
All my joys to this are folly,  
Naught so sweet as melancholy.  
 
 All my griefs to this are jolly, 
 Naught so damn’d as melancholy.       
 
Similarly to Ficino’s notion of melancholy, melancholy is at once a gift, 
beyond all joys, and another time, a curse, beyond all pains. But in addition, through 
this comparison: “none so sweet / none so damned,” melancholy also names the 
emotional experience of feeling the most extreme, or absolute “high” or “low” that can 
possibly be attained.  
As such, melancholy becomes not only the expression of subjectivity, but also 
of singularity: a unique sensation to which no other sensation, no other past, no other 
states compare, both in relation to oneself and to one’s recent past: “all my joys to this 
are folly” / “all my griefs to this are jolly”… “My pain’s past cure, another hell,” as 
well as in relation to other individuals: “I’ll not change life with any king,” and the 
complete opposite: “I'll change my state with any wretch.”  
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These sensations of singularity attributed to melancholy maintain a continuity 
of subjectivity despite the rupture of difference, diversity, and even self-difference. 
Early-modern melancholic subjectivity is therefore not constructed through continuity 
of perception, sensation, or cognition, but rather by this knot of interiority that holds 
together their contradictions, even on the verge of costing an internal “splitting” into 
utter destruction and disease. This view of melancholy subjectivity as a position of 
diversity and singularity held in one (individual/moment/essay), will be pertinent to 
my reading of Montaigne’s melancholy position culminating in the singularity of the 
monstrous.  
Given this radical notion of subjectivity, and the absolute complications of 
causes and causality, there appears to be no moral imperative to feel any one certain 
thing — something that eighteenth-century theories of passions will aim to change by 
generating systems and classifications common to all. Additionally, to evoke the two 
philosophers, there is no imperative as to whether or not one should laugh or cry — 
these reactions are almost entirely interchangeable, because they are fully subjective.  
Thus, when Montaigne positions himself between Heraclitus and Democritus, 
he might very well claim to identify with Democritus, so as to hold humanity in more 
contempt. But in fact, his “choice” in the matter: “J’ayme mieux la premiere humeur,” 
as if by “liking” a humor more, one can simply embody it, can also be taken as a 
commentary on the mobility and fluidity between emotional states, whereby we 
should not see sadness or compassion as necessary moral reactions to a reality that 
would normatively be perceived in that way. 
Montaigne’s essay on “tristesse,” De la tristesse, is the most powerful 
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testiment to the seriousness with which people perceive emotional reactions, of which 
the seriousness attributed to “tristesse” is most emblematic for Montaigne. While his 
essay surveys various reactions and representations of deep and unspeakable grief and 
sadness resulting from the loss of loved ones, it ends with a woman who died out of 
the “shock of ease/gladness” — “qui mourut surprise d’aise de voir son fils 
revenue,”92 (“who died overcome with gladness to see her son back”93), resulting from 
seeing her son return alive from a journey. This anecdote is followed by an even 
greater “folly” regarding the “importance” and seriousness of this passion, “tristesse,” 
(“tesmoignage de l’imbécilité humaine”), relaying a story about a philosopher who, 
not being able to grapple with and win an argument that was directed at him, “died on 
the spot” from a passion no less “great” than this “noble” tristesse, the passion of 
“shame”:   
Et pour un plus notable tesmoignage de l’imbécilité humaine […] Diodorus le 
Dialecticien mourut sur le champ, espris d’une extreme passion de honte, pour son 
eschole et en public ne se pouvoir desvelopper d’un argument qu’on luy avoit faict.94 
 
[And as for a more remarkable testimony of human frailty […] Diodorus the 
dialectician dies on the spot, seized with an extreme passion of shame, for not having 
been able to shake loose, in his own school and in public, from an argument that had 
been put on him.]95 
 
This melancholic and emotional fluidity, which I have identified as radical 
subjectivity, places melancholy and folly on a spectrum where they can flow into each 
other, or resemble each other depending on the case, as Burton’s examples and 
Montaigne’s “tristesse” have just demonstrated.  
As noted earlier in relation to Montaigne’s “choice” of laughter, folly also 
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possesses a protective quality, and it is not a coincidence that as melancholics, 
laughter and folly are Burton and Montaigne’s chosen perspective on the outside 
world.  When Montaigne aims at a position of levity and distance from human 
existence in regards to the most solemn matters, like death, like illness, it becomes 
apparent that this is a strategic distancing that also stems from an obsessive concern 
and fear of death and illness.  
When in Que philosopher c’est apprendre a mourir, Montaigne tries to put our 
lamentations over death under the distancing and neutralizing gaze of folly, his 
justifications only reveal a deeper concern and sadness. This is because, as will be 
shown to be typical of Montaigne, his liminal and practically inhuman examples and 
take on the matter make it difficult to believe that this is in fact a human position that 
he holds or expects others to hold.  
The following anecdote from Que philosopher c’est apprendre a mourir will 
illustrate just that. Through his persistent and obsessive efforts to provide rhetoric and 
examples through which death should not be taken seriously, he gives the example of 
some unknown small creatures who, as he has read in Aristotle, live on the banks of 
the Hypanis river, and whose entire lifespan is only one day long. Through the 
anecdote and analysis he provides, the longevity of these creatures is supposed to put 
human life in perspective — comparing one day to a human lifetime. To the extreme 
and absurd point (perhaps?) where considering any human death as premature, and 
where to lament any death, is just as great a folly as to say, that if one of these creature 
dies at eight in the morning, it has died in its “youth,” whereas if it dies at eight in the 
evening, to say that it has died in “old age”: 
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Aristote dit qu’il y a des petites bestes sur la riviere de Hypanis, qui ne vivent qu’un 
jour. Celle qui meurt à huict heures du matin, elle meurt en jeunesse; celle qui meurt a 
huit heures du soir, meurt en sa décrieptude. Qui de nous ne se moque de voir mettre 
en consideration d’eur ou de malheur ce moment de durée?96 
 
[Aristotle says that there are little animals by the river Hypanis that live only a day. 
The one that dies at eight o’clock in the morning dies in its youth; the one that dies at 
five in the afternoon dies in its decrepitude. Which of us does not laugh to see this 
moment of duration considered in terms of happiness or unhappiness?]97  
 
 Now, as our human lives are now put in perspective, we should conclude that it 
is with the same folly that we would be deploring a death of any length, and hence 
death at all for that matter: “Parquoy c’est pareille folie de pleurer de ce que d’icy à 
cent ans nous ne vivrons pas, que de pleurer de ce que ne vivions pas il y à cent ans” 
[…] “Rien ne peut estre grief, qui n’est qu’une fois.”98 (“Wherefore it is as foolish to 
lament that we shall not be alive a hundred years from now as it is to lament that we 
were not alive a hundred years ago.”… “Nothing can be grievous that happens only 
once”).99 
VI. “WHO IS THE FOOL?”: A QUESTION CONCERNING NORMATIVITY  
 
The image of the Fool’s Cap Map of the World raises another question that is 
pertinent to this folly-melancholy discussion: who, in the end, is the melancholic or 
the fool? Is it the world and all its inhabitants in their folly and ridicule, as the fool and 
melancholic say, or is it the jester in the cap and bells and the melancholic who argue 
this? Is this radical, subversive judgment, that the whole world is mad, a mere result 
and sign of their own folly and melancholy?  
At times, those who make these assertions about the folly or madness of the 
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world are themselves considered to be fools or melancholic. This is Sara Ahmed’s 
argument about the figure of the killjoy: those who “kill the joy” in turn become the 
ones who are considered problematic to begin with.100  
Jaques the melancholic from Shakespeare’s As You Like It is an excellent 
example for this backfiring. A self-professed melancholic famously proclaiming that 
“all the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players,” he shares in with 
the positions of contemptus mundi and spectatorship evoked earlier in this chapter. 
When Jaques is warned that listening to music will make him more melancholy, he 
replies by recounting all the pleasure and nourishment he gets out of melancholy, 
being able to “suck melancholy out of a song as a weasel sucks eggs,” he wants more:  
I thank it. More, I prithee, more. I can suck melancholy out of a song as a weasel 
sucks eggs. More, I prithee, more.101  
 Interestingly for our discussion on the relationship between folly and 
melancholy, Jaques the melancholic also wants to become a fool like Touchstone, the 
court jester — “worthy fool!” he calls him. Jaques is envious of the “liberty” the fool 
possesses to vent, criticize, and speak the truth, “to blow on whom I please; for so 
fools have.” He believes that if this were allowed to him, he could cure this “infected 
world,” thereby expressing the envy of the melancholic for the “shield” of folly, 
thereby emphasizing that the “killjoy” is not heard in his own right: 
Invest me in my motley; give me leave 
To speak my mind, and I will through and through 
Cleanse the foul body of th’infected world, 
If they will patiently receive my medicine.102  
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Thus, it appears that without the motley of the fool as shield, without the social 
function of the fool that permits this truth-saying, this self-perceived “healer of the 
world” is far from how others see him. Instead, his position about the world sticks 
back to him, in Ahmed’s terms: he is ridiculed, and deemed foolish, both for his 
melancholic “attitude,” his obsession with isolation, his lamenting and wallowing 
amidst all the festivities, and also for the very (melancholic) experience that he deems 
valuable and insightful, and which others perceive as his shallow and petty fixations.  
His own perceived “depth,” a supposed “gift” of melancholy, is ridiculed as 
repetitive and trivial. Touchstone mockingly plays back to him his own melancholic 
language, the expressions of the futility of life and the fleeting nature of time, by 
mimicking it in the form of a mere succession of the hours — from 1 o’clock to 2 
o’clock — that is, with Jaques’s special insight and experience entirely emptied out of 
meaning and of the knowledge he purports to have:  
Thus may we see ... how the world wags. / ’Tis but an hour ago since it was nine/ And 
after one hour more ’twill be eleven / And so from hour to hour, we ripe and ripe, 
/And then from hour to hour, we rot and rot; /And thereby hangs a tale.103  
 
 Jaques, however, fails to perceive it as a mockery but rather sees the fool as a 
contemplative and deep-kindred spirit, whose spot he envies. Thus a line is drawn 
between the melancholic and the “others,” between the naysayers and those who want 
to keep the party going, or the dinner table conversation agreeable and happy.104 What 
deepens the melancholic’s melancholy increases his removal and alienation from the 
world.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The question of “who is the fool,” much like the questions of “who is 
melancholy,” “who is impaired,” “who is abnormal,” perhaps even “who is wrong,” 
are questions that get at the heart of normativity. These questions are central to all 
discourse that aims to reverse relations of power between a constructed otherness and 
a perceived normalcy, across identities of gender, race, and disability, and as observed 
also in queer theory and affect theory in relation to negative versus happy feelings or 
experiences.  
 Jaques’s melancholy viewpoint and feelings, as an example, are delegitimized 
due to the fact that they do not agree with the “common” or general feelings and 
concerns. But the way they are delegitimized is by turning his very own melancholy 
and judgments on him. If he deems the world sick — he is sick, if he does not enjoy 
the party —  he is not enjoyable, if he thinks he has special insight — he has no 
insights, and so on, following Ahmed’s analysis. 
 When Ahmed conceives of certain negative and unhappy affects and utterances 
as ones that stick to those who bring them into the conversation, she is suggesting that 
some feelings, those perceived as disrupting or “killing” the mood or the sense of 
agreement, cannot in fact be heard. They become signs of the unhappiness, sadness or 
anger of the person expressing them, and that person becomes a killjoy. To examine 
this from the perspective of the other, of the melancholic, of the person with abnormal 
judgments and feelings, it is as if their interior becomes merely an exterior.  
 In this manner, when we observe the figure of Dürer’s Melancholia and only 
see a slothful immobility, lack of interest in the world around, sorrow, pathology, or 
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perhaps even condescension or eccentricity, we are ignoring an interior mobility, and 
therefore ignoring the individual, and also perhaps the world and environment (the 
context) taking place inside or around the individual, of which we know nothing. We 
are equally ignoring anything that may have happened or may happen — the recent 
aspiration and activity of the artist, or the potential crash. We are ignoring the 
oscillations and movements that have been described through Ficino’s notion of 
melancholy, the internal tensions, mental activity, and no less significant — the 
spectrum of experience from wretchedness to royalty, as Burton’s poem expressed.  
 In a sense, it is as if the “normative” spectators of Melancholia and Melancolia 
I, see something they do not like that causes them to look away. Thereby looking away 
from the dejected gaze, because it itself looks away, and therefore appears to not take 
part in the shared world of normativity, where all gazes must be centered and focused 
on an object in use.    
 Representations and literary figures are a means through which an alternative 
reality can be constructed, as an exteriorizing version of this interior space that 
remains otherwise unheard if it merely tries to participate in the conversation. 
Subverting and contesting normativity merely through a pronouncing of judgments 
and condemnations, as Jaques does, and through the melancholic complaints of 
“moans and woes,” may not be as effective as these alternative representations of the 
world, with alternative or reversed values, like the ones constructed through the 
dejected, impaired gaze of Melancholia. In other words, without the “abnormal” or 
“pathological gaze,” we would not have the image (Melancolia I), or the world it 
creates.  
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 Valuing the notions of creating, representing, and constructing alternative 
orderings and views of the world, through the alternative and “impaired” vision, 
connotes contemporary debates on the importance of carving out and creating 
alternative spaces, cultures, and other norms, as opposed to trying to live alongside the 
norm, either by hoping for be accepted as other, or by hoping for the “equal rights” to 
enjoy the same norms.105  
In terms of early-modern theory, I will show how folly performs this reversal 
of normative values and normativity. Folly, as Foucault observes, does not present as a 
vice, an objective immorality; rather, folly is defined as a complete quid pro quo — it 
performs a full reversal of values, taking the false for the true, death for life, man for 
woman, and so on.106 Ficino defines folly and madness as just that exchange of 
opposites, whereby we seek one thing in its opposite: value in money, love in property 
instead of family and friends, mastery in others rather than in ourselves: “The man 
who believes he will find one thing in its opposite is mad and miserable.”107  
Ficino interprets or converts the platonic falsity into the folly of the world by 
depicting human behavior and life as a “monstrous” inversion between body and soul, 
low and high, false and true, passing and eternal, self or soul versus otherness, and a 
foolish and mad concern for the former over the latter. The following passage 
expresses the foolish inversion and concern over petty and material matters, like 
choosing beautiful furniture, taking extra care to tune a musical instrument, or an 
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obsession with finding remedies for the body. These concerns that humanity labors 
over become “folly” and “madness” in light of the neglect of the most human 
concerns, portrayed in inverse symmetry: the beauty, measure, and health of the soul.  
They [men] would like all their household furniture down to the least article to be 
made as beautiful as possible, but they are hardly ever concerned that the soul should 
become beautiful. They diligently seek out remedies for bodily diseases, but neglect 
the diseases of the soul […] They lay out the parts of buildings to a measure, and tune 
strings on a lyre to a hair’s breadth, but they never attempt to harmonize the parts and 
movements of the soul.108  
 
 In effect, a neglect of the soul over the body maps onto to worldliness and 
folly, valuing money instead of the soul or fellow men, caring for possessions, 
“cultivating fields” instead of cultivating themselves, caring for their livestock more 
than their family, conserving money but wastefully spending time,109 all constituting 
“daily deaths” of an unlived present, while humans only express concern and fear for 
the one final death.110 This understanding of folly as an inversion of values also maps 
onto to a form of self-possession and honesty that are offered, as in Pascal, as in 
Montaigne, as antidotes to folly: striving to posses external virtues and affairs, such as 
glory, money, striving to master others, while self-mastery, self-possession, and 
internal virtue, internal peace, are neglected and forgotten.  
Oh fools! Oh wretches! Since you cannot lay hold of anything by any means but 
through your own selves, how will you ever come by outer possessions if you have 
lost the inner? Travelers! Why do you seek treasure far away, when it is nearby, 
indeed within yourselves?111  
 
 As the close readings and analysis of Burton’s Anatomy, and the early-modern 
figures and images demonstrate, folly and melancholy become complex assessments 
                                                
108 Ibid., 33.   
109 Ibid., 33. 
110 Ficino, “Meditation 21,” 35.  
111 Ibid., 34-35. 
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of the world, and, more importantly, critical and alternative representations/creations 
of the world, achieved through great subjective efforts and creativity (the busy activity 
behind melancholy immobility). In order to ensure that they will not stick back to 
those pronouncing them, judgments of folly and melancholy should not just be 
pronounced by a subject begging to integrate into a normative conversation or world, 
say by the melancholic poetic subject like John Donne, but must be constructed and 
represented through a particular organization or reorganization of the world and its 
values, notwithstanding the assistance of folly as a subversive quid pro quo.  
In this manner, and to return one last time to Dürer’s image, the “chin resting 
on hand,” the “dejected gaze,” the “lethargic arm holding caliper,” are alternatives to 
“forms of life,” to borrow Wittgenstein’s term, perceived as norms, and therefore as 
malleable and not fixed: that we dispute colors but not math, that we do not gnaw at 
our food like animals, that we do not express sorrow by smiling, that we walk on our 
legs and so forth. And so in our context, we normatively are expected to stare at 
something and not into space, to appear busy and not just be busy (with thoughts); if 
we are holding an object, we must be using it in some way; our face should not tense 
up if we are at rest, and so on.  
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[Figure 1] Albrecht Dürer, Melancolia I, 1514 
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[Figure 2] Jean de Gourmont, Fool’s Cap Map of the World, ca. 1575 
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[Figure 3] Haintz-Nar-Meister, The Book Fool, 1494. 
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[Figure 4] Peter Paul Rubens, Democritus and Heraclitus, 1603. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
HUMORAL THEORY, SKEPTICISM AND “DIVERTISSEMENT”  
THREE EARLY-MODERN THEORIES OF MELANCHOLY 
 
I. THE MELANCHOLY HUMOR: “IT’S COMPLICATED” 
 
The following passage, which comprises the opening lines of Montaigne’s essay De 
l’affection des peres aux enfans, the essay discussed in the following chapter, 
constitutes his most explicit confession of his “melancholy humor,” and is frequently 
used to explain the role of melancholy in the Essais.  
C'est une humeur melancolique, et une humeur par consequent très ennemie de ma 
complexion naturelle, produite par le chagrin de la solitude en laquelle il y a quelques 
années que je m'estoy jetté, qui m'a mis premierement en teste cette resverie de me 
mesler d'escrire. Et puis me trovant entierement despourveu et vuide de toute autre 
matiere, je me suis presenté moy-mesmes à moy pour argument et pour subject.1  
 
[It was a melancholy humor, and consequently a humor very hostile to my natural 
disposition, produced by the gloom of the solitude into which I had cast myself some 
years ago, that first put into my head this daydream of meddling with writing. And 
then, finding myself entirely destitute and void of any other matter, I presented myself 
to myself for argument and subject.]2 
 
The “melancholic humor,” brought about by the “chagrin of solitude”3 into 
which Montaigne had “cast himself,” is usually accounted for by the monumental loss 
of his dearest friend and alleged lover Étienne de La Boétie. In turn, this state of 
idleness and void is thought to have propelled the writing of the Essais in a “work of 
mourning”4 and compensation for loss.5  
                                                
1 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 364. 
2 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, 8, 278. 
3 “Chagrin” is translated by Frame as “gloom,” but could mean many things including grief, affliction, 
sorrow, resentment, and even anger. 
4 “Language gives shape to the voice of bereavement,” Lawrence Kritzman, The Rhetoric of  
Sexuality and the Literature of the French Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  
1991), 70. 
5 “The eternizing properties of written discourse compensate the lost immediacy and  
  
69 
This reading, however, although congruent with parts of the text, is too 
causality-laden, presenting a perfect economic “payoff”  — the void produced by grief 
has in exchange produced an artistic monument –, while also being too material and 
concrete — the book as substitute for the friend, in order to fit in with Montaigne’s 
more general belief systems and style.  
It introduces grief and mourning into a passage concerning melancholy, which 
are very separate notions, especially in early-modern thought. Moreover, it presents 
Montaigne’s writing as an avoidance or diversion away from something, from loss. 
Even if this movement is understood to be a movement away from the “chagrin,” it 
would still assume that the text in its original form is already suffering from some 
lack, since it is merely secondary to a psychoanalytic “Thing”: the real friendship, 
plenitude, happiness. For example on the perpetual self-exceeding nature of 
Montaigne’s writing, Lawrence Kritzman writes, “[his book] functions as a receptacle 
that is, paradoxically, filled with “crotesques”, the result of epistemological and 
ontological emptiness.”6  
It is important to note in this regard, that finding a justification for Montaigne’s 
writing of the Essais appears to be of extreme importance to Montaigne scholars, since 
Montaigne himself often notes, his project was socially a risky undertaking — in his 
words, it was “the only book of its kind,”7 and indeed it was first of its genre. In his 
decision to make a book about himself, Montaigne was defying one of the greatest 
                                                                                                                                       
fluidity of a living friendship,” Barry Weller, “The Rhetoric of Friendship in Montaigne’s Essais,” in 
Reading Montaigne: A Collection of Essays, ed. Dikka Berven, 41-61 (London: Routledge,  
1995), 42.  
6 Lawrence Kritzman, The Fabulous Imagination: On Montaigne’s Essays, (New York: Columbia  
University Press, 2009), 61. 
7 “C’est le seul livre au monde de son espece,” Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 364. 
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taboos of his time,8 which would perhaps shed some light on the importance of 
revealing a deep justification for the project. Starobinski, for example, notes that 
melancholy serves Montaigne to “plead innocent of the crime of writing,”9 yet early-
modern melancholy theory and subjectivity refute the need for such justifications and 
explanations.   
Against the temptation of a psychoanalytic interpretation that posits a 
relational and causal “loss” and “gain,” against the temptation to “imagine and 
recreate a satisfying presence in place of an absence,”10 Pot, in his chapter, 
“L’essayiste et son humeur,” exposes the “inexplicable mystery” of melancholy and 
its origin according to this passage. If Montaigne does not name the cause of his 
melancholy here — the loss itself, the friend — it is because it does not refer back to 
one, except in an unpredictable and mysterious manner. In the essay De l’affection des 
peres aux enfans analyzed in Chapter 3, Montaigne will again not name La Boétie 
when referring to his loss, but refers to his experience as a “trop certaine experience” 
(“comme je sais par une trop certaine experience.”)11  
According to Pot, Montaigne’s Essais cannot provide a model for the “work of 
mourning.” The appropriate model for Montaigne’s time period would instead be 
“humoral theory,” which would emphasize the mysterious, accidental, and hence 
singular manifestations of the early-modern subject. As we have seen in the previous 
                                                
8  Screech, Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the Essays, 24. 
9 Jean Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago  
Press, 2009), 23.  
10 Pot, L’inquiétante étrangeté, 4.  
11 “Car comme je sçay par une trop certaine experience, il n’est aucune si douce consolation en la perte 
de noz amis, que celle que nous apporte la science de n’avoir rien oublié à leur dire” (II, VIII, 376). 
This “experience” will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
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chapter, these “distorted” and “subjective” perceptions and views are paradoxically 
what allow a glimpse into something natural and true — the “birth” of perception, the 
“pathological vision” that points to its own singular bias, an expression of a “mimetic 
crisis” and skepticism about the ability to know the world, which would come up 
against emerging notions of perfect representation and linear perspective, as in Dürer’s 
Melancolia I. Even when the explanations for melancholy and complexions were 
astrological they did not present as causal explanations, but rather as complex sets of 
relationships between qualities and shared properties, “freed from a confining 
substantial basis,” which in the seventeenth century replaced Aristotelian “causality of 
substance.”12  
Ficino, for example, in his Three Books on Life, describes at length the 
characteristic qualities of melancholy in terms of Earth-like qualities such as dryness, 
being “immovable at the center,” heaviness, along with a pull (again a cosmic term) 
towards Saturnine qualities such as being “the highest of planets,” writing that Saturn 
“makes us persevere in investigating doctrines and retain them when discovered,” the 
result of this tension being likened to the melancholic struggle.13 Even the expression 
“born under Saturn,” an accepted astrological denomination of melancholics, indicates 
a cosmic and more occult influence and pull, rather than a concrete and causal 
connection. Consequently, it was also not a fully deterministic fate, as it was possible 
to contend with the planetary forces, to find freedom within this pull, particularly 
using the guidance of other planets that possessed different or more desirable qualities.  
                                                
12 Jennifer Radden, “Introduction: From melancholic states to Clinical Depression”, The Nature of 
Melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva, ed. Jennifer Radden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
9.  
13 Ficino, Three Books on Life, 114-115. 
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As the figures of melancholy subjectivity from Chapter 1 have illustrated, 
early-modern subjectivity involves interior motions and shifts that might be either 
invisible (Dürer), hard to decipher, or else fully interiorized, unprovoked, and 
untraceable as in Burton’s poem. Indeed, these interior movements provide other kinds 
of (non-causal) relations, which we can now revisit in Montaigne’s description of his 
melancholy humor:  
[une humeur melancholique] produite par le chagrin de la solitude, en laquelle il y a 
quelques années que je m’estoy jetté, qui m'a mis premierement en teste ceste resverie 
de me mesler d'escrire.14 
 
 Melancholy does not refer back to a loss or a cause, nor to any external reality 
for that matter, but back to itself, back to other forms of pain and sensations that could 
have “triggered” it, or complicated it, “mixed” in with it, to evoke the humoral terms 
of fluids. But even if the cause is not fully internal, since causes do not refer simply to 
external stimuli, the relevance or feel of the experience is internal: “produite par le 
chagrin de la solitude” [“produced by the sorrows of solitude”]. This relationship is 
especially true if melancholy is part of one’s complexion as it was for Montaigne, 
making him prone or disposed to the illness of melancholy that could occur through 
added “mixtures” and complications. This notion, too, as we have seen, is part of the 
ambiguous nature of early-modern melancholy and the threat of “tipping over.”  
This non-causal notion of mixtures is further elucidated by the fact that, as 
Montaigne notes in this passage, his “natural complexion” was not melancholy: “une 
humeur par consequent très ennemie de ma complexion naturelle,” meaning that the 
melancholy humor was not only hostile (ennemie), as in different from his natural 
                                                
14 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 364. 
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humor, or other, but also dangerous to his “natural complexion.” Screech suggests 
Montaigne’s awareness of this dangerous concoction, his natural complexion being 
“sanguine-melancholy” (“between the jovial and the melancholic”). According to 
humoral theory at the time this would mean a calm demeanor if there were no 
significant disturbances.15 Yet this calm complexion could easily be tipped in one 
direction, and if the balance were disturbed in the direction of melancholy (excess of 
it), it could result in mania and in the disease form of melancholy, as it supposedly did 
for Montaigne here — perhaps in this sudden “resverie de me mesler d'escrire,” 
hinting perhaps at a manic state of the inspired poet or melancholic genius.   
Given this account provided by humoral theory, the “chagrin de la solitude” 
could have disturbed the balance, but in any case, even given the logic of humoral 
theory, these terms remain vague and indeed mysterious. This is true especially when 
read within the larger context of early-modern melancholy, for example through the 
radical variety of Burton’s melancholy “cases” in the previous chapter, which defy any 
systematic approach altogether.   
Finally, as Montaigne’s language or absence of language on the matter makes 
clear, by virtue of his neglecting to name and provide a cause, as Pot notes, there is 
nothing material and external such as a loss, or even grief resulting from a loss, that 
puts him in a “dream-like” state of writing. Rather, he confesses to have fallen victim 
to the mysterious and inexplicable force of melancholy which “put the crazed idea of 
writing into his head”: “qui m’a mis premierement en teste ceste resverie de me 
mesler d’escrire,” putting him outside of himself — that is, in a dream-like, perhaps 
                                                
15 M. A. Screech, Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the Essays, new ed. (Lanham, MA:  
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 25. 
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delusional state.16  
Melancholy, much like sensations and perceptions more generally, does not 
relate to an external object and cause but to its own senses and passions, back to the 
“sorrow of solitude,” which again is entirely internal, and like the senses and passions 
is foreign to external phenomena. The following passage from the Apologie de 
Raimond Sebond reflects Montaigne’s own skeptical views regarding sensation and 
perception of external things in general:  
Nostre fantasie ne s’applique aux choses estrangeres, ainsi elle est conceue par 
l’entremise des sens; et les sens ne comprennent pas le subject estranger, ains 
seulement leurs propres passions[.]17  
 
[Our conception is not itself applied to foreign objects, but is conceived through the 
mediation of the senses; and the senses do not comprehend the foreign object, but only 
their own impressions.]18  
 
The notion of sorrow bringing on melancholy, or sadness bringing on 
melancholy or dejection or fear, but also idleness, boredom and even joy, and any 
“internal” passion for that matter, is also central to how Burton explores melancholy in 
the Anatomy — without ever being able to “catch” melancholy and define it or its 
causes once and for all. Due to its multiplicity, spontaneous, and even surprising 
“happening,” it is deemed to be an occurence “without cause,” or one with a very 
loose and mysterious relation to cause(s), as Chapter 1 has explored. When attempting 
to discuss and describe melancholy, it can therefore only be addressed discursively, by 
referring back to other “melancholic” language, “sorrow, need, sickness”: “The 
melancholy ‘disposition’ is caused from ’sorrow, need, sickness, trouble, feare, griefe, 
                                                
16 Depending on how we understand “resverie” if more on the pleasant side of “daydreaming” or the 
slightly more delusional side, Montaigne is not condemning this state as something “sick,” “bad” or 
even painful. 
17 Montaigne, Essais, II, XII, 585. 
18 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, 12, 454.  
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passion, or perturbation of the Minde, any manner of care, discontent’”[…]19 
Understanding Montaigne’s melancholy in these ways, from within early-
modern discourses on melancholy, runs contrary to how Screech understands 
Montaigne’s relation to melancholy in Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the 
Essays as a state to keep in balance and be cautious of; he notes Montaigne’s disdain 
for excess, particularly “out of body” experiences like “mania,” and excessive 
passions like “tristesse,” as we have also discussed albeit from a different perspective. 
Therefore, again, as many other critics suggest, the act of writing is perceived as an act 
of taming and regulating excess, or alternatively of mitigating or taming loss.  
These views position Montaigne as the moderate philosopher rather than the 
crazed poet, a dichotomy that might hold true, except that it understands “melancholy” 
as a very narrow set of things in relation to its manifold of meanings in early-modern 
thought and as explored here. For example, the notion of the “crazed poet” against 
which Screech positions Montaigne is only one narrow aspect of early-modern 
melancholy, but in fact it is merely one of many symbols that express tension, 
oscillations, relations to extreme positions, interior conflicts and differences, and so 
on.  
Against the psychoanalytic economy of loss and compensation, of a “real” gain 
in exchange for a “phantasmatic” one (“recreating a satisfying presence in place of an 
absence”20), Burton’s Anatomy offers an alternative “economy” of melancholy, one 
that is not based on exchange, but rather on an economy of debt, whereby, once it hits, 
                                                
19 Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, I, I, I, 5.  
20 Pot, L’inquiétante étrangeté, 4.  
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it increases the chances of getting into deeper and deeper debt. Imagine “melancholy” 
as being thrown into prison for debt once, and then being held in prison further and 
longer each time by new claims made by new debt collectors. This is how 
“melancholy” is conceived not as a “state,” but rather as something that “takes hold,” 
a power, which can increase or decrease, go deeper and deeper, as the terms “plunge,” 
“gulf,” and “seizing” below evoke. This is an alternative logic by which “sorrow” can 
be said to cause “melancholy.”21 
As it is with a man imprisoned for debt, if once in the gaol, every creditor will bring 
his action against him, and there likely hold him — if any discontent seise upon a 
patient, in an instant all other perturbations will set upon him: and then, like a lame 
dog or broken-winged goose, he droops, and pines away, and is brought at last to that 
ill habit or malady of melancholy it self: so that, as the philosophers make eight 
degrees of heat and cold, we may make eighty eight of melancholy, as the parts 
affected are diversely seised with it, or have been plunged more or less into this 
infernal gulf, or waded deeper into it.22  
  
Burton’s image depicts a radically different model. If someone is already being 
“held” by some difficulty, as the prison metaphor goes, held by any kind of pain, 
illness, fear, loss, then it is more likely that as a “preexisting” vulnerability, it will lead 
to additional vulnerabilities, which will lead to more and other vulnerabilities, since 
some level of agency and freedom have been impinged on — the metaphor of “being 
held” in prison — and will decrease further each time another injury occurs. To 
illustrate this understanding of “folding” and “deepening” of melancholy with a very 
mundane example: a simple cold can make us miss work, which can make us stressed 
or anxious, which can deprive us of getting the rest needed to “get over” the cold… 
                                                
21For an important explanation of early-modern causality as an adherence in things, 
akin to magical power, see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), particularly II, 11.  
22 Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, I, I, I, 138.  
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which of course at that point, can turn into a chest cold, and then into pneumonia, and 
back to mental stress and what we might call depression, and so on.  
Finally, not being able to “get out of debt”23 in this manner also conveys the 
importance of understanding vulnerability through this context of melancholy, 
contrary to the assumption that one gets “hit” and then after some time gets back up. If 
we keep in mind that melancholy also goes hand in hand with social critiques, then 
what does it mean that melancholy is like an indefinite prison, or that prison can be 
indefinite, since the analogy goes both ways? That debt incurs more injuries and more 
debt, that moreover, injuries (prison, debt) do not elicit compassion but rather further 
cruelty, imprisonment, and further “debt”? By analogy, this would also mean that 
vulnerability and disability, should socially incur less injuries and less punishment, so 
that the sinking into this “internal gulf” could be mitigated.  
Uniquely to the early-modern notion of subjectivity, melancholy can be said to 
deepen melancholy, sorrow can deepen into melancholy, which can shift into a more 
manic state, or “dry out” the body by that very excess as Ficino’s melancholy caused 
by contemplation illustrated. There is no one direction or course in which melancholy, 
or passions for that matter, if we remember how “sorrow,” “gladness,” and “shame” 
produced the very same effects on the soul and body in Montaigne’s De la tristesse, 
could develop. At the very least, this progression and workings of the passions cannot 
be known or accessed in any humanly predictable way, evoking the theory of 
skepticism that will follow this discussion.  
Montaigne’s melancholy is in the same way part of a broader interior working, 
                                                
23 The same logic would apply to expressions like “getting out of depression” and all those expressions 
that urge us to “get out,” “up,” and “over negative states.  
  
78 
and not an event that would produce other events or actions, such as the monstrous 
project of the Essais, which are commonly attributed to his melancholy state. As the 
following section will show, Montaigne, in accordance with early-modern thought, 
would not accord “melancholy” with such a distinct, and divided place, from outside a 
larger scheme of internal and “abnormal” phenomena, or even, from outside of 
phenomena in general.  
 
II.  SKEPTICISM  
 
 
Although the “honest” and aspirationally “naked”24 author of the Essais has 
confessed falling victim to melancholy, and having no control over this, he was in fact 
attacked by melancholy after which he was possessed by a resverie to write, he is not 
confessing anything about his melancholy in fact. He is not woe-ing or howling like 
Burton’s characters, he is not describing how melancholy tyrannizes him like the 
subject of Burton’s poem (“damn’d melancholy”), he does not curse his “condition” as 
Ficino did in his letter. He does not confess a “bittersweet” relationship with his pain, 
the oscillations of pleasure and pain, nor the now pleasant now painful musings of the 
melancholic imagination, and not even what it feels like to be thrust into this state 
where a mysterious force invades him and makes him write.  
Is the experience painful or pleasant? What are the qualities of this experience? 
It is not even clear if “resverie” is delightful or frightening, while the notion of 
                                                
24 “Que si j’eusse été entre ces nations qu’on dit vivre encore sous la douce liberté des premières lois de 
nature, je t’assure que je m’y fusse très volontiers peint tout entier, et tout nu,” Montaigne, “Au 
Lecteur,” Essais (my emphasis).  
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“casting oneself” or “thrusting oneself” into the “sorrows of solitude” (“le chagrin de 
la solitude, en laquelle il y a quelques années que je m’estoy jetté”25), would or should 
evoke something painful. The reader is thus precluded from accessing the experience, 
and the interiority of these workings.  
This non-confessional confession resonates with Montaigne’s other formal 
confessions about the monstrous births of his idle mind in De l’oisivete (“m’enfante 
tant de chimeres et monstres fantasques”26), where, as Regosin has noted, despite the 
build-up, no monsters actually appear in the essay, or anywhere in the Essais.27  
As the final chapter of this dissertation will explore, when actual monsters do 
appear, they are neutralized and their monstrosity dispelled, especially when they are 
related to the other as monstrous. When the monstrous, on the other hand, applies to 
Montaigne himself, the monstrous abounds and regains its miraculous status. And yet, 
as I will argue in this final chapter, these monsters, which Montaigne applies to 
himself, are metaphorical devices that he employs in order to evade judgment and 
avoid confession altogether and even more fully. It appears that, for Montaigne, 
confessions are highly rhetorical and selective, and they are strategized in such a way 
so as to defend experience, rather than disclose it — as the fortress of an “arrière 
boutique”28 — to the domination of external events, and from the penetrability and 
judgment of the outside.   
In his essay De l’oisivete, Montaigne confessed to being attacked by his own 
                                                
25 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 364.  
26 Montaigne, Essais, I, 8.  
27 Richard L. Regosin, Montaigne’s Unruly Brood: Textual Engendering and the Challenge to  
Paternal Authority (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 156.  
28 This term is from Montaigne’s essay De la solitude (I, XXXIX, 235); the term represents a highly 
secure and deeply interior space, which will further be discussed in Chapter 4.  
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sensations and mind, this time under the grip of his idle mind gone wild and proving 
impossible to rein in — “faisant le cheval eschappé, […] [l’esprit] m’enfante tant de 
chimeres et monstres fantasques les uns sur les autres.” The attack is staged in relation 
to his “naïve” expectation and belief in the calmness and ease (repos) that a retired life 
would offer him: “il me sembloit ne pouvoir faire plus grande faveur à mon esprit, que 
de le laisser en pleine oysiveté” […]. But as Regosin observes:  
There is something disconcerting about Montaigne’s insistence on a program of 
“chimeres et monstres fantasques,” because, in spite of all I have said about the 
grotesque and the monstrous in the Essais, the text does not literally “perform” it. 
Montaigne’s mind does not throw itself in disorder into the vague field of the 
imagination, it does not lose itself in an indefinable nowhere, nor does it produce wild 
and unfettered thoughts without order an purpose, neither here in this essay nor in the 
world as a whole.29 
 
Therefore, instead of showing us any monsters, any disorders resulting from 
the idle mind in this highly structured essay, instead of performing the thing he 
confesses, Montaigne, according to Regosin merely announces them — that they 
exist. Here, I rely on Regosin’s analysis of the double meaning of the French verb 
“monere,” the etymological origin of the “monstre,” to make a similar argument 
regarding Montaigne’s confession of melancholy. “Monere” in Old French means both 
“to show” in the literal sense, but also “to show” in the sense of a “portent” — 
something that points beyond itself to a hidden meaning, usually an omen or a divine 
sign, an understanding that is consistent with a traditional view of the monstrous.30  
Similarly to De l’oisivete, Montaigne in his confession in De l’affection des 
peres aux enfans is also just showing in the first sense. He is merely showing that he 
thrust himself into the “sorrow of solitude,” that a melancholy humor put a “resverie” 
                                                
29 Regosin, Montaigne’s Unruly Brood, 157.  
30 Ibid., 165.  
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into his head, without showing as a way of exposing any depth or hidden meaning, any 
interior experience.  
In “The Invisible woman in Montaigne’s Essays,”31 Kathleen Long argues that 
the revival of Pyrrhonian skepticism in France in the sixteenth century has influenced 
not only epistemology and the doubt cast on the possibility of knowing external 
reality, but also the psychological views of the period. The psychological phenomena, 
which were later deemed “abnormal” and sought to be managed and corrected in the 
Foucauldian sense — madness, dreams, sexuality, cross-dressing, incest, to repeat a 
few mentioned in Long’s article — were considered in the same light as ordinary 
phenomena in the early-modern view impacted by skepticism, and as such needed to 
be left as is, that is, outside of rational systems of knowledge and categories. As Long 
explains:    
Where scepticism tries to see these phenomena as existing in themselves, free of 
rational constraints, psychology tries to some extent to reconcile them with a more 
rational course of action, bringing them into a context in which they can be discussed 
and analysed. That is to say, psychological methods create a discourse around these 
phenomena, which scepticism views as extra-discursive.32  
 
Montaigne, in line with this skeptical influence, “does not see such 
[mental/psychological] disturbances as definitively correctable but as part of the 
human nature.”33 Since, as Long points out, both the psyche and the epistemic were 
influenced by and subsumed by skepticism, it makes sense to conclude that for 
Montaigne then as well, these supposedly “abnormal” psychological events are merely 
phenomena to be observed and accepted. Therefore, a “fit” of melancholy or madness, 
                                                
31 Kathleen Long, “The Invisible Woman in Montaigne’s Essais,” Montaigne Studies: An  
Interdisciplinary Forum 9, no. 1-2 (1997).  
32 Ibid., 136-137.  
33 Ibid., 136.  
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a wild and unruly imagination, would not constitute “abnormal” events for Montaigne. 
Abnormal or monstrous events that he would have felt a burning need to confess, in 
some special level of detail distinct from any other experience, nor the need for that 
matter, to provide them with deeply rooted explanations. As such, he merely shows 
them, that they are, that they took place.34  
Perhaps then, melancholy according to the initial passage is just another trope 
and image, which continues to illustrate Montaigne’s views regarding mystery, the 
monstrosity of the self, as part of a more general manifestation of his skepticism and 
inability to know. A further illustration therefore, of the need to cast doubt and reflect 
on our ability or rather inability to know others and ourselves in the way a modern 
subject would expect, but also of the plagues (monsters) of presumptions to 
knowledge that Montaigne’s own time, i.e., science, culture, custom, represented to 
him.35 
To conclude this section, we could say that perhaps melancholy, along with the 
“fantastical” monsters of the mind, do not need to be searched for in melancholy or in 
melancholizing —  in the content of the melancholic fit or soliloquy, in the 
melancholic complaint or cry, or alternatively in external deformities when it comes to 
the monstrous bodies or monstrous productions of the mind. These phenomena can be 
found instead anywhere and everywhere, since Montaigne does not in fact allocate a 
                                                
34 In any case, a “burning need to confess” is something that is entirely contrary to Montaigne’s Essais 
and the views they express. In part due to this skeptical understanding of the world, a disbelief in 
“burning matters” over others, a disbelief in what “culture” signals as crucial, or “confessable.” His 
essay, Du repentir, is a great example of the equanimity with which he views “sacred” matters.  
35 On the relation between presumption to know and the monstrous see: Kathleen Long,  
“Montaigne on Monsters and Monstrosity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Montaigne, ed. Philippe Desan,  
715-731 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). This issue will be taken up in greater detail in  
Chapter 4.  
 
  
83 
special place for them, given that they do not mean more or point to more (“portent”) 
than other phenomena.  
For this reason, as this skepticism applies to melancholy too, a “flea-bite,” a 
“minor” injury, even joy, can constitute insufferable torment. One does not need the 
category or diagnosis of madness or melancholy, in order to denote an exceptional 
happening, an exceptional phenomenon, or abnormality. Exceptionality, much like 
how it is conceived by skepticism and early-modern melancholy, depends on the 
individual and on the individual’s sensations and perceptions.   
 
III.  PASCAL’S DIVERTISSEMENT: A MELANCHOLIC BIAS  
 
 
The psychoanalytic version of diversion is often used to explain Montaigne’s 
writing project and “digressive” writing style, as a substitution for loss, emphasizing 
the death of La Boétie, and the loss of “totality” as an ideal: the text, meaning and 
subject as a “whole,” which Montaigne’s writing and project resist.  
The production of writing reveals, however, that writing does not restore the self to its 
plenitude. This is perhaps why Montaigne's project can never conclude in any 
absolute way. What the essayist comes to know in his absence to himself is that the 
self he seeks to recover always remains in some sense absent.36   
 
In Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia, “the work of mourning” presents as a 
diversion tactic in the form of a slow process of moving away from the irremediably 
lost object, and a turn towards new, substitute objects that are already “beckoning” 
the grieving subject. Moreover, this “work of mourning,” and turning away from the 
lost object, constitutes the normal reaction to loss, one that ends in time, as opposed 
                                                
36 Regosin, Montaigne's Unruly Brood, 38.  
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to the pathological reaction of melancholia, presented as an endless mourning, with 
the lost object unacknowledged and eventually internalized.37  
As Marc Shachter has noted, also against the logic of the “work of mourning,” 
when Montaigne uses the notion of “diversion” in his own writing, he employs it as a 
form of self-mastery and in order to set the terms of his own subjection, diverting 
himself from one passion (pain) to another (love).38 According to this reading, 
diversion for Montaigne is more a diversion inward than a working away from an 
object of pain or loss, highlighting Montaigne’s concern with his internal integrity, 
both in the sense of wholeness and honesty.   
Pascal’s diversion (divertissement) offers another useful contextualizing for 
Montagne’s project, again from within early-modern theories of melancholy and folly 
and away from psychoanalytic readings. Pascal’s “diversion” is not a movement away 
from “loss,” particularly not from one primary loss like the death of La Boétie, but on 
the contrary reflects a perpetual and monstrous move away from the human condition, 
defined as melancholy.  
A critical term, like folly, this notion of diversion subverts the normative order: 
life for Pascal is already melancholy, and death is but one of the “one thousand and 
one accidents” and injuries that plague humans at all times, or that remain lurking and 
                                                
37 The normative definitions of these two conditions in Freud’s text can be alluded to through mere 
differences in how long they each last, otherwise seemingly identical: …“although mourning involves 
grave departure from the normal attitude to life, it never occurs to us to regard it as a pathological 
condition and to refer it to medical treatment. We rely on its being overcome after a certain lapse of 
time, and we look upon any interference with it as useless or even harmful.” Freud, “Mourning and 
Melancholia,” 233-234.  
38  Marc Schachter, “Qu’est-ce que la critique: La Boétie, Montaigne, Foucault,” in Montaigne after 
Theory/Theory after Montaigne, ed. Zahi Zalloua, 122-141 (Seattle: University of Washington Press 
and Whitman College, 2009). 
 
  
85 
waiting to happen. And much like the universal world of folly and madness, and with 
the same rigor and rhetoric that we have seen in the previous works, he observs that, 
“all men complain: princes, subjects, nobles, commoners, old, young, strong, weak, 
learned, ignorant, healthy, sick, in every country, at every time, of all ages, and all 
conditions.”39  
Understanding Pascal’s notion of diversion requires that we first adopt his 
underlying melancholic “bias” as laid out in Chapter 1 with the analysis of 
Melancolia I. Pascal sees both the human condition as melancholy, and all human 
pursuits as folly and miserable, to which the only “healthy” reaction would be a direct 
contending and dwelling within the truth of mortality and melancholy. Pascal assumes 
that the very nature of “pursuits,” and almost any activity whatsoever, is not only a 
distraction from the truth, but also necessarily miserable in its own right, such that in 
order to understand “diversion,” one must accept these assumptions, and this 
melancholic “bias.” 
Even beyond the “hunting,” “gambling” and “billiard playing” that describe a 
majority of man’s life according to Pascal, the “esteemed” pursuits of public and 
active life are also described as a mere extension of this distracting “chase.” Men’s 
political and active life in “court or in war” are described as “dangers and troubles,” 
even “passions” are simply understood negatively as part of “quarreling,” and 
“wicked enterprises”:  
When I set to thinking about the various activities of men, the dangers and troubles 
which they face at Court, or in war, giving rise to so many quarrels and passions, 
daring and often wicked enterprises and so on.40 
                                                
39 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin Classics, 1995), X, 148, 45. 
40 Ibid., VIII, 136, 37. 
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Beneath these diversions, the human condition itself is also miserable and 
melancholy (these terms are again not used in a distinct manner): “the natural 
unhappiness of our feeble mortal condition, so wretched that nothing can console us 
when we really think about it.”41 In fact, the human condition is so miserable and 
impossible to bear, that man is willing to avoid it at all costs, including by choosing 
“the dangers of war,” which are nothing more than an “agitation that takes our mind 
off it and diverts us,”42 preferring war to peace, death to life, in this deviant “game” — 
literally playing with life. Diversion, therefore, becomes not a coping mechanism, as 
in the psychoanalytic account, but rather an evasion of truth and honesty, and therefore 
a terrible loss in its own right. Perhaps, in the end, diversion is the only loss, since it is 
the only one that is not “accidental,” and that could be overcome by facing our human 
lot for what it is.   
This understanding of diversion approaches the notion of folly, as it has been 
described in Chapter 1. Like folly, diversion sees the world as diverse and changing, 
full of accidents and losses in the plural — “the vast Ocean of folly” — of humoral 
subjects in constant flux, a world of unpredictable “flea-biting” injuries, and endless 
variations of loss and pain, thwarted in between extreme joy and torment, compared 
to the more one-dimensional, and causal world of a central loss or death described by 
Freud.  
Like folly, diversion is also a critical term, of platonic resonance, that reflects 
the worldly and deceptive existence on the “world as stage” (theatrum mundi), where 
                                                
41 Ibid., 38. 
42 Ibid. 
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all values have been reversed such that men seek value in the fleeting, while ignoring 
their nature and basic condition and moving away from it — “seeking far,” in 
Ficino’s terms.43 Similarly, Pascal contends that diversion may not provide any sense 
of pleasure or happiness, “because it comes from somewhere else, from outside; so he 
is dependent, and always liable to be disturbed by a thousand and one accidents, 
which inevitably cause distress.”44 
As a critical term, diversion, like melancholy and folly, is also a reflection of 
Pascal’s contemptus mundi, as he sees all humans as wretched, engaged in an infernal 
pursuit of vain goals, to their bitter ends. As such, Pascal’s diversion, like folly and 
melancholy, positions him as the (weeping) spectator of the world’s stage, with all its 
follies and faults, and as a Jaques, who sees the truth and the “cure,” and is desperate 
to speak his mind (“to blow on whomever he pleases”).  
Finally, much like folly, diversion also provides a subversive social critique by 
pointing out that what we esteem to be of most value is most corrupt, in direct parallel 
with the “quid pro quo” logic of inversion: “Men spend their time chasing a ball or a 
hare; it is the very sport of kings.”45 For Pascal, with this critical vision, the king, as 
the one purporting to be most in control and have the most power, becomes the 
greatest fool, since folly is found to exist in direct relation to those who are most 
presumptuous, and therefore most self-deceptive about their human condition, 
understood as limitation, vulnerability, and essentially — melancholy.  
The early-modern critique of folly is part of a longer tradition of memento 
                                                
43 From Ficino, and quoted in Chapter 1: “Oh fools! Oh wretches!” […] “Why do you seek treasure far 
away, when it is nearby, indeed within yourselves?” Ficino, “Meditation 21”, 34-35. 
44 Pascal, Pensées, VIII, 136, 37. 
45 Ibid., II, 39, 8.  
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mori, discussed in relation to the Fool’s Cap Map in Chapter 1. One of its famous 
medieval iterations, in the genre of the dance macabre, whereby dead and skeletal 
figures would take prominent figures like kings, generals, and popes, and dance 
around the graves with them, is an excellent illustration of how folly and diversion 
similarly aim to take down the mighty, or at least “remind” them (memento) of their 
human condition (mori). 
In this reversal of values, power and even, or especially royalty — the 
“normative” symbols of the king — are measured inversely, as the ability to sustain 
boredom and melancholy, and as the ability to sustain solitude and quiet, completely 
devoid of diversions. A repeated metaphor for this state of (subversive) power in 
Pascal, is the ability to remain alone in one’s town, house, and room, and not engage 
in any pursuits, nor in any conversation or commerce: “all of humanity’s problems 
stem from man's inability to sit quietly in a room alone.”46 This is something the king 
has no practice with, and will therefore become the most wretched if he were not at 
all times distracted:  
he is bound to start thinking of all the threats facing him, of possible revolts, finally of 
inescapable death and disease, with the result that if he is deprived of so-called 
diversion he is unhappy, indeed more unhappy than the humblest of his subjects who 
can enjoy sport and diversion.47 
 
Since the behaviors of diversion and folly are by definition uncritical 
behaviors, when presented from the distant spectator’s view of the melancholic: 
Pascal, Montaigne, Ficino, Burton, Dürer, they are also presented, in their liminality, 
as dangerous.  
                                                
46 Ibid., 37.  
47 Ibid., VIII, 136, 38.  
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This danger is central, particularly to Montaigne, since in the absence of self-
mastery, one is left to abide by norms or custom, which, for Montaigne, as well as for 
Pascal, and the other authors I am exploring, are at the source of cruelty, ignorance, 
and other social ills. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, norms and customs are 
at the source of the utter loss, of the waste of the self, of an honest life in Montaigne, 
of the soul in Ficino, or of salvation in Pascal, which are all related terms in the 
context of my argument. These norms either enslave us or kill us, whether literally 
through tyranny and war, or by losing the chance at an honest life, with a variety of 
costs that will be explored in much greater detail in Chapter 3, through the notions of 
avarice and waste.  
In De la solitude, Montaigne’s discussion of the false orientation and absurdity 
of human concerns towards what is external to them, is illustrated through a depiction 
of a miserable scene of battle carried out “for the sake of a man whom perhaps they 
never saw, who is not in the least concerned about their doings and who at that very 
moment is plunged in idleness and pleasures.”48 A closely related passage from Pascal 
reads similarly about the dangers of custom and the tyranny of external rule giving 
war as an example:  
Larceny, incest, infanticide, parricide, everything has at some time been accounted a 
virtuous action. Could there be anything more absurd than that a man has the right to 
kill me because he lives on the other side of the water, and his prince has picked a 
quarrel with mine, though I have none with him?49  
 
Moreover, even war itself, as an earlier quote suggested — “the dangers and 
troubles of war” — is a mere diversion and not a goal in its own right, provided that it 
                                                
48 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, I, 39, 177.  
49 Pascal, Pensées, III, 60, 16.  
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allows us to avoid our own melancholy human condition by providing “the agitation 
that takes our mind off it and diverts us,”50 from which we can derive the subversive 
conclusion: men go to war in order to avoid melancholy.  
The “finer and higher” satisfactions that sublimation offers in the form of 
cultural achievements as described by Freud in Civilization and its Discontents,51 are 
the very same which for Pascal, and to a great extent for Montaigne as well, 
encourage and reward masquerading, competitiveness, pride and manipulation on the 
human stage of folly as they see it.  
For both Pascal and Montaigne, these pursuits and achievements, these 
externalized sublimated desires, constitute dangerous diversions away from the true 
condition according to humanist values of honesty that involve a turn inward. 
Therefore the question of “how to live” is the “wager” with the highest stakes. In this 
regards, there is a deep connection between Pascal’s metaphors for diversion as 
“gambling” (Pascal’s wager), “hunting” and “chasing,” and the binary of 
avarice/waste, which will be central to my readings of Montaigne in chapters 3 and 4.  
One of Ficino’s notable descriptions of melancholy is its analogy to the Earth, 
and its earth-like qualities, such as being “immovable at the center,” “heavy,” “cold” 
and “dry.”52 In resonance with this understanding of melancholy, Pascal challenges 
humanity to reside at this earthly and heavy “center” — to dwell, as melancholy 
                                                
50 Ibid., VIII, 136, 38.  
51 “A satisfaction of this kind, such as an artist’s joy in creating, in giving his phantasies body, or a  
scientist’s in solving problems or discovering truths, has a special quality which we shall certainly one  
day be able to characterize in metapsychological terms. At present we can only say figuratively that  
such satisfactions seem ‘finer and higher.’” Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, Reprint  
ed., ed./trans. James Starchey (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010), II, 3, 731.    
52 Ficino, Three Books on Life, 114.  
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dwells — as the wiser “gamble.” Taking a “gamble” on “dwelling” or on melancholy, 
offers a chance at the salvation of the self and soul, as a radical alternative to all the 
“noise” and “distractions,” which guarantee a removal from ourselves, and are for this 
reason nothing but a necessarily lost gamble.  
Finally, Pascal’s vision, as quoted earlier, of “sitting quietly in a room alone,” 
reflects a melancholy vision of a certain “nascent” and “naïve” scene, in resonance 
with the “room” in which Dürer’s Melancholia figure sits: an “undecided” abstract or 
symbolic room or location, where all perspective, order, norms, and also distractions, 
are lacking.  
 
 
IV.  READING PASCAL: A MODEL FOR READING MONTAIGNE’S ESSAIS 
 
 
This parallel between Pascal’s vision and that of Melancolia I, however, also 
simultaneously invokes the notion of the subjective distortion or bias of the 
melancholic gaze or perspective, as has been discussed. Therefore, despite the 
universal claim regarding the human condition, and its melancholy, Pascal’s notion of 
diversion unravels Pascal’s own views, and, I argue, subjective opinions, regarding 
the human condition and what should be its central occupation. For diversion would 
assume a truth that human kind is looking away from and avoiding, whether it merely 
pretends to ignore it or mask it, or whether it has truly lost touch with its origins by 
force of those diversions.  
Montaigne, as critics have often addressed, exiles himself from social and 
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public life in order to find tranquility and freedom, according to classic principles of 
stoic self-possession and ataraxia (tranquility). But for a melancholic, diversion as 
the “world as stage” upon which everyone (else) is a player, can be felt in a more 
acute and painful way. Externalized, worldly existence, can more acutely hurt the 
melancholic’s specific sense of freedom,53 and therefore externalized existence is 
perceived and represented by melancholy as diversion and theatricality, whereby 
diversion is constructed as a melancholy-laden term in this derogatory and false 
sense.  
For Pascal, and by implication for Montaigne as well, the opposition between a 
“truth” as one sees it, and “dissimulation” as that which others are performing, is 
necessarily subjective and an indication of a melancholic viewpoint. In this regards, 
we may think of the viewpoint of Melancolia I as both a perspective and a destruction 
of another perspective — that of order, linearity and use, and yet it is still itself a 
perspective.  
Pascal’s obsessive need to never be diverted and always remember the 
“wretchedness” of the human condition, with the radical view that each and every 
diversion masks a hideous human truth, is further clarified by understanding the 
paradoxical nature of memento mori (“remember you must die”), the philosophical 
and practical theory to remember mortality and reflect on it.  
                                                
53 I take this idea from Barthes in his Journal de deuil, where he details and observes his grief. Barthes  
notes that the typical advice to distract yourself, to “get out there,” is harmful in relation to deep grief,  
and aggravates the pain, against which solitude can in fact be a kind of remedy: “M. et moi eprouvons  
que paradoxalement (puisque d’ordinaire, on dit: Travaillez, distrayez-vous, voyez du monde), c’est 
lorsque nous sommes bousculés, affairés, sollicités, exteriorisés, que nous avons le plus de chagrin.  
L’interiorité, le calme, la solitude le rendent moins douloureux.” Roland Barthes, Journal de deuil,  
Seuil ed. (Paris: Seuil/Imec, 2009), 110.  
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Robert Smith, in an article about Pascal’s relationship with the philosophical 
idea of memento mori, points to the paradoxality of how this notion plays out in his 
work. Since the imperative to remember mortality suggests that it can be forgotten, 
from whence is derived the role of the remembrance as ritual or practice to begin with. 
Pascal, on the other hand “rankles at the indifference of those who do not ruminate 
upon it,” finding it “monstrous” and “not natural” that humans could neglect their very 
own condition, not fearing their mortality and suffering while at the same time 
worrying deeply about worldly affairs and losses that are so minor in comparison with 
this death and eternity.54 
In light of death, any other form of worrying is folly for Pascal. We see here a 
similar logic to the dynamic discussed between melancholy and folly in Chapter 1: 
that there is also a certain folly to melancholy, especially when presented alongside 
such a vast and varied list of worrying and woe-ing. Pascal, similarly, converts 
melancholy into folly in order to present the “correct” melancholy as truth — only the 
melancholy of the human condition is properly melancholy, while the myriad forms of 
“mundane” melancholic experiences should be entirely dismissed:  
[…] the same man who spends so many days and nights in rage and despair over the 
loss of some office or over some imaginary affront to his honor is the very one who, 
without anxiety or emotion, knows he is going to lose everything through death.55  
 
 The “loss of some office” is not a worthy source of melancholy, and must 
always be contextualized against mortality against which it becomes mere folly. The 
notion of “some imaginary affront to his honor,” further suggests Pascal’s need to 
                                                
54 Robert Smith, “Memento Mori,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 3, no. 3 (June  
1998): 47-48. 
55 Pascal quoted in Smith, “Memento Mori,” 160.  
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downplay human affairs and human feelings in their current form, in order to assert his 
horrific image of a looming death.  
All this melancholy revealed in Pascal’s reasoning, his stylistics, his sentence 
structures, as well as his own digressions in narrative, further emphasize his 
melancholy “bias,” as he repeatedly claims with as much vigor as the damnation he 
believes in, that “all our pleasures are simple vanity, that our afflictions are infinite, 
and lastly that death, which threatens us at every moment, must in a few years 
infallibly present us with the appalling necessity of being either annihilated or 
wretched for all eternity” […] “nothing is so important to man as his condition. 
Nothing is so frightening to him as eternity.”56 
This extreme language of annihilation of all of human behavior, at all times, 
including all human pleasures, as Pascal sees it, the variations of which I have 
highlighted above, evokes the all-encompassing annihilating vision of 
melancholy/folly from Chapter 1, with the similar tone of rigor and anger we have 
seen for example in Brant, revealing Pascal’s own anger and frustration.  
We can even hear the opposition between the extremes of “high” and “low” 
characteristic of the melancholic subject featured in Burton’s poem: “None so sweet”/ 
“None so damn’d”… “Nothing so important/Nothing so frightening,” reflected here. 
Both in how he feels, as well as in what he thinks — his subjective assessments: 
“simple vanity”/”appalling necessity.” In other words, Pascal is also enveloping the 
tensions of “melancholy man” within himself.  
As I have also noted in Chapter 1, through Burton’s various social critiques, 
                                                
56 Ibid.  
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positions of melancholy and folly are subjective and elaborate representations of the 
world, that depend on narrative, imagery, representation, and so on, and are not 
expressions of empty statements and clichés, of which Jaques is accused. Like 
Montaigne and Burton, Pascal too is representing the world as folly and melancholy 
through this extreme usage of language, through these oppositions, and by concealing 
any moderate or alternative options in universalist, truth-ringing statements.  
As Burton has portrayed the folly of study by digressing to describe the folly 
of the schoolmaster, whose violence resulted in preventing those children “a single 
hour of pleasure anytime after in their entire lifetime”… “their poore children are so 
disheartened and cowed, that they never after have any courage, a merry houre in their 
lives, or take pleasure in any thing,” so Pascal is representing an image of the world as 
a death sentence waiting to happen, while everyone is nonchalantly playing outside, 
and busy hunting. Therefore, pleasure too must be represented as mere folly and 
something that will soon lead to tragedy, annihilating any possibility that humans are 
in fact experiencing pleasure.    
Furthermore, Pascal’s narrative in his Diversion fragments also reveals 
melancholic digressions or slips in narrative that expose his melancholic thinking, the 
kind that I will reveal in Montaigne’s narrative on a much larger scale in the 
following chapter. For instance, when Pascal pauses to provide an example of the 
human reliance on diversion for the sake of feeling happiness, the example he 
provides is no less than that of a man “who lost his only son a few months ago.” Who, 
therefore, as his narrative continues to slip into his melancholic “bias,” when he is 
met with lawsuits and quarrels became “less troubled and oppressed” because these 
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distractions made him simply “not think about it any more.” “All his attention,” 
Pascal writes, is focused on following his dogs in their hunt for the boars, concluding 
that: “that is all he needs.”57  
The simplicity with which Pascal presents grief and loss here, easily remedied 
by a hunting game, compared with the emotional strength and power which he 
attributes to mortality and the human condition, is a clear indication of the 
melancholic thinking that underlie his arguments, and his own melancholic biases.  
Far from staining or dismissing Pascal’s theories, however, these findings 
structure them and shed new light on them, as well as on our understanding of 
melancholy and its surrounding discourses, such as happiness, the human condition, 
and the important dynamic between singular and universal truths and views.  
This brief reading of Pascal through a melancholic and not a “neutral,” 
“philosophical” lens, is meant to provide an example of sites where melancholy can 
provide a useful literary tool for filling in gaps in narrative in new ways, particularly 
of philosophically oriented texts where those gaps appear less “inviting,” and where 
the universal and objective style deter subjective readings of the text and authors.  
While Pascal’s text does not reflect his melancholic state, his own sorrows and 
lamentations, the text itself reveals melancholy as a structuring view of the world 
(Dürer’s “perspective”). For example, the extreme and binary oppositions in 
expressions and thought, annihilating views of the world as it is (contemptus mundi), 
particularly “dark” digressions, strikingly negative choices and examples, and other 
melancholic perceptions of the world, some of which were discussed at length in 
                                                
57 Pascal, Pensées, VIII, 136, 41. 
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Chapter 1.   
Reading melancholy as a perspective or viewpoint adds subjective weight to 
his “philosophy,” allowing subjectivity to be uncovered through “philosophy,” and 
allowing the two to overlap in a way that philosophy does not rank higher than 
subjectivity and, at the same time, does not rank higher than melancholy either.  
Pascal’s “objective” or explicit philosophy, regarding the human condition and 
death, ends up being a form of rhetoric and representation through which his 
subjective, melancholic biases are conveyed, forming a “subjective philosophy” (i.e., 
a subjectivity) from under the guise of an “objective philosophy.” For example, the 
“subjective philosophy” in this reading of Pascal is that the term “diversion” is not 
what all humans do — the objective form — but how a melancholic position views 
what other human beings are doing.  
This type of reading reveals these relativities, and allows us to think of the 
binaries of happiness/unhappiness, or sadness/pleasure freed from their seemingly 
universal status and claims, such that we can also free the subject from a “pre-
defined” relationship to the world. For example, that “happiness” means to express 
certain views or feelings, or that expressing negative feelings means you are unhappy, 
as the discussion of Ahmed’s work has touched on. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
WHY MONTAIGNE RUSHES EVERYONE OFF TO BED: 
IMAGES AT THE LIMIT IN DE L’AFFECTION DES PERES AUX ENFANS 
 
What is good in Montaigne can only be acquired with difficulty. 
 
PLAISE PASCAL1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Montaigne’s unique writing style has received much attention in Montaigne 
studies, from a wide range of perspectives, noting the fragmentary, heterogeneous and 
divergent qualities of the Essais. These observations often follow Montaigne’s own 
many self-avowals of his “stile et esprit vagabonds,” his “evasive” subject matter [“il 
va trouble et chancelant”2], his work as “patchwork”, and finally his “deformed” and 
“monstrous” writing. Indeed his writing style has been linked to the workings of the 
“fortuitous” nature of the mind and the imagination (his “esprit vagabond”), to the 
sublimation of loss in discourse and writing that therefore resists unity, to diversion 
from loss. Finally, it has been ascribed to the humanist genre and education practices 
of Montaigne’s own time period, the “commonplace-book”: collections of fragments 
and quotes under a single heading/title, as a form of rereading and reusing ancient 
models (“exemplarity”) for contemporary use (the “exempla”).3  
The essay De l’affection des peres aux enfans is no exception to this tangential 
divergence between essay title and essay, between various topics, anecdotes and 
examples. In fact, as I will discuss, this essay on “the affections of fathers” shows not 
                                                
1 Pascal, Pensées, XXV, 649, 212. 
2 Montaigne, Essais, III, II.  
3 Ann Moss, “‘De l’amitié’ (Essais 1.28): ‘Luy’ and ‘Moy,’” in Distant Voices Still Heard:  
Contemporary Readings of French, ed. John O’Brien and Malcolm Quainton, 185-201 (Liverpool:  
Liverpool University Press, 2000).. 
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a single example of a positive fatherly affection or fatherhood, but rather only 
disaffections, parricide, infanticide, theft, avarice, and folly.  The fathers of the essay 
are “broken and half-alive” (“cassé, et demy-mort”)4, they “bite and slap” in their old 
age. While blood has already ceased to run through their veins, they hold on to a 
tyrannical and threatening façade, “ces mines fieres et tyranniques d’un homme qui 
n’a plus de sang ny au coeur, ny aux veines,”5 (“these fierce and tyrannical looks from 
men who have no blood left in either heart or veins”)6, and are nothing but “mere 
scarecrows” (“vrais espouvantails de cheneviere”)7. Montaigne has already “buried 
them alive,” in order to prove his point, through a highly structured affective 
“aversion,” through indictments and contemptus mundi, rather than through the 
“diversion” of a wide range of loosely related topics.  
The structure that the early-modern “exempla” and humanist genre provide to 
the fragmentation and heterogeneity of the essay will be the most relevant one to the 
melancholy reading of the essay.  
While Ann Moss explains how this fragmentary and heterogeneous writing 
style of the humanist “commonplace-book” genre allows Montaigne and his 
contemporaries to “assemble themselves from scattered parts of dead men’s speech,” 
referring to the ancient examples and quotes collected under “title headings,” her 
notion of “establishing subjectivity” again relies on psychoanalysis to contextualize 
this in terms of a “universal” subject “bereft of an ideal,” having to constitute himself 
through the ruptured and already fragmentary nature of language: “How indeed is the 
                                                
4 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 367.  
5 Ibid., 373. 
6 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, 8, 285.  
7 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 373.  
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subject to be constituted? Our near contemporary, Lacan, would reply: by language as 
such a chain of signifiers, ‘in a manner always disjointed and intermitted.’”8  
Beyond this psychoanalytic dynamic that focuses on a structural rupture or 
loss, of ideals, of authority, of meaning, which ends up emphasizing the formal side of 
Montaigne’s writing — the fragmentary as form, the ruptured writing style — the 
present reading of Montaigne as a melancholy subject, with a melancholy viewpoint 
(perspective), enables us to focus instead on the singular and unique content/matter of 
Montaigne’s writing.  
Rather than continue to marvel at the fragmentary, as if we were marveling at 
the distorted perspective and distorted gaze in Melancolia I, which only continues to 
perpetuate it as deviant, we may turn our gaze away from the “impairment” — the 
“impaired” gaze in Pot’s language9 — and towards the world that has been distorted, 
and yet constructed by this “pathological” gaze. Thereby sharing in the world seen or 
envisioned by that gaze instead.  
This gazing beyond the fact of the distorted gaze, would involve seeing and 
sharing in Montaigne’s harsh indictments on the world and human behavior, as the 
above descriptions of fathers indicate, the folly and melancholy of the world, his firm 
positions and values, his own vehement passions, the many liminal and morbid 
images, a persistent and haunting occupation with death — the many vanitas and 
memento mori that flood his writing. 
The following quote from the essay gives us a taste of the Montaignian typical 
                                                
8 Moss, 198. 
9 Pot, L’inquiétante étrangeté, 10. 
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digressions, which I will argue, do not reveal the rupture of ideals and wholeness, but 
in terms of content, reveal his liminal and morbid thinking, and his “biased” 
melancholic viewpoint and fears. Looking elsewhere, gazing into an empty distance, 
as we observe in Dürer’s Melancolia I, away and beyond the topic of the “affections 
of fathers,” towards a horizon of emptiness and death, but which is nonetheless full, 
significant and signifying, and rich with its own order:   
“Voulons nous estre aimez de nos enfans? leur voulons nous oster l’occasion de 
souhaiter nostre mort?”10,11 
 
Do we want our children to love us?  Do we want to take away from them the 
occasion for desiring our death?12 
 
Montaigne is asking something quite preposterous and even outrageous: do we 
want to prevent our children from wanting us dead? But isn’t it obvious that we do not 
wish for this? And does it not require extreme thinking and a skewed view, in the 
direction of something very morbid and melancholic, to even be able to conceive of 
such a formula, even if it is a rhetorical one, and particularly when the essay topic is 
“the affections of fathers”?  
These liminal, and “skewed” melancholic perspectives, which constitute the 
diverse digressions in his writing, are everywhere in the essay and provide it with a 
highly hermetic structure. Of the multitude of possible “examples” of fathers, 
Montaigne choses the most liminal father figures — the miserly, withholding fathers, 
who, to take these figures the furthest, are in a deteriorated state and on the brink of 
                                                
10 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 369. 
11 In his final edition, Montaigne retracts a bit, providing his awareness to the absurdity of the question, 
and condoning any such violence. In parenthesis adding, “Combien que nulle occasion d’un si horrible 
souhait peut estre ny juste, ny excusable.”  
12 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, 8, 282.  
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death. Furthermore, as I will show, the distracted gaze into the far horizons that extend 
beyond the topic at hand will often be looking at or into death, as the most distant and 
liminal focal point, that Montaigne brings closest to him, and to us.   
Through these liminal figures — the far edges of the distracted gaze — I argue 
that Montaigne’s subjective and personal fears and sorrows come to light, 
simultaneously revealing his powerful social critiques and values, which only his 
melancholy makes possible. Through the miserly fathers, Montaigne’s critique and 
values are carried by virtue of aversion, a form of looking away or elsewhere, — what 
not to do, how not to behave, in order to persuade, in the most hyperbolic way of the 
opposite: generosity, honesty. These values in turn, are also idealized to a practically 
inhuman and nonsensical way, by which they too become liminal images and define 
the opposite edges of the same melancholic/distracted horizon.   
The primary binaries produced by the miserly father are avarice/generosity, 
holding on/letting go, performativity/honesty, tyranny/love, withholding/revealing, 
values which are pertinent to Montaigne’s “philosophy” but are often read only when 
Montaigne discusses them explicitly, as positions he holds, and not as coming to light 
through a melancholic viewpoint and internal state, through his fears, obsessions, or 
sadness. 
Death, as the edge of the “normative” focal point, is brought most closely to 
the center, running through almost each and every image or value, or rather dictating 
what and how all other topics will come into view. Or, as the metaphorical expression 
that occasionally flickers through the essay goes: “taking one’s leave”, “stripping 
down” and “going to bed.” An expression Montaigne reverses from its common 
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proverbial form, into its most subjective, singular form: a private use of language and 
norms, which will be further explored towards the end of this chapter.   
The liminal father figures on the threshold between life and death allow 
Montaigne to attain thoughts about death and evoke his (obsessive) memento mori 
throughout the essay, such that the essay practically digresses into his other essay 
explicitly dedicated to dying: Que philosopher c’est apprendre a mourir.  
 
I.  THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOLLY  
 
 
As Ann Hartle has pointed out in Michel de Montaigne: Accidental 
Philosopher, Montaigne reverses philosophy on its head, and in this process becomes 
an entirely original philosopher — a singular philosopher. 13,14 This process of reversal 
is akin to the singular “exempla” drawn from rereading, reworking, and rejecting of 
ancient models of “exemplarity” as universal rules to follow, in attunement with 
singular and diverse experiences instead.  
I further tie this notion of the “singular philosopher” with the theory I have 
been expanding upon, that early-modern subjectivity as a singularity most manifested 
in melancholy, and philosophy, are not mutually exclusive, and that melancholy 
constitutes a complete viewpoint of subjectivity, and hence a philosophy. Since I have 
explored melancholy in terms of a paradigmatic subjectivity, in its idiosyncratic 
distortion, point of view, ordering of the world, and also internal sensations that are 
                                                
13 Ann Hartle, Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
14 Hartle uses the term “accidental philosopher” but in the sense of “singular” which is less confusing in 
the context of my argument.  
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not reality-dependent, philosophy becomes a natural extension of melancholy as the 
world can no longer be viewed and organized separately from sensations and internal 
states.  
This point is further elucidated in contrast to the subject of the Enlightenment, 
a “universal subject,” who can supposedly access agreement and shared realities with 
others. A relative objectivity due not only due to the self-grounding nature of reason, 
but also due to a perceived proximity between objects, and internal ideas or 
sensations; a much later incarnation perhaps of the Aristotelian view of man as a 
“rational animal,” with which this essay strongly disputes.  
The following reading of De l’affection des peres aux enfans is a case in point 
on how the singular subject, the melancholic, who draws from his experiences, 
sensations and perspectives, which as I will show are “folly” and “melancholy” 
through and through, is at the very same time a philosopher. And, conversely, how the 
“singular philosopher,” by reversing philosophy and morals on their head, is in turn 
the melancholic subject. This reading will simultaneously expose folly and 
melancholy, both of the world and of the author, and a “singular philosophy” imbued 
with melancholy views. Or vice versa: a melancholy singularity imbued with a 
universal philosophy.  
Montaigne frames his essay with a seemingly classic, philosophical debate 
between the powers of nature and those of reason, a theme that repeats often in his 
writing. Nature commands all animals to love their own, according to the law of the 
“begetter loves the begotten,” an extension of the law of self-preservation and self-
love, which will later in the essay become crucial to the folly of the miserly father.  
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S'il y a quelque loy vrayement naturelle, c'est à dire quelque instinct […] qu'apres le 
soing que chasque animal a de sa conservation et de fuir ce qui nuit, l'affection que 
l'engendrant porte à son engeance, tient le second lieu en ce rang.15  
 
[If there is any truly natural law, that is to say any instinct […] after the care every 
animal has for its own preservation and for its own preservation and the avoidance of 
what is harmful, the affection that the begetter has for his begotten ranks second.]16 
 
To this Aristotelian principle, Montaigne mixes in another, contradictory 
universal principle, in order to “make it his own,” 17  his own singular mix, 
demonstrating the “crisis of exemplarity” and its relevance to Montaigne’s singularity. 
To this law of nature Montaigne adds the law of reason, so that two contradictory and 
yet universal principles are now acting upon each other. If the nature argument placed 
humans as “animals,” the law of reason now places humans above nature with the 
more godly capacity of “reason,” and the “voluntary liberty,” to not be “slaves to 
nature” [“carried away tyrannically by her”]:  
Puis qu'il a pleu à Dieu nous doüer de quelque capacité de discours, affin que comme 
les bestes, nous ne fussions pas servilement assubjectis aux lois communes, ains que 
nous nous y appliquassions par jugement et liberté volontaire, nous devons bien 
prester un peu à la simple authorité de nature, mais non pas nous laisser 
tyranniquement emporter à elle ; la seule raison doit avoir la conduite de nos 
inclinations.18 
 
[Since it has pleased God to give us some capacity for reason, so that we should not 
be, like the animals, slavishly subjected to the common laws, but should apply 
ourselves to them by judgment and voluntary liberty, we must indeed yield a little to 
the simple authority of Nature, but not let ourselves be carried away tyrannically by 
her: reason alone must guide our inclinations.]19 
 
After superimposing one universal law upon another, it is as if Montaigne has 
mixed them together, creating a subtle combination of both rules that replaces both 
                                                
15 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 365.  
16 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, 8, 279. 
17 See Moss, 198, on the ‘commonplace-book’ as a common humanist form of reading and learning, 
where through fragmented quotes and examples through the subject of Montaigne’s time would 
“assemble [himself] from scattered parts of dead men’s speech collected in ordered places.” 
18 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 366. 
19 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, 8, 279. 
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laws in a kind of “ideal balance” — “nous devons bien prester un peu à la simple 
authorité de nature: mais non pas nous tyranniquement emporter à elle.” And yet, this 
proves to have been deceptive, as Montaigne concludes in another contradiction that 
only the rule of reason should guide us: “la seule raison doit avoir la conduite de nos 
inclinations.” At this point, after these various combinations and mixtures, a general 
confusion has been cast on what rule or even what combination of rules should be 
followed.  
After reversing philosophy on its head with these “singular” mixtures and 
borrowings, Montaigne essentially pits philosophy, with its universal rules, against 
itself, thus getting it out of the way and clearing the way for his primary concern and 
interest — the human stage of folly as he sees it. In the world of folly and human 
nature outside of philosophical discourses, rule following in general, whether of 
reason or of nature or of their mixture, is a philosophical fiction (and presumption).20  
If “rule following,” or “principles,” in Aristotelian language, are found 
amongst the chaotic and diverse folly of the world in its actual state, it is performative 
and inauthentic, which is yet another folly. Custom is Montaigne’s prime rule that 
humans can in fact be found to follow, behaving according to norms and beliefs that 
are precisely not “processed” and “assembled” on a singular basis (like the exempla), 
and therefore custom is a blind and dangerous force in its own right, as discussed in 
                                                
20 This argument interestingly resonates with the argument Erasmus makes in The Praise of Folly, that 
philosophy as the sciences of logic and reason (“the enemies of he human race”), and the notion that 
man was granted with reason, are responsible for creating the fiction of folly as if folly were a 
divergence from man’s natural condition: “In fact, a horse ignorant of grammar is not wretched for that 
reason, and no more is a foolish man automatically unhappy, because these conditions belong to their 
nature.” Desiderius Erasmus, The Praise of Folly, trans. Robert M. Adams (New York: Norton & 
Company, 1989), 32-33. But as I will show, Montaigne’s take on folly will be different, and much more 
“subjective.”  
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the section on Pascal in Chapter 2. In this essay, the “customs” that the miserly fathers 
follow are the ones that dictate their withholding. Not letting go of what allegedly is 
keeping them safe —- savings, money, pride, force — turns out to be a social and 
manipulated form of self-preservation: ruling by force and tyranny rather than through 
love due to existing conventions of fatherhood and child rearing.  
Folly takes the last rein over philosophy and its pretense for a universal and 
rational human, as fathers are first introduced in their violation of both the law of 
nature and the law of reason. While man was initially here compared to beast and then 
in a second move raised to a more godly level by virtue of “reason,” the folly of 
fathers takes them back to a state below that of beasts in a third move that demolishes 
the debate altogether, thereby demonstrating the annihilating impact of melancholic 
reasoning, the destructive and not merely distracted gaze. 
Contrary to beasts who take care of their own, humans are all too excited and 
moved by the “games and tricks” of their newborns, “des trepignemens, jeux et 
niaiseries pueriles de noz enfans,”21 while withholding care and love as these babies 
become older and actually require it for their own survival.  
What we have here then is a complete manifestation of the quid pro quo by 
folly explored in Chapter 1. That is, applying love and care to the things that are the 
furthest from the proper of human life: power over others instead of power over self, 
personal wealth over internal wealth, love of power versus love of children, caring for 
children when they are still like “monkeys” rather than when they are “men,” and 
perhaps even favoring survival in terms of quantity, over quality, as these poor fathers 
                                                
21 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII 366. 
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illustrate, and finally, of course, caring for these at the expense of happiness, or a 
“good life.” 
The fathers of the essay sink below the level of beasts when these meaningless 
“diversions” of “babyish tricks” in Pascal’s sense, constitute the only form of fatherly 
love which furthermore evaporates once these “pet monkeys” become more adult and 
“more human.” Diversion becomes tragic, or rather melancholic, when, in contrast, the 
“true” needs, and true or necessary forms of love and support are withheld and 
neglected. The folly-tragedy here is that it is as if parents only loved their children as a 
“pastime” and as a diversion, before they are “human,” and that tragically — the more 
“human” they become, the less they love them and give to them.  
… comme si nous les avions aymez pour nostre passetemps, comme des guenons, non 
comme des hommes.22 
 
[… as if we had loved them for our pastime, like monkeys, not like men.]23 
 
Montaigne’s own (rhetorical) “confessions” that he will not stand for these 
“soulless” newborns to be nursed and cuddled in his proximity, add another dimension 
of folly. As he confesses not being able to relate at all to this human diversion and 
adoration for tricks, pet-monkeys and cuddly babies, he also distances himself from 
this “world as theater,” and positions himself as its spectator, and the spectator of its 
madness, as a Democritus who finds it laughable.  
As previously discussed, in his essay De Democrite et Heractlites, Montaigne 
admits his preference for the laughter of Democritus to the weeping of Heraclitus as it 
is more “condemning” of human nature, and more devoid of compassion for it. 
                                                
22 Ibid., 366. 
23 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, 8, 280.  
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Despite this admission, we now see how his passionate disaffections and aversions, his 
contemptus mundi, and his more adamant refusal to be participate in world affairs, also 
shed a more weighty and lamenting melancholic light on him, making him more 
resemble Heraclitus, or at least both figures. Even beyond this, as someone who 
cannot stand the trivialities of human behavior, and who also conveys a sense of anger 
and desperation to “cure the world” of its “disease,” he bears a resemblance even with 
the melancholic position illustrated through Jaques, and certainly with Pascal’s.  
The ruins of the nature/reason debate continue to remain in the background so 
as to enhance the folly of fathers who continually violate both principles. They love in 
a more bestial way (“babyish tricks”), but they also love less than beasts because they 
withdraw their love when these babies become “human” and when their Nature settles 
in.  
The figure of the miserly father carries the weight of the folly of fathers in the 
essay, to fully display this violation and hence folly/tragedy. With the ruins of the 
nature/reason argument still as the frame, the father as the generator, the begetter, 
becomes close-fisted (restrain), and miserly (espargnan), thereby destroying his own 
creation, and according to that law of nature, even himself. In an even greater folly (a 
suicidal behavior?), he also ends up violating the most fundamental law of self-
preservation, since self-preservation was the foundation upon which the care for the 
“begotten” was founded.  
The father’s miserliness, and folly, is that he seeks self-preservation at the cost 
of his child’s life by withholding any “expenditures” of wealth, affection, guidance, 
but also later as we will see, honesty, friendship, communication. In a sense, the 
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miserly father withholds generosity itself. In this economy of the miserly father, by not 
spending anything, he is the most wasteful: literally wasting away the lives of his 
children, and as we will see later, even his own life. Ultimately, this will be the 
greatest tragedy the essay builds up to implicitly, up and against the explicit logic of 
giving to one’s children. 
While the “broken and half-dead” father (“cassé, et demy-mort”) sits alone in a 
corner of his house enjoying all his assets and success to himself, “jouysse seul à un 
coing du foyer,”24 his children are out cold in the world, desperately seeking another 
way to provide for themselves, turning, as a result, to crime and theft in another 
extreme and liminal representation of folly. To paint the folly of the miserly father in 
the most extreme and dangerous light, Montaigne claims to have met many such 
young men that have even become addicted to theft as a result of the miserliness of 
their fathers, and were bound to forever live as criminals… “si addonnez au larcin”… 
“que nulle correction les en pouvoit destourner.” This again echoes Burton and 
Pascal’s extreme language and imagery for the sake of persuading the dangers and 
critique of folly: 
Comme j’ay veu de mon temps plusieurs jeunes hommes de bonne maison, si adonnez 
au larcin, que nulle correction les en pouvoit détourner. […] par la rigueur et avarice 
de son pere25 
 
As I have seen in my time several young men of good family so addicted to stealing 
that no correction could turn them from it. […] by the rigor and avarice of his father26 
 
From a slightly different angle, the non-linearity (non-causal relation) of early-
modern melancholy and melancholic thinking would allow Montaigne to suggest that 
                                                
24 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 367. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, 8, 280.  
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any given behavior or event, in this case fatherly avarice, can bring about any level of 
torment, any passion or behavior, in this case — addiction to theft without correction.  
This is due to the mysterious and uniquely interior processing and perceptions of the 
early-modern subject, for whom what might be a “flea-bighting” injury, would cause 
“insufferable torment” to another. 
Beyond the folly of violating the natural law of “begetter loves the begotten,” 
ruining his own creation as these liminal images depict eventually ruining and killing 
himself according to the same law, the miserly father’s greatest folly stems from the 
fact that he is not even alive: his Nature has already run its course, “ces mines fieres et 
tyranniques, d’un homme qui n’a plus de sang, ny au coeur, ny aux veines.” Therefore, 
he stays alive on “borrowed time,” himself a thief of life, a life that should be handed 
over to his children from whom he is now stealing.  
All these follies lead the way to Montaigne’s greatest concern and obsession 
with death. The miserly father’s folly is in a final moment neglecting the imperative of 
memento mori, or in Montaigne’s language, not knowing how to die, most highlighted 
by the father’s miserliness that takes place, and even increases on the brink of his 
death and time to leave:  
Voire il semble que la jalousie que nous avons de les voir paroistre et jouyr du monde, 
quand nous sommes à mesme de le quitter, nous rende plus espargnans et rétrains 
envers eux; il nous fache qu'ils nous marchent sur les talons, comme pour nous 
solliciter de sortir.27 
 
Indeed it seems that the jealousy we feel at seeing them appear in the world and enjoy 
it when we are about to leave it makes us more stingy and tight with them; it vexes us 
that they are treading on our heels, as if to solicit us to leave.28  
                                                
27 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 366-367, my emphasis.  
28 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, 8, 280 (my emphasis).  
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Montaigne depicts the father’s miserliness as occurring at the very same 
moment of his “time to leave” and approaching death, so there is no question that he is 
foolishly fighting back, against Nature (the philosophical argument continues to 
crumble): “quand nous sommes à mesme de le quitter.” These developing humans 
arrive, appearing as if a threat emanating from nowhere, “treading on our heels,” 
taking a bite of the same world at the very same time in which the fathers must leave 
it. A father that cries out that his child is chasing him out of the world, coming of age 
only to rob him of his lifetime endeavor and reminding him of his near end, is an 
image that could fit in seamlessly with the many of the Anatomy tales we have seen.  
But, as I am simultaneously trying to show, Montaigne takes enormous care to 
present, or moreover, to represent the fathers in such a way that there is no question 
about their folly, that their time is indeed up… but who, in fact, has this knowledge? 
And who lives in anticipation of this in fact?  
Learning how to die, according to the Socratic tradition, involves a letting go 
of death and finitude, giving oneself up to death. In Montaigne, on the other hand, 
learning how to die presents as a constant anticipation and even obsession, or even an 
attempt to master it by structuring all of the human actions as potentially final actions, 
so that death catches us at the perfect time, or so that everything we do up until death, 
is deemed more meaningful by it. This is the more explicit argument I read in 
Montaigne’s essay Que philosopher c’est apprendre a mourir, when he comments for 
example, on the ridicule and folly of a historian who, with his last breath, complained 
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only of the fact that his chronicle of kings will be cut too short and not be completed.29 
Montaigne, who does not want to end up like this poor man, wishes that death could 
“catch him planting his cabbages,” in a state where he is not only feeling a casual 
indifference to it (“nonchalant d’elle”), but also in regards to his unfinished or 
“imperfect garden”: “que le mort me treuve plantant mes chous, mais nonchalant 
d’elle, et encore plus de mon jardin imparfait.”30  
In his representation of the world, Montaigne must make sure that the fathers’ 
miserliness be not at all contextualized by their own needs and by their own self-
preservation, nor by the forces that they are up against in light of old age, indeed death 
(from their own viewpoint), and not even by their concerns facing the foolish behavior 
and cruelty of their heirs — the other form of folly left ignored and unaccounted for 
by him. 
Montaigne is not interested in making this into a philosophical argument by 
which men are below beasts in their folly. Rejecting philosophical authority and the 
productive ruins it produces, is merely the framework through which he presents his 
singular views and melancholy: the ridicule of human behavior, the tragic waste of 
diversion and inauthenticity, blindness towards one’s own condition, the weight of 
mortality, and so on.  
As a melancholic and not as a traditional philosopher — indeed, as a 
melancholic and a singular philosopher — Montaigne sees and represents ridicule 
everywhere. And because he is obsessed with death, like Pascal, he only sees, through 
                                                
29 “J’en vis mourir un, qui, estant à l’extremité, se pleignoit incessamment, de quoy sa destinée coupoit 
le fil de l’histoire qu’il avoit en main, sur le quinziesme ou seixiesme de nos Roys.” Montaigne, Essais, 
I, XX, 87. 
30 Montaigne, Essais, I, XX, 87.  
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his “pathological vision,” the ridicule of men living their lives in ignorance of death: 
fathers wasting away their final years in contempt and greed, wasting their children’s 
future and prospects, wasting their potential bond and love. This particular notion of 
waste, understood and represented only from a particular (biased) angle, conveys the 
waste in saving and withholding. That is, as with the principle of madness and folly, a 
principle of quid pro quo produces a meaningful social critique, in juxtaposition to the 
customary notions of waste which are applied to the opposite: the material waste of 
money and goods, as the following tale will further explicate.   
 
II.  BLINDNESS AND FOLLY  
In the essay Montaigne tells a personal story of a miserly old man he knows, 
who brags to him about the tight rein and the obedience he keeps his family under. But 
Montaigne tells his story as a classic fools’ tale; “it is all a farce,” he writes.  While 
this acquaintance-protagonist boasts his vigilance, his “clear sight” into things (“Quant 
de fois s’est il vante de moy de la bride qu’il donnoit aux siens”… “combien il voyoyt 
cler en ses affaires”)31, Montaigne builds up the comic tension between his assumed 
knowledge, and evident ignorance, quoting Terence: “Lui seul ignore tout,”32 (“He 
alone is unaware of it all”).  
While once glorious in his youth, old age has made him mad: “il frappe, il 
mord, il jure”33 (“he slaps and bites and swears”). Transformed by age, he is now 
                                                
31 Ibid., II, VIII, 373.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid. 
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burdened by fears and suspicions of everyone that surrounds him. He holds his keys at 
all times near, “plus cherement que ses yeux”34 (“dearer than sight itself, dearer than 
his eyes”),35 yet everyone still has access to all his possessions and uses them and his 
house as they please. Drunkenness, gambling, prodigality, gossip, and conspiracies at 
his expense are taking place everywhere in his house right under his nose. Presuming 
to be in control, this father is presented by Montaigne as a classic fool, blind to what is 
going on behind his back and”unbeknownst to him, is the one being controlled and 
exploited in fact.  
This tale indicates that there is another option for folly that Montaigne 
purposefully does not account for, choosing instead to neglect it in favor of the 
specific form of folly that he needs to represent in order to carry out his more 
subversive critique, not only of customs and norms, but also of vanity and memento 
mori.  
These “other,” overlooked follies and faults are those committed by the 
father’s children, his heirs, and his household members or supposed confidants —
follies of drunkenness, gambling, deceit — acts and faults that are normatively 
considered exemplary of wastefulness, and even of folly in an earlier notion of vices 
and sin. The potentially disturbing fact that the heirs and confidants are fooling their 
loved one, furthermore weakened by old age and ill, closer to his death than they, is 
not a matter of concern for Montaigne, for whom moralism is replaced by this early-
modern folly as critique. Its goal, as we see here, is to reveal deeper and reversed 
                                                
34 Ibid. 
35 Once again the motif of blindness appears. Blindness means not knowing that which you are blind to. 
You might be watchful of one thing, but blind to something even more consequential.  
  
116 
principles to normative ones.  
Indeed, Montaigne is representing an opposite, non-normative, view of folly 
than the customary and (his) contemporary one in relation to the case of the miserly 
father. The expression that the essay reverses on its head is the common proverb: “Il 
ne faut pas se depouiller avant de se coucher”36 (“one must not strip down, give away 
all their belongings before lying down”), to which Montaigne provides a positive 
variation of its negative form: “Il faut se depouiller avant de se coucher.”37  
In its origin and use, this proverb was destined to protect the father against his 
heirs and against humiliation of old age, whereby heirs where viewed as “vultures,” 
awaiting the father to die: “l’avidite et l’ingratitude ont, de tout tems, caracterise les 
heritiers.”38 In fact, in one Brant’s cantos, the folly of the fathers is presented exactly 
in these terms, in allowing the children to abuse him and waste his money, whereby 
his folly lies in thinking that in return, they will take care of him and return the favor.39  
The questions, therefore, of “who is the fool?” is not an evident and immediate 
one. It relies on the literary and artistic representation, of bias, of distortion, and yet of 
a particular and meaningful order, as we have initially analyzed through Dürer’s 
image. While the aged miserly father is the chosen fool, as constructed by Montaigne, 
for his differently understood wasteful and self-humiliating behavior, it would have 
                                                
36 “Et à celuy-là peut servir justement cette responce que les peres ont ordinairement en la bouche : ‘Je 
ne me veux pas despouiller devant que de m'aller coucher.’” (Montaigne, Essais, II. VIII, 370). 
37 …“de nous coucher, quand les jambes nous faillent” (Ibid., 371). “Il est assez en estat, s'il est sage, 
pour avoir desir de se despouiller pour se coucher” (Ibid., 370). 
38 Jean-Charles-François Tuet, Matinées sénonoises ou Proverbes françois , suivis de leur origine  ; de  
leur rapport avec ceux des langues anciennes et modernes, de l’emploi qu’on en a fait en poésie et en  
prose, de quelques traits d’histoire, mots faillans, & usages anciens dont on recherche aussi l’origine,  
&c. &c. Paris: Née de La Rochelle and Vve tarbé,1789. In Gallica (June 2009):  
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5657384q/f6.image (accessed May 2017), 430-431.  
39 Brant, “Of the Teaching of Children,” The Ship of Fools, 72-73. 
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been possible to depict his children and servants as fools for taking advantage of him, 
for duping him, and cruelly waiting to inherit his money which they are already 
spending. It would have been equally possible to critique the waste of the heirs, and 
their own waste of soul in favor of the body. Except that, paradoxically, since they are 
not ill and dying, the liminality and power of waste would have lost their effect in 
favor of an abstract moralism, providing further insight into how Montaigne’s rhetoric 
and art serve his subjectivity. Like many other moments in the text, this is an 
important “singular Montaigne” moment to keep in mind, since Montaigne’s 
singularity will shift and change according to his (melancholic) needs, and with it his 
representations and distortions of melancholy and folly. 
Montaigne digresses for at least two pages into a discussion about all the small 
details of the scams and conspiracies against the miserly father, without sparing any 
negative detail: “Les pas de la vieillesse sont si lents, les sense si troubles”40 (“Old 
people’s steps are so slow and their senses so confused”), that the valet who was just 
now fired by the father can continue his usual position in the house due to the father’s 
weakness and ignorance. If the father receives a letter, he depends on others to read it 
to him. These supposedly close family members and servants take this opportunity to 
“invent things on the spot” (“on y treuve sur le champ ce qu’on veut”),41 for their own 
profit, and according to their whim: “et faict-on a tous coups que tel luy demande 
pardon qui l’injurie par mesme lettre”42 (“and all the time they have someone asking 
                                                
40 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 374. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid.  
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his pardon who is really insulting him in this very letter”).43  
Contrary to Pascal, for whom diversion was a blindness to, and turning away 
from, the human condition as wretched, for Montaigne, blindness is the human 
condition which humans ignore, evoking a dizzying image of “blindness to blindness,” 
another image that folds onto itself and contains its own tensions characteristic of 
early-modern imagery related to melancholy. Specifically, in Montaigne, blindness is 
the human assumption to knowledge despite inherent ignorance in the epistemological, 
skeptical sense (the inability to attain knowledge), but also despite the infinity of 
nature and forms compared with which the human eye, and our span of experience, is 
remarkably lacking — a critique that has crucial ties with the monstrous, as will be 
further expanded on. Thus blindness is a fundamental human folly, one that goes 
beyond “not knowing that one does not know,” it means not seeing that one cannot 
see, thereby moving from the philosophical to a liminal image.  
This “blindness to our own blindness,” feeds into our sense of certainty and 
arrogance, the manifest expression of which is in the certainty of “custom,” which is 
therefore blind in turn. This certainty stemming from blindness, or this blindness to 
blindness, is responsible for many of the social ills (and monsters) that Montaigne 
decries at every opportunity: ethnocentricity, prejudice, lack of tolerance, and a 
justification for domination and bloodshed. In his essay De l’education, Montaigne 
writes that the prosecution of witchcraft and magic is of a greater folly than the 
practices themselves, since the prosecution stems from certainty and presumption to 
know, while the practices do not. “No folly can be greater,” he writes, than assuming 
                                                
43 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, 8, 286. 
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to know “the possible and impossible and the limits of the possible and knowledge.”  
Many Montaigne critics, such as Richard Regosin and Bernard Sève, address 
the importance of ignorance in Montaigne, but in a philosophical, Socratic spirit. 
While according to this philosophical tradition ignorance is opposed to knowledge and 
truth, and is the mark of the human condition, it is only such as part of the infinite 
quest for knowledge, i.e., that the more one knows, the more one knows one’s own 
ignorance, which ends up being a a mark of wisdom in fact.   
As with the other “reversals” of philosophical concepts and binaries, 
Montaigne plays with, and reinterprets ignorance as well, specifically in the direction 
of his demonstration of folly. He is not concerned with the Socratic quest to always 
learn how little you know, and thereby attain wisdom [the figure of the sage], but 
rather with human behavior and folly in their actual lived forms. Montaigne is not 
concerned with the philosophical binary of knowledge/ignorance in itself, or even in 
deconstructing it in its own right.  
With his famously coined “Que sais-je?” (What do I know?), Montaigne 
expressed his utmost disdain for this “knowing” and certainty, another philosophical 
position he reverses on its head with a question, rather than an assertion, that performs 
perpetual doubt, beyond and even against the mere skeptical position of “not 
knowing.” The perpetual doubt is not only about “not knowing the world” or even 
oneself, but the form of the question folds back onto itself, questioning the question, 
removing external reality and a subject-object relation altogether.   
Montaigne’s skepticism, however, is also part of his melancholy. Compared 
with the later model of Cartesian doubt, where “not knowing” is used to assert the 
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subject, in its ability to at least perform doubt, Montaigne’s formula is of a subject 
who lives inside doubt and questioning, a subject who does not experience the 
constancy through which to assert and establish himself. Therefore, compared with the 
stability, or desire for stability of a Cogito, skepticism in Montaigne also bears 
resemblance to melancholic instability and oscillation, while Hassan Melehy, for 
example, has read this instability as a sign of self-difference through the alterity of 
time and language, where Montaigne’s self is constituted instead in the act of writing 
as its closest form of “being.”44 
 As Montaigne distances the performance of doubt even from the self, from the 
“je,” Richard Scholar finds that Montaigne performs doubt through liminal figures, in 
the form of a “conceptual persona,” a concept he borrows from Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari. The “conceptual persona” is a means for the philosopher to think 
through, and embody his philosophy through a conceptual figure who “haunts his 
thinking.” For Montaigne, according to Scholar, this persona is the “blind man.”45 
Without making philosophical assertions, and in fact again breaking with 
skeptic philosophy or going beyond it, the conceptual persona who is also a liminal 
figure, enables Montaigne to explore and show the limits of our knowledge”an image 
at the threshold of the existing world, beyond sense and knowledge.46 “Que sais-je?” 
as a question, suggesting that even “not knowing” should remain unsure, therefore 
calls for a turn to the figurative and to a demonstration or showing of knowledge at its 
                                                
44 Hassan Melehy, “The Essay: The Writing of the Subject,” in Writing Cogito: Montaigne, Descartes, 
and the Institution of the Modern Subject (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997). 
45 Richard Scholar, The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early Modern Europe: Encounters with a Certain  
Something (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 246. 
46 Ibid., 247.  
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limits. 
The particular example of a blind man from Montaigne’s Apologie de 
Reymond Sebond, as Scholar shows, is one who ends up not being blind, or rather not 
“suffering from blindness.” In fact, his blindness points instead to “sighted humanity” 
for labeling him as such. The “blind man” in this essay has no idea of his blindness 
prior to hearing about it through words provided by others. Prior to this, he has full 
access to all pleasures and experiences, including visual ones: he enjoys playing 
tennis, and expresses delight in “seeing” his handsome godson (a visual descriptor). 
The function of this image is to evoke, not through positive proof but again 
through images, the uncertainty and awareness of “whether or not sighted humanity is 
not equally blind.” Montaigne asks: 
…que scait-on si le genre humain faict une sottise pareille, a faute de qulque sens, et 
que par ce defaut la plus part du visage des choses nous soit cache? 
 
[…what do we know about whether mankind is doing something equally foolish for 
some lack of sense, and whether by this lack the greater part of the face of things is 
hidden from us?]47 
  
Again we see how presumption of knowledge and certainty, presumption of 
“sight” to follow the image, is the greatest folly according to Montaigne. To follow 
this image: what if we are missing a sense? What if there are other hidden qualities 
that we cannot perceive through our senses? What if we have not yet seen everything? 
Clearly, we have not… therefore humanity is blind in its very nature. It is not an 
impairment that can be “overcome.” This is particularly true if we think of the 
“limping” gaze of Dürer’s Melancholia, the “cross-eyed” and “one-eyed” (borgne, 
                                                
47 Montaigne quoted in Scholar, The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi in Early Modern Europe: Encounters with a  
Certain Something, 247.  
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louche) gaze as discussed in Chapter 1, not as a deviance and abnormality but rather as 
paradigmatic of an “anomaly” understood as a “difference,” which is in fact “normal” 
in Canguilhem’s terms”the norm of diversity and difference to which there is no 
“normal,” no perfect “health.”48 Thus, the “pathology” becomes an “anomaly” which 
in fact becomes “normal” singularity and hence “normal” subjectivity. This idea is 
also further connected to the notions of melancholy and folly as universal categories, 
in that a general impairment, a general limitation, defines all of us, despite the fact that 
its manifestations and examples might be infinite and unclassifiable: “They dote all, 
but not alike.”49 
 Returning to our Montaigne passage:   
…que scait-on si le genre humain faict une sottise pareille, a faute de quelque sens, et 
que par ce defaut la plus part du visage des choses nous soit cache? 
 
The passage produces meaningful alliterations and rhymes: faict / faute / 
defaut, which creates deep resonances between lack, mistake and defect. There is 
ambiguity here in relation to whether or not “ce defaut,” refers back to the factual lack 
of a sense (“a faute de quelque sens”), as the translation above suggests, or rather, to 
the acting and doing (faict) as if one has no lack. That is, in the first case there is a 
physical lack or deficiency, while the second reading suggests that “ce defaut” refers 
to the “sottise” of acting this way, i.e., the human presumption as lack. 
This second reading evokes a piercing sense of tragedy and melancholy that 
accompany this great folly: what if we are getting everything wrong, by assuming we 
have seen everything? What if all our beliefs and ways of living as a result are 
                                                
48 Georges Canguilhem, On the Normal and the Pathological, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett, (New York:  
Zone Books. 1991), 74-77.  
49 Burton, “Democritus to the Reader”, The Anatomy of Melancholy, 31. 
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altogether incorrect? Most important, what if as a result of thinking we know, we 
prevent ourselves from seeing more, discovering more, living more?  
 
III.  THE CONCEPTUAL PERSONA OF THE MISERLY FATHER  
 
In De l’affection des peres aux enfans, the one who purports to see and know, 
the miserly father from our story, suffers from the most intense blindness. And not 
only is his blindness literally the blindness into the affairs of his household and family 
affairs, nor that of the state of the money he is losing while he thinks he keeps it 
locked up, but more importantly the blindness about his human condition (the 
emphasis of singularity, of “his” human condition is crucial). Specifically, that his 
blindness is costing him much more than what he is saving: the love of his children, 
the lives of his children, a worthy death and a worthy life wasted through the misery 
and miserliness of his death.  
Using this notion of the “conceptual persona” I argue that the miserly father 
functions similarly to the blind man, both as another instance of the “blind man,” as I 
have shown in folly’s link to blindness, but also in the extra “liminality” that the 
miserly father manifests. The miserly father is not only at the limits of “sight” as he 
cannot “see” his condition and its consequences. He is also at the limits of “life” and 
“passion,” practically at a loss of his very humanity due to the vile passion of avarice 
that has taken over him, blinding him to any other affections: generosity, love for his 
children, even self-love.  
Through this liminal passion of avarice, and its counterparts here: apathy, 
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cruelty, tyranny, the miserly father is at the limits of our means and ways of knowing 
but also at the limits of feeling, of passion. According to David Hume, for example, 
avarice is barely even a passion, but rather a residual one that appears in old age 
“where all the other affections are extinct,”50 its “all-consuming” force underlies the 
human weakness and blindness for Montaigne. At the same time and even more 
importantly the figure of the “miserly father” is liminal also in its position between life 
and death: to the blindness of the miserly father is added another dimension of folly, 
which is being miserly in the face of death. Montaigne’s memento mori is further 
woven into the tale, adding to the folly and waste conveyed by the figure of the 
miserly father, his horrific failure to remember death, even as it is (supposedly) 
encroaching.  
Avarice is often depicted in its absurdity, and is considered a threat because it 
often does not yield to reason or any other passions. In its cumulative nature, it always 
wants more. More absurdly, it accumulates without wanting to put the accumulated 
possession and wealth to use — wihtouth wanting to spend any of it. The prop of the 
miser is his “coffers of avarice,” and the symbolic behavior is the absolute refusal to 
unlock them: “Avoir de l’argent dans un coffre autorise toutes les possibilities de 
depense sans se defaire de ses economies.”51 
The most liminal image of the miser is that he prefers to take his treasure to the 
grave, less it be spent by someone else, even if that someone else is his very own 
extension and his own creation — his offspring, those early pet monkeys he cherished 
                                                
50 David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), III, VII, 3. 
51 Philippe Desan, “L’avarice chez Montaigne,” Seizième Siècle 4, no. 1 (2008): 116.  
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so much. Even on his deathbed he remains obsessed with cost and not spending: “on 
the very brink of the grave,” “refusing themselves the most common necessaries of 
life.”52  
Hume in Of Avarice tells several such stories, the most liminal one being a tale 
he borrows from Antoine Houdar de La Motte, in which a miser who is already dead 
and needs to cross the River Styx, manages to avoid paying the ferry passage by 
swimming across when the guard looks away (obviously, all the other ghosts paid 
their fare share). His punishment, a punishment directed at his vice of avarice, was to 
get sent back to earth and see how all his heirs are spending his riches. Avarice, 
therefore, is portrayed as having such (blind) determination, that it not only defies 
death by ignoring it, but also to such a point that getting sent back to earth, getting sent 
back to life, becomes a punishment to see his money being spent there by his heirs.53  
The miser prefers to not live in the moment by not spending anything in the 
moment, in exchange for living in a phantasmatic future, even beyond death. By not 
spending even after the bitter end, by continuing to occupy lofty estates, by holding 
the keys near even while health and youth have fully escaped him, the miser imagines 
himself infinite, in a kind of delusional diversion from the reality of death and 
memento mori.  
The philosophical-logical argument in the background of this essay enhances 
the miser’s folly even further. The law of nature conveys his self-destructive and self-
sabotaging conduct, given that his children are extensions of himself. Finally, in his 
blindness, the miser’s own nature and finitude have been replaced and wasted away by 
                                                
52 Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, III, VII, 2. 
53 Ibid., 5.  
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a phantasmatic life beyond these.   
 
IV.  THE FROWNING FATHER — “GRIMACE PATERNELLE” 
 
To the image of the “miserly father” Montaigne adds another “negative” 
(“aversive”) and liminal example of fatherhood, namely the stern, unmoving and 
authoritative father — an affective miser. One who is constantly “with a frown” on his 
face, who shows himself to his son only with a “gravité et grimace paternelle,”54 only 
with a “façon tyrannique,” a tyrannical façade, meaning, not only showing this “face” 
but also, only showing his “bad side” (façon), evoking a duplicity that did not exist in 
the case of the “miserly father.” 
A form of emotional avarice, the “frowning father” withholds and stores his 
love inside, “dans son ame,” while externally maintaining a frigid distance and only 
showing a distant and spiteful attitude: “Et ce pauvre garçon, disoit-il, n’a rien veu de 
moy qu’une contenance refroignée et pleine de mespris.”55  
However, unlike the story of the miserly father who is turned foolish and blind 
by age, the tale of the “frowning father” contains no comic elements. It tells the tragic 
and painful tale of a father who comes to full tragic awareness of his faults, who gains 
sight of his “error” or “tragic flaw” (Greek, hamartia) in the classical sense, as he 
realizes not only the cost of his “grimace paternelle,” but also its vainness and 
                                                
54 Montaigne, Essais, I.VII, p. 375. 
55 Ibid.  
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misleading falsehood, calling it now a “vain disguise” (“ce vain masque”)56. With the 
transition from comedy to tragedy, the loss and cost of these negative images of 
fatherhood is increased, and with them Montaigne’s warnings to “remember death” 
are more acutely heard.  
This melancholy tale and digression tells the story of Monsieur de Monluc, 
another father figure in this essay who, according to Montaigne, confides in him about 
his fatherly struggles and feats. According to Montaigne, Monsieur de Monluc 
confides in him that he is now full of regrets that come piling on top of the grief and 
heartache he has over the loss of his son, a young gentleman of “great promise,” who 
dies before his potential can be realized, evoking yet another layer of “waste” to the 
general feelings of waste this essay builds off of.  
Montaigne in this section clears the stage for the cracked voice and deep 
heartache of this grieving father. Beyond the grief, however, Montaigne chooses to 
focus on the father’s pain of regret, something that involves miscalculated decisions 
and mistakes during his lifetime — his “tragic flaw” — rather than the feelings of loss 
and mourning, which are presented as circumstantial and irrelevant to the pain as 
Montaigne chooses to narrate it. 
[Il] me faisoit fort valoir, entre ses autres regrets, le desplaisir et creve-coeur qu’il 
sentoit de ne s’estre jamais communiqué à luy […]57  
 
It is not merely “creve-coeur,” heartbreak, but rather, “creve-coeur que”…  
heartbreak that he had never shown himself to him, heartbreak that he had withheld 
                                                
56 It appears that there is a relationship between folly and melancholy in the selection of texts I have 
analyzed, where the two differ only in relation to awareness: folly is a blindness to melancholy, and 
melancholy perhaps is too deeply aware of folly.   
57 Montaigne, Essais, II, VII, 375. 
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his affections, versus heartache about or over the loss. Focusing on the father’s 
weighty regrets and the anger he directs at himself, Montaigne makes room for his 
tragic soliloquy (Montaigne here quotes Monluc at length), where Monluc asks 
himself for whom he has been saving up this singular affection — “A qui gardoy-
je”…“cette singuliere affection?” A complete “waste,” he realizes, since this “singular 
affection” was reserved only for this one person, and can no longer be of “use”:  
A qui gardoy-je à déscouvrir cette singuliere affection que je luy portoy dans mon 
ame? estoit-ce pas luy qui en devoit avoir tout le plaisir et toute l’obligation?58 
 
[For whom was I keeping the revelation of that singular affection that I bore him in 
my soul? Wasn’t he the one who should have had all the pleasure of it and all the 
gratitude?]59  
 
The father’s loss here is not of his son, but rather the loss of the truth and 
honesty that pertain to his relationship with his son, and the false knowledge and 
communication they had of and with each other. The “frown” and stern disguises (the 
“masque vain”) have now stamped these lives forever in the form of the mask, rather 
than in their true image, and true reflections of their souls. The father laments that his 
son died without having been able to share himself (his true self), and real affections 
with his son, “le desplaisir et creve-coeur qu’il sentoit de ne s’estre jamais 
communiqué à luy”; “avoir perdu la commodité de gouster et bien cognoistre son 
filz”60 (“the sorrow and heartbreak he felt for never having opened up to him.” […] 
“he had lost” […] “the comfort of appreciating his son and knowing him well” […])61.  
The essay continues to slide on the plane of affections. The essay on fathers’ 
                                                
58 Ibid., 376. 
59 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, 8, 287.  
60  Montaigne, Essais, II, VII, 375-376.  
61 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, 8, 287. 
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affections for their children becomes an essay on fathers’ lack of affections, and then 
about affections that, albeit their depth and sincerity, are mistakenly bottled up. 
Similarly, Monluc’s story of loss, which seemed like it would be about mourning, 
becomes a story about error and regret, and the father’s own choices and realizations 
about himself, and about his dishonesty and mistakes. At this point, the topic of the 
affections of fathers for their sons becomes an essay about the fathers themselves, 
their lives, their well-being, and their survival.  
Since Montaigne is not focusing on Monluc’s loss, but rather on his error, this 
allows Montaigne to focus on his [Montaigne’s] own well-being and survival in yet 
another digression. The excuse for the digression is to “agree” with Monluc, and to 
“agree” with the logic of his heartbreak, an odd intervention in its own right: “Je 
trouve que cette plainte estoit bien prise et raisonnable.”62 In the final 1595 edition of 
the Essais, Montaigne adds that he is “better off” for having had this full knowledge of 
his friend, and for having savored him (gouster), emphasizing his personal stakes in 
the theory through which the essay has been operating:   
En vaux-je mieux d’en avoir le goust, ou si j’en vaux moins ? j’en vaux certes bien 
mieux. Son regret me console et m’honnore.63 
 
The verb “gouster” is what differentiates Monluc’s experience and tragedy 
from Montaigne’s experience and loss of La Boétie in another digression to 
Montaigne’s own loss, which he does not name except by indicating “une trop certaine 
experience.” Monluc failed to know his son in the embodied and full sense evoked by 
“gouster,” while for Montaigne, experience, a term that for him encapsulates tasting, 
                                                
62 Ibid., 376.  
63 Montaigne, “Notes,” Essais, 1533.  
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trying, and trying out (various facets), renders every literal experience into something 
that is always “full,” and fully unique and internal, and in a sense, inalienable — 
immune to the kind of devastation expressed by Monluc.64 Montaigne has transformed 
the event of Monluc’s loss to his internal regret and heartache over his own affections 
and behaviors. 
In Monluc’s case, what has been lost is not primarily the person” — again quid 
pro quo, a loss for a loss — but the true and real affections that were blocked by the 
mask, and were not spoken, communicated or shown: “j’y ay perdu le plaisir de sa 
conversation, et sa volonté quant et quant,” “et aussi de luy declarer l’extreme amitié 
qu’il luy portoit, et le digne jugement qu’il faisoit de sa vertu.”65  
As with the critique of folly, the focus is turned to the things that matter, the 
things that are deemed less ephemeral and worldly, which here also overlap with the 
things over which one has no control, like death. Following the platonic understanding 
evoked in the context of folly in Chapter 1, there are two kinds of pains, and two kinds 
of losses: the loss of communication and honesty, which is deemed worse than the loss 
caused by death. The loss of not having experienced (“gouster,” “cognoistre”) or 
revealed (“à déscouvrir cette singuliere affection,” “l’extreme amitié qu’il luy portoit”) 
one’s “true image” and “acquaintance,” the loss of sincerity, are far more devastating 
than death itself.  
This is not only because Montaigne simply values honesty and authenticity, 
and not only because of the primacy of the internal workings and the self, but also 
                                                
64 This notion of the “fullness” of experience is inspired by Starobinski’s notion of the “thickness” of 
experience that Montaigne tries to produce in order to compensate for the brevity of life, as Starobinski 
describes it, Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion, 237. 
65 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 376.  
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because there are two (or many) kinds of lives. Montaigne shows how death structures 
life at every moment, interpreting and sealing anything prior in its light. In this case, 
the father’s “vain” affections and his “frowning face” have robbed him and his son of 
a “good life,” even prior to his son’s death, symbolizing, in fact, a life that had already 
been lost to this masquerading.   
By choosing to give voice to the pains of regret rather than mourning in this 
way, Montaigne approaches his memento mori from yet another angle. In the first half 
of the essay, the violation of memento mori is sounded out through the miserly father’s 
refusal to “take his leave” on time, his persistent reign by force despite his senses and 
capacities being too weak, which cost him love and a worthy life, as well as through 
the repeated iterations throughout the essay’s warning about the dangers of not 
knowing “when to take your leave,” not knowing to “lie down when your legs fail,” 
(“de nous coucher, quand les jambes nous faillent,”66	  portraying the father as a thief 
towards his own children and even towards himself. In this portion of the essay, 
memento mori is now sounded out tragically through the ruination of the “good” and 
“honest” life of this son and father, whose pride and concern with hierarchy, 
discipline, and other customs have meant that his son will never know he loved him, 
and that simultaneously, he will always know that his son died unloved. And Monluc, 
in turn, will have nothing, internally, to survive on, or to lessen the pain with. 
For Montaigne, through his melancholic digressions, life is shown to be fully 
structured by death and “final actions,” like the historian who died thinking his 
chronicle will be unfinished. In contrast to a position of memento mori as a reminder 
                                                
66 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 371.  
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of death, mortality, and humility, and to the philosophical position of learning how to 
die, the digressions in the essay structure it as one unified melancholy image, whereby 
the affections of fathers for their children digress into many images of memento mori, 
along with the many melancholy/folly distortions and reversals of values that this 
chapter has analyzed.  
As we have seen in the discussion on Pascal, death is something that can be 
forgotten, and it is only melancholics like Pascal as I read him, who are scandalized by 
humans who do not perpetually dwell in their finitude and the fact that they are 
“wretched for all eternity.” The melancholic becomes a master of memento mori, and 
in a sense, death replaces life in a final quid pro quo, and in a final proverbial reversal. 
From the “normative” position that views death as the end of life, its limit, to viewing 
life as a continual dying, or rather an “art” of dying:  “Tout ce que vous vivez, vous le 
desrobez à la vie; c’est à ses despens. Le continuel ouvrage de vostre vie, c’est bastir 
la mort”…67 (“All the time you live you steal from life; living is at life’s expense. The 
constant work of your life is to build death”).68 Therefore, even death itself is not an 
“objective” event, since everything within life, death included, is a human artifact that 
involves not only the agency of construction, but also of assembly, composition and 
art (“bastir”).  
Following the normative view of death, as an external accident that ruptures 
life, proves in this essay and elsewhere to be much more costly than this alternative 
melancholic view of death, since saving up, either money or love, prove to pertain to 
                                                
67 Montaigne, Essais, I, XX, 91.  
68 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, I, 20, 65. 
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an immortal life, and thus to an inhuman life, and therefore the melancholic model 
proves to have universal value.  
 
V.  “PAR UNE TROP CERTAINE EXPERIENCE” 
 
Montaigne’s placing of experience and internal life above and beyond a concrete loss  
or a concrete friendship is further emphasized by his refusal to name and specify these, 
outside of the mysterious and vague referral to a “trop certaine experience,” similar to 
the intentional mystery and vagueness of the “melancholy humor” and “chagrin” in 
Chapter 2.   
…car comme je sçay par une trop certaine experience, il n’est aucune si douce 
consolation en la perte de noz amis, que celle que nous apporte la science de n’avoir 
rien oublié à leur dire, et d'avoir eu avec eux une parfaite et entiere communication.69 
 
While a unique (“certaine”) experience is seemingly being denoted, the “trop” 
throws us off towards a notion of multitude, intensity and doubling which folds the 
external experience inward, and once more onto the internal sense of experience. By 
virtue of being “too” unique and specific, or by virtue of being “too much,” the 
experiences themselves lose touch with the external ones, and become irrelevant or 
else inaccessible and untraceable, as the figure of the monster in Chapter 4 will be a 
symbol for.  
In addition, “par une trop certaine experience,” as in an “all too familiar 
experience” suggests not only the loss of La Boétie. Montaigne, to whom death is “all 
too familiar,” has also experienced the loss of his four children during infancy, as he 
                                                
69 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 376.  
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mentions in this essay only “by the way.” Early on in the essay when Montaigne 
expresses his condemnation of violence in education, another side-topic, digression, to 
“fatherhood,” he casually mentions that he himself was raised without violence, and 
did the same with his own children. Except, as he says, they all “died on him” as 
babies: “J’ay deu la pareille aux enfans que j’ay eu; ils me meurent tous en 
nourrisse;”…70 
Despite the survival of his one daughter, Leonor, which he acknowledges 
further below in the essay, Montaigne nonetheless writes here, “Ils me meurent tous en 
nourrisse,” another significant melancholic slip, with the aim of representing a 
complete or radical “experience” (“trop certaine”), through which he can make his 
extreme arguments. Perhaps, in this manner, Montaigne finally becomes his own 
liminal image, his own conceptual personae. Someone who survives and even enjoys 
life despite having lost everything as his image of an “arrière boutique” — a deeply 
private and internal metaphorical space, “toute nostre, toute franche,”71 evoked in De 
la Solitude, would want to persuade us of: “discourir et y rire comme sans femme, 
sans enfans, et sans biens, sans train et sans valetz, afin que, quand l’occasion 
adviendra de leur perte, il ne nous soit pas nouveau de nous en passer”72 [“here we 
must talk and laugh as if without wife, without children, without possessions, without 
retinue and servants, so that when the time comes to lose them, it will be nothing new 
to us to do without them”73]. Any moderate or more “realistic” account or description 
                                                
70 Ibid., 369.  
71 Ibid., I, XXXIX, 235. 
72 Ibid.  
73 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, I, 39, 177.  
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of loss, would lessen the effect of his radically alternative representation of the world.  
Montaigne’s “all too familiar experience” with death and loss was also 
experienced through the illness of “the stone,” an illness that his father suffered and 
died from, and which he knew, also, “all too well,” that he had inherited from him. In 
De la resemblance des enfans aux peres, he writes: “Il est à croire que je dois à mon 
pere cette qualité pierreuse, car il mourut merveilleusement affligé d’une grosse pierre, 
qu’il avoit en la vessie”…74 — “qualité pierreuse” being a (melancholic) play on the 
name of the illness and the name of his father, Pierre.  
 
VI.  ADAPTIVE MELANCHOLY  
 
Montaigne defends himself against death by constantly preparing for it, 
designing it such that death should find him only “planting his cabbages,” in complete 
ease in relation to any endeavors that might remain incomplete, or any other regrets, 
for example anything that he may have wanted to say, to evoke the metaphor of the 
Essais themselves in relation to his life/death project.  
This seemingly pastoral image of Montaigne enjoying his garden, and its 
humorous tone, reveal a harsher reality — Montaigne’s adaptive, melancholic self-
staging for his alternative, melancholic view or experience of the world. And yet, this 
melancholy is still “normal” as a way of life and a philosophy, and is perhaps a 
“normal” adaptation to realities or circumstances he might need to look away from,75 
                                                
74 Montaigne, Essais, II, XXXVII, 742.  
75 This is a paraphrasing of Canguilhem’s notion of health as an overcoming of changes in the 
environment: “life is not indifferent to the condition it meets with.” Canguilhem, On the Normal and 
the Pathological, 72. 
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the various deaths and losses, the various anticipations of illness and suffering, but 
also the passions and dispositions, the fluidity of it all, and finally, simply being 
human, or being a subject.  
It is only normal perhaps that Montaigne, who has lost his four children at 
infancy, and did not get a chance to educate them according to his beliefs and in that 
“soft” way that he was raised, might focus and notice only those fathers who use 
violence against their children and waste away their fatherhood. Notably through their 
avarice, envy and hate, ruining not only their children’s happiness but also wasting 
this potential bond and love, with the ultimate and tragic result of wasting their own 
lives. At many different points in the essay he slips into saying, with resounding pain -
if we can or want to hear it — emphasized by the conditional, that “unreal” tense that 
“he would have”… “loved to”… “give”… “share”… “be loved”… 
In speaking of the violence people use in education, Montaigne writes that he 
himself practiced tenderness with his children. Except, as he abruptly writes: they died 
as babies. He then adds: “J’eusse esté beaucoup plus religieux encores en cela envers 
des masles,”76 (“I would have been much more meticulous on the matter with boys”), 
and then later and even more strongly felt as a projection of the chance he did not 
have, he writes: “j’eusse aymé à leur grossir le coeur d’ingenuité et de franchise,”77 (“I 
would have loved to make their hearts overflow with openness and frankness”). In 
speaking of the “violent approach,” Montaigne does not understand these fathers, as 
he sees them throwing away an opportunity to feel loved. Sadly, for him, this opinion 
can only be expressed in the tragic conditional:  
                                                
76 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 369.  
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Quand je pourroy me faire craindre, j’aimeroy encore mieux me faire aymer.78  
 
[If I were able to make myself feared, I would have much rather enjoyed making 
myself loved.] (My translation.) 
 
For Montaigne, death means not only what he has been robbed of in relation to 
what others throw away because perhaps they have so much of it, but it also means 
living life differently, and setting up beliefs and values that add “taste” and meaning to 
life, a certain “thickness” against life’s ephemerality in Starobinski’s terms, 79 
especially if this were to end prematurely.  
Part of this “thickness” and meaning can be offered through the values of 
generosity, tolerance, honesty and love, and reversing values as needed to be able to 
adapt and live better within certain circumstances, even if those circumstances are still 
understood as many “concoctions” of the interactions between subject and world. In 
De l’affection des peres aux enfans, this means being able to “savor” (gouster) a loved 
one, remembering to tell them and show them everything, and never withhold love, as 
Monluc failed to do. But more importantly, and more crucially, it means honesty in 
relation to oneself, so that death does not “catch” one with this “chagrin” of regret and 
error, in the middle of a worldly and ephemeral endeavor such as the charting the 
chronicles of kings, while the things most dear to us left untouched, undone or unsaid.  
Love, according to this reading, has to involve generosity, transparency, and 
honesty. Not for the sake of “love” and “memory” so much as for the interior 
experience that is always one’s proper, one’s “arrière boutique,” the only thing to have 
and draw from in a mournful/mad/melancholy/foolish world where loss is “all too 
                                                
78 Ibid., 373.  
79 “Perceptible fullness emerges when action ‘holds and fixes’ an infinitely light substance, namely life, 
thereby giving it weight long enough to be perceived.” Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion, 237.  
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much” and “all too familiar.”  
But this love as a defense against death involves more than just generosity and 
honesty. Love according to Montaigne also involves letting go and turning inward. 
The value of letting go is something that these miserly, withholding fathers 
demonstrate the opposite of. By following custom blindly in their attachment to 
“social” self-preservation, by creating a violent schism between themselves and their 
very own children according to custom or normative ideals, they have lost the chance 
of “feeling loved,” a worthy life stamped by a worthy death, and lastly an interior 
plenitude that would have stemmed from placing one’s own honest feelings and needs 
before custom — Monluc’s regret and his interior depletion.  
Beyond a straightforward “giving” to the other what is yours, letting go has 
more to do with a general renouncing of a worldly, external existence: retreat, a turn 
inward, even solitude — other values that are dear to Montaigne and that protect him 
from loss and death, as made explicit by the passage from De la solitude.  
In an important comparison, and in line with the quid pro quo logic of the 
critiques performed by melancholy and folly, Montaigne in an essay entitled De 
mesnager sa volonté argues in favor of avarice. Since, as we have learned, there are 
many kinds of avarice and folly, and many ways of displaying avarice or folly. In this 
essay Montaigne argues that people are all too ready to sacrifice their privacy and time 
and lend themselves to public use, defending their finances and success, but not their 
souls. Here, by “not giving oneself,” protecting internal integrity and the freedom of 
the mind, and ridiculing “regular” avarice from yet another angle, for the purpose of 
advocating for personal independence and authenticity:  
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Personne ne distribue son argent à autruy, chacun y distribue son temps et sa vie; il 
n’est rien dequoy nous soyons si prodigues que de ces choses là, desquelles seules 
l’avarice nous seroit utile et louable.80  
 
While others neglect to notice that “their time is up,” Montaigne is anxiously 
preemptive about already taking his leave, and giving up his time, imagining where he 
wants to be and how he wants to feel (“en plantant mes choux”), living alongside and 
towards death (“bastir la mort”). Montaigne everywhere writes that he is “always 
taking his leave,” evoking the same obsession and personal defense as with the other 
values I have discussed.  
The values of “withdrawing” and “letting go” are illustrated in another 
digression that this essay performs through Montaigne’s reversal of the French 
proverb, which, as noted earlier, he deconstructs and rebuilds throughout the essay: “Il 
ne faut pas se dépouiller avant de se coucher” [“one mustn’t undress before getting 
into bed”]. As mentioned earlier, this proverb means the exact opposite of what this 
essay conveys:  “Il ne faut pas se desaissir, se priver de son bien avant sa mort,” 
meaning that one must be vigilant and watchful all the way until death — death marks 
the limit of life for the non-melancholic, but for the melancholic, death is within life.  
While this proverb expresses the logic behind the behavior of the miserly 
father, Montaigne rewrites it to express the dangers of following customs blindly, and 
not living honestly by one’s own needs — by following “exemplarity” over the unique 
and tailored “exempla.” The reversal of this expression throughout the essay: “Il est 
assez en estat, s’il est sage, pour avoir desir de se despouiller pour se coucher”; “la 
raison nous commande assez de nous despouiller, quand noz robbes nous chargent et 
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empeschent, et de nous coucher quand les jambes nous faillent;”81 which also exploit 
and add new “laws of nature” — our weakness and failing legs signal to us to let go — 
to Montaigne’s current agenda, reveal again Montaigne’s melancholic bias and 
adaptation of rules to his own experience, an expression of his own private dictionary: 
“J’ay un dictionnaire tout à part moy,”82 which will be a central part of the following 
chapter. 
                                                
81 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 371. 
82 Ibid., III, XIII, 1091.  
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CONCLUSION: 
“THE CHILDREN OF THE MIND” 
 
To conclude the analysis of the essay, I will discuss the final part of the essay 
that is frequently commented on, which deals explicitly with the concept of non-
biological, conceptual, fatherhood through the figure of the author. With this final 
subtopic or digression, I wish to show how it too ties in with the melancholic 
structuring of the essay.  
In this final section, Montaigne digresses fully away from any concrete, 
corporeal forms of fatherhood, as if in the “assiduous contemplation” of his subject-
matter, his soul indeed flew out of his body, in Ficino’s language1 — landing on the 
topic of the “the births of the mind,” (“les enfantemens de nostre esprit”2). The 
“children of the mind” are intellectual productions and art work  — no less worthy and 
in fact, more worthy than the offspring of the body, the biological children, due to 
their immortality. 3  
This theory is ascribed to a long tradition of the topos of the author or poet as 
the father of his work, and Montaigne is typically positioned in this fatherly role, in a 
“fantasy of parentage” through the act of writing.4 And yet this “fantasy of parentage” 
does not fit Montaigne’s values and beliefs, in this essay or elsewhere. Much of what 
he says in this final part of the essay, denying his desire for real children, and 
                                                
1 Ficino, Three Books on Life, 115. 
2 Montaigne, Essais, II, VIII, 380.  
3 In De l’amitie, Montaigne quotes a philosopher who when asked about whether he loves his children 
because they are his, answers by spitting on the ground, so as to demonstrate that not everything that the 
body produces is worth admiring, such as worms and feces. This is noteworthy in relation to the 
contradictions in values between the two essays, as explored in Chapter 4.  
4 Kritzman, Lawrence. “Montaigne and the Crisis of Autobiography.” In The Cambridge Companion to 
Autobiography, edited by Maria diBattista and Emily O. Wittman, 49-57. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014, 52.  
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especially boasting that his children are far more “perfect” than biological children 
(“more noble than the body”) do not fit in with his views on love and loss, and the 
overall tone of the essay. There is something off about how Montaigne goes from 
“absolute communication” with a loved one, to the favoring of the sterile endeavor of 
writing, to even suggesting that the victories of war and conquest are comparable 
“children of the mind,” and more worthy than biological ones.  
Instead of automatically identifying these declarations as a psychoanalytic 
“defense mechanism” as Kritzman does — the book as substitute for the child — by 
closely reading the values that the author-book relationship represents, I suggest that 
the book should be read not as a substitution for loss but rather as one final example of 
fatherhood. That is, one more final digression in the essay, rather than a certain 
fruition of the argument, whereas the book is not a vile and smelly example of 
fatherhood, but rather a pure and noble image, such that the aversive images have 
something ideal to interact with.  
The purity of this authorly relationship is not that it transcends death and loss, 
and that it is obviously free of human flaws, as a surface reading suggests. Authorship 
for Montaigne is not represented here, I believe, as a “fantasy of parentage,” but as a 
symbol or image of the purest values of fatherhood as such. As yet another image, 
namely that of “authorship,” and moreover, another liminal image as we will see, 
Montaigne finally provides an exemplary fatherhood. Although, of course, it cannot be 
“blindly followed” since he provides us with only with an [inhuman/liminal/ideal] 
image, always referring us back to ourselves for more guidance.  
The author as father does not, as the topos goes, extend himself into his work, 
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thus immortalizing himself. Instead, the author gives everything to his book, who will 
go on to be immortal without him, allowing his book to be “wiser” and greater than 
him. The book will go on to speak without him, saying even more than he himself, 
Montaigne, could fathom and know: 
…il peut sçavoir assez de choses que je ne sçay plus, et tenir de moy ce que je n’ay 
point retenu […] Il est plus riche que moy, si je suis plus sage que luy.5 
 
The authorship of the book provides the image of the ideal father. The father 
who gives and does not steal, who lets go, not remaining watchful and vigilant, who 
does not hold back, and who says everything, literally as a form of transparent 
communication to which the Essais project aspires. The image of the author as an 
ideal father finally provides a counterexample to the miserly and withholding fathers, 
and displays, figuratively, the values of fatherhood and a model for fatherhood that 
Montaigne can entrust. Emphasizing not the purity of the (inhuman) child, the 
immortal child of art, as the trope goes, but rather, the giving of the father — an image 
of giving: “comme on donne aux enfans corporels.”  
A cettuy cy tel qu’il est, ce que je donne, je le donne purement et irrevocablement, 
comme on donne aux enfans corporels;6 
 
As Montaigne has shown, this pure and unconditional love is not given to 
“corporeal” (real and human) children, who become beggars and thieves as a result of 
the waste and folly of their fathers. Thus Montaigne does not position himself as the 
father who seeks to birth a non-biological child-substitute in this phallic compensatory 
act. Rather, he positions himself as the author in order to exemplify and demonstrate 
pure love, fatherly or other, in this ultimate form of giving and letting go. With the 
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book, Montaigne concludes his argument, and also, once more, takes his leave: “Ce 
peu de bien que je luy ay faict, il n’est plus en ma disposition.”7  
 
 
 
                                                
7 Ibid.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
PLAYING WITH MONSTERS 
 
 
Every injury would be fatal if tissues were incapable of 
forming scars and blood incapable of clotting. 
 
                              GUÉYENOT 1   
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Montaigne’s essay, De l’amitie, is most commonly read as an ode to his friend, 
La Boétie, and to their “ineffable and inevitable friendship.”2 La Boétie’s death, as 
discussed, is often considered to be at the heart of the writing of the Essais project and 
its fragmented nature: “the loss of the friend sublimated by the text”…“the loss of 
wholeness in favor of fragmented writing”.3  
As Montaigne himself claims in the opening of his essay, La Boétie’s 
renowned treatise against tyranny, La Servitude Voluntaire, was to serve as the 
centerpiece of the essay, in order to honor the friend. As one of Montaigne’s many 
self-deprecating avowals go, he confesses at the beginning of the essay that his only 
skill and talent lie in the art of ornamentation, i.e., filling in the void around the 
centerpiece with grotesque or monstrous figures, while falling short at the structured 
portrait or center. Notably, this confession is found to reflect the monstrous writing 
style considered as one of the hallmarks of his Essais. As a result of this 
“shortcoming,” therefore, Montaigne decides to borrow a “centerpiece” from his 
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2 Desan, Montaigne: A Life, 144.  
3 Richard L. Regosin, The Matter of My Book: Montaigne’s Essais as the Book of the Self (Berkeley:  
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friend: “Je me suis advisé d'en emprunter un [un tableau] d'Estienne de la Boitie, qui 
honorera tout le reste de cette besongne.”4  
But as we notice already in this simple confession of a shortcoming in which 
his friend surpasses him in talent (“je n’en connois point qui luy soit comparable”5) — 
the “honor” might only serve to shine on, and honor, Montaigne’s own work, rather 
than commemorate the friend: “qui honorera tout le reste de cette besongne.” The 
emphasis is placed on a “borrowing” (d’en emprunter) for Montaigne’s own sake — a 
borrowing, which I will show, will further be transformed into a full demand and 
ceasing of what belongs to his friend.  
Furthermore, as we find out at the end of the essay, Montaigne has pulled back 
on his decision to commemorate his friend with this “centerpiece,” and none of La 
Boétie’s writing ends up appearing in his essay, an omission that has been considered 
a central mystery regarding the Essais.6  
While for Regosin the missing essay merely replicates and reproduces the 
unease of loss and absence,7 Régine Reynolds-Cornell argues more subtly for a 
political justification for the omission: an intentional obscurity and refusal to say 
everything. Suggesting that, Montaigne did not have faith in overt dissent, and 
therefore chose the covert dissent of his Essais to the overt dissent expressed in his 
friend’s treatise, which he felt might be too explicit and subversive.8  
                                                
4 Montaigne, Essais, I, XXVII, 182.  
5 Ibid.  
6 For an elaborate discussion of the “mystery” of the omission of La Boétie’s treatise, and possible 
justifications, see: David Lewis Schaefer, ed., Freedom Over Servitude: Montaigne, La Boétie, and On  
Voluntary Servitude (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998). 
7 Regosin, The Matter of My Book: Montaigne’s Essais as the Book of the Self, 20.  
8 Régine Reynolds-Cornell, “Smoke and Mirrors: Covert Dissent in Montaigne’s Essays and Overt 
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Desan, on the other hand, takes the essay’s ode to this “ineffable and inevitable 
friendship,” with a grain of salt, and instead uncovers some of Montaigne’s rhetorical 
devices and manipulations. Desan points to the fact that this notion of an ideal 
friendship was a common literary topos of the sixteenth century, used as an “exercise 
in humanism,” rather than a lived reality: “humanism puts friendship on a pedestal, 
because it symbolizes the most human of feelings.”9 According to Desan, Montaigne, 
whose fame, and political and authorial status lagged behind La Boétie’s, exploited 
this topos “in order to generate a mutual and reciprocal debt which would explain all 
the political and authorial fame and advancement Montaigne gained from La 
Boétie.”10 
My reading of this essay agrees with Desan’s more suspicious, rhetorical and 
even manipulative reading of Montaigne. However, instead of reading the “generation 
of mutual and reciprocal debt” created through this figure of an ideal friendship, as a 
political or authorial one, I reveal the personal and subjective “gains” of a friendship 
“placed on a pedestal,” in terms of Montaigne’s melancholic subjectivity. This reading 
approaches Montaigne’s melancholic subjectivity to Canguilhem’s notion of health, 
understood as an adaptation to a change in “milieu” and “norms,” in contrast to the 
Freudian notion of melancholy seen as a pathological reaction to the environment, 
specifically to loss. Finally, this healthy “adaptation,” as I will show, takes place 
through the notion of early-modern melancholy as radical subjective oscillations in 
                                                                                                                                       
Dissent in the Discourse On Voluntary Servitude,” in Freedom Over Servitude: Montaigne, La Boétie, 
and On Voluntary Servitude, ed. David Lewis Schaefer, 115-126 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
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9 Desan, Montaigne: A Life, 144.  
10 Ibid., 116.  
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feelings and perspective.  
If, according to Desan, the ideal friendship figured in this essay as a monstrous 
attachment and conjoinedness, allows Montaigne to omit his treatise from the essay 
and in this sense abandon La Boétie, provided the justification that the two friends are 
one,11 I argue that Montaigne exploits conjoinedness in order to personally absolve 
himself of guilt and mourning. Not as an end in itself, but in order to preserve the 
primacy of experience as an internal phenomena, which any sort of division and 
relationality would necessarily disrupt.  
Preserving the integrity of experience in this manner is more than a stoic 
“immunity to misfortune” against the uncontrollable forces of external reality, as it is a 
shifting malleable interior and emotional relation to the environment, and not a fixed 
state of a certain “freedom from emotions.”12 Read in contrast to the previous essay, 
De l’affection des peres aux enfans, I will reveal shifts and reversals in values and 
ethics, corresponding with the melancholic position of oscillation between, and 
commitment to, new and changing realities, perceived as offering health and 
adaptability to the subject.  
Similarly, I argue that these contrarieties and oscillations also find their 
expression through Montaigne’s play with the notion of the monstrous itself. Much 
like his play with the norms of fatherhood, the norms of avarice, the norms of folly, of 
which the play on the proverb: “Il faut se depouiller avant de se coucher,” was 
symbolic in the previous essay and chapter, this new liminal figuration of a monstrous 
                                                
11 Desan, Montaigne: A Life, 116.  
12  Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy. (New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone, 
1967), 264. 
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attachment, of his friendship as monstrous, will be represented as a play on and with 
other monsters in Montaigne’s essays, and moreover, a play on the more traditional, 
and again, normative, notion of the monstrous in his time.  
In particular, the figure of the “monstrous friendship” as truly monstrous, 
miraculous, and truly rare, will be read in contrast to Montaigne’s other monsters, 
specifically in relation to the “monstrous child” of another essay, D’un enfan 
monstrueux. Contrary to the “monstrous friendship,” which will prove beyond 
comprehension and classification, the monstrosity and rarity of the “monstrous child” 
lends itself to understanding and familiarization, and is consequently normalized. This 
distinction between the truly rare, or the truly monstrous, and that which is merely 
novel or anomalous, in Canguilhem’s terms, meaning simply “diverse,” will further 
emphasize Montaigne’s subjective shifts in worldviews and theories, to which he 
matches these strategic images and figurations. 
The complete reversal of values and ethics between De l’affection des peres 
aux enfans and De l’amitié, and between the different figurations of monstrosity, will 
illustrate that the reversal of values characteristic of folly and melancholy, is not a 
fixed reversal, and is subject to the rapid shifts of subjectivity and perspective that 
define the melancholic subject of early-modern thought.  
In stark contrast to the Freudian understanding of melancholy as a pathological 
versus a “normal” reaction to loss, pathological due to a failure of individuation 
between the ego and the loved object (resulting in “melancholy cannibalism”),13 this 
reading will present Montaigne’s potential “cannibalism” in terms of health, according 
                                                
13 Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia”, 249-250 
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to Canguilhem’s understanding of the term.  
Health for Canguilhem is first and foremost a subjective evaluation on the part 
of the individual, and not an external or objective measure: a qualification of 
wellbeing as consciously felt and reported by the individual or sick person. Secondly, 
health is defined as the ability to adapt to, and be compatible with life in its diversity 
and change. Pathology, Canguilhem writes, “implies pathos, the direct and concrete 
feeling of suffering and impotence, the feeling of life gone wrong.”14 Against 
naturalist and biological accounts, which have been tainted by statistical and physical 
measures, Canguilhem places health within the human psyche, and the human ability 
to tolerate variations in norms, “adaptation to a personal milieu is one of the 
fundamental presuppositions of life.”15  
In this manner, Montaigne’s “devouring of the other” in this monstrous 
attachment, can be read as a healthy response to the norms of individuation, which 
might institute loss and grief. In addition, the monstrous figure allows Montaigne to 
self-define, and to constitute his own subjective norms, reshaping and reclaiming his 
experience, or pathos against what is customary. Given that for Montaigne the 
monstrous friendship is also a literary figure, it is important to keep in mind that this 
“healthy adaptation” also symbolizes Montaigne’s views and critique of social norms. 
In this way, the monstrous figuration parallels melancholy’s duality, at once in the 
form of subjective and internal perceptions, and in its own critique and (externalized) 
condemning of the world, i.e., its contemptus mundi. 
                                                
14 Georges Canguilhem, On the Normal and the Pathological, 77 (my emphasis).  
15 Canguilhem, Knowledge of Life. Translated by Stefanos Geroulanos and Daniela Ginsburg.  
(New York: Fordham University Press. 2008), 129.  
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Finally, these melancholic oscillations also provide additional context to the 
well-noted notion of self-difference in Montaigne’s writing, the notion of a subject as 
“patchwork,” (“Nous sommes tous de lopins”16), where, according to Montaigne, 
“each day brings about a new fantasy” (“Chaque jour nouvelle fantasie”17), and “each 
bit [of us], each moment [in time], plays its role” (“chaque piece, chaque momant, 
faict son jeu”18). 
Hassan Melehy has identified Montaigne’s essay form with the notion of self-
difference, as a discourse produced in layers, assembled in parts, through revisions and 
the rewriting of experience over time. The self-different subject constitutes itself in 
this form of writing as a kind of tracing of experience, a movement towards a unified 
self, that remains forever disrupted by the movement itself, in time and language.19 
Melehy’s notion of self-difference primarily expresses the alterity produced by 
language, in Derridian terms of a self-exceeding self and the impossibility of auto-
affection and pure presence, which situates the Montaignian subject as already 
postmodern.  
Early-modern melancholy, on the other hand, provides a notion of self-
difference that maintains the internal integrity, and even wholeness, of experience and 
interiority, which I believe are more consistent with Montaigne’s subjectivity. Within 
this context, the oscillations and tensions internal to the melancholic subject, explored 
in Chapter 1 through Burton’s poem: “I’ll not change life with any king,” / “I'll change 
my state with any wretch,” also shed light on Montaigne’s fundamental notion of self-
                                                
16 Montaigne, Essais, II, II, 321.  
17 Ibid., 317. 
18 Ibid., 321.  
19 Melehy, Writing Cogito, 68.  
  
152 
difference where “each day brings about a new fantasy,” and there is as much internal 
otherness, “between us and ourselves,” as there is otherness between ourselves and 
others (“Et se trouve autant de difference de nous à nous mesmes, que de nous à 
autruy”20). 
Approaching early-modern melancholy oscillations to Montaigne’s self-
difference, suggests that, while the subject might not be self-identical over time, the 
shifts are not simply produced by the alterity of language as an external force. And 
that, as I will show, Montaigne’s rhetoric and figurations display an agency and even 
mastery over these various and shifting adaptations. Melancholy, therefore, pervades 
the Essais not in its fragmented style and monstrous form reflective of an absence or a 
lack, but rather in the fragmented content and values, reflected in these contingent, 
and, often contradictory, feelings and needs that each different moment brings, unified 
through melancholy subjectivity, rather than lost in time.  
I. A NEW CONTEMPTUS MUNDI, AND NEW VALUES 
 
Montaigne’s contemptus mundi expressed through his harsh indictments of the 
fathers in De l’affection des peres aux enfans, his calls to value generosity and letting 
go, which he alone claimed to embody as friend and author, cease to apply in his 
essay, De l’amitie. Here, a new contemptus mundi will find new targets, presenting a 
new reversal of values, and a new ethics. In De l’amitie, this new contemptus mundi 
will be directed at all “common” and “ordinary” relationships, encompassing all 
relationships but his own, including father-son relationships, where the honesty and 
perfect communication advocated for in De l’affection, become misplaced and even 
                                                
20 Montaigne, Essais, II, II, 321.  
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immoral.  
In a similar shift, the rhetoric persuading us of letting go, will be replaced by 
the figure of a “monstrous friendship”: a monstrous attachment to the other that will 
dissolve and obviate these values of generosity and letting go altogether. Through this 
new figuration, taking becomes giving, theft becomes the most ethical, and an 
obligation to grieve the dead loved one is subsumed by the attachment and the 
indivisible monstrosity of the two.   
Presented as an ode to his friend, De l’amitie immediately digresses into a 
defense of Montaigne’s “half life” and “halfness” — “il me semble n’estre plus qu’à 
demy,”21 such that continuing to live would mean not only living in infinite grief, but 
also in infinite guilt. Quoting Terence, Montaigne writes: “Nor may I rightly taste of 
pleasure here alone, — so I resolved — when he who shared my life is gone.”22 
Montaigne expresses this dilemma and guilt as the fear that he is “stealing his share” 
(“il me semble que je luy desrobe sa part”23), since everything, including life, is shared 
down to each moment, experience, pleasure, projected into the future from which the 
other will continually be absent, and will continually be unable to claim and enjoy his 
share.  
The monstrous union — what is his is mine — is therefore not just an 
expression of pure love and even attachment. It is also an attempt to respond to, and 
perhaps even prevent, the prompting of infinite and monstrous grief — infinite 
because, without the monstrous attachment, and with the (normative) division between 
                                                
21 Montaigne, Essais, I, XXVIII, 192.  
22 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, I, 28, 143.  
23 Montaigne, Essais, I, XXVIII, 192. 
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two people, life and death would also go their separate ways: 
et les plaisirs mesmes qui s’offrent à moy, au lieu de me consoler, me 
redoublent le regret de sa perte […] il me semble que je luy desrobe sa part.24 
Far from a “work of mourning,” adjusting to the new “reality principle” of 
absence, mourning, which is again unnamed here, except as the “regret de sa perte” 
(again the “chagrin of losing him”), proves to deepen with time, to double itself (“me 
redoublent”), with each moment that is lived or enjoyed without the other, and with 
each moment that the other continues to not enjoy. Contrary to the notion of death and 
loss as an event outside of life, Montaigne provides us with yet another image of death 
as a fully internal experience, one that therefore can be structured internally (“bastir la 
mort”), even as it regards the death of the other.  
The image of the “monstrous friendship” absorbs the “half life” into its fold, 
even beyond the “gouster” and “savoring” of the friend from the previous chapter, into 
an endless and definitively indivisible hybridity or mixture. Through this new liminal 
image, life belongs to both friends, indivisibly, and so do the pleasures, and any other 
experiences and goods. It is as if Montaigne wants to argue that even if he wanted to, 
he could not discern what belongs to him, and what belongs to his friend. And 
therefore, in light of this monstrosity, Montaigne is not “stealing his share,” or for that 
matter even living without his friend, since life, and even “personhood,” is transferable 
from the one to the other: “celuy qui n’est pas autre : c’est moy.”25 
Not letting go of his friend, “taking” from his friend by continuing to live in 
his absence, are now the means by which Montaigne survives even more honestly and 
                                                
24 Ibid., ibid.  
25 Ibid., 190.  
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more ethically than he would if he were living according to the values of letting go 
and generosity that he modeled in De l’affection des peres aux enfans. He achieves 
this by constructing an alternative world, another “distorted” world of melancholy, in 
which taking from the friend, or enjoying what has belonged and will belong to the 
friend, is doing the utmost service to the friend.  
As a surviving “half,” Montaigne must “steal” from his friend, in order to 
continue survive: “Nous estions à moitié de tout : il me semble que je luy desrobe sa 
part” (“In everything we were halves: I feel as though I am stealing his share from 
him”). At the same time, he has to justify, to lay claim to his life and all its 
“pleasures,” therefore asserting that he is in fact no other than his friend: “celuy qui 
n’est pas autre : c’est moy,” by which he generates “a mutual and reciprocal debt,” in 
Desan’s terms.  Consequently, anything that belongs to the one, also belongs to the 
other, not only material goods, but also spiritual and mental ones (“volontez, 
pensemens, jugemens”), thereby supposedly solving the ethical dilemma of the 
remaining “half”:  
Tout estant par effect commun entre eux, volontez, pensemens, jugemens, biens, 
femmes, enfans, honneur et vie […] ils ne se peuvent ny prester, ny donner rien.26 
  
[Everything actually being in common between them — wills, thoughts, judgments, 
goods, wives, children, honor, and life […] they can neither lend nor give anything to 
each other.]27  
 
Specifically in relation to the generosity/avarice, giving/theft, letting 
go/holding on — the dichotomies analyzed in Chapter 3, Montaigne in this essay 
argues that with a true friend, the concept of theft radically dissolves, as the two are in 
                                                
26 Ibid., 189 (my emphasis).  
27 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, I, 28, 141 (my emphasis).   
  
156 
fact one, and therefore what belongs to one belongs naturally to the other: “ile ne se 
peuvent ny prester ny doner rien.” 
The very notion of giving/taking, if it exists between the friends, undermines 
the friendship, and renders it, in a derogatory sense in this essay, “common and 
familiar”  (“amitiez ordinaires et coustumières”28). A friendship that abides by any 
notion of “economy” whatsoever renders it a non-friendship, compared with this 
perfect, true and rare form of union, next to which all other forms are less than 
shadows or “sorry excuses.”  
Therefore, while this figure of a perfect friendship may be an expression of a 
literary topos of ideal and ineffable love, it is also a perfect expression of early-
modern melancholy, carried by the figure of the monster: a position of unique 
superiority against which everything else is common, low and worldly, which 
resonates with the feelings of radical singularity demonstrated in the analysis of 
Burton’s poem: “all my joys to this are folly”, giving way to new “indictments,” and a 
new contemptus mundi.  
In this perfect identity, union, and consubstantiality, no “exchange” is possible, 
no lending, and no borrowing: “ils ne se peuvent ny prester ny donner rien.” Keeping 
in mind that Montaigne wanted to “borrow” a centerpiece from the “talented” La 
Boétie, we can now take note that such a borrowing would have in fact been 
impossible, as it would have undermined Montaigne’s central argument regarding 
their union. Perhaps, then, the omission can be seen as a consistent replication of this 
monstrous indivisibility, rather than the “replication of absence,” as Regosin 
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suggested. This justification for the omission is further solidified by Montaigne’s 
mention that La Boétie’s treatise against tyranny was also referred to as Le Contre Un 
(“mais ceux qui l’ont ignoré, l'ont bien proprement dépuis rebatisé, Le Contre Un”),29 
which emphasizes the importance and ambiguity of Montaigne’s oneness: the oneness 
of the monster as a tribute, and yet an oblique tribute, to the original oneness of 
tyranny in La Boétie’s treatise.  
To fully seal his argument of the impossibility of “taking” from the friend, 
Montaigne pushes his examples and images to the limit and to their complete reversal, 
much like he did in De l’affection des peres aux enfans. In De l’amitie, he 
demonstrates how when one friend ends up taking something from the other, it is the 
other — the giver — who is indebted to his friend: “Si, en l’amitié dequoy je parle, 
l’un pouvoit donner à l’autre, ce seroit celuy qui recevroit le bien-fait, qui obligeroit 
son compagnon.”30 [“If in the friendship of which I speak, the one could give to the 
other, it would be the one who received the benefaction who would lay an 
obligation.”]  (My translation). 
The conditional is used here since it is merely hypothetical that it was possible 
to give to a friend, since in fact there is no start or end to the union between the two, 
and no possible distinction that would allow this economy. But given this hypothetical 
situation in which one friend gave something to the other, Montaigne effects a full 
reversal of the giving/taking dynamic. The giver, and not the receiver, would be 
indebted to the friend to whom he gave something, because the receiver is the one who 
allowed for the giver to achieve his most supreme desire — to give to his friend. In 
                                                
29 Ibid., 182.  
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this complete reversal, it is the receiver who turns into the giver, “donnant ce 
contentement à son amy d’effectuer en son endroit ce qu’il désire le plus,”31 giving his 
friend an opportunity to give. The receiver gives giving to the giver. 
In Jacques Derrida’s account of death and friendship in Donner la mort, which 
strongly echoes De l’amitie, the ideal ethical act is the act of a gratuitous giving of 
one’s life for another. But ultimately, Derrida points to the impossibility of the 
gratuitous gift that defines an altruistic disinterested friendship, since those conditions 
of possibility would be inhuman: requiring complete anonymity, that there be no trace 
of any exchange or indebtedness, no interest or purpose, which are inevitable aspects 
of language and communication.32 
Against this account, and through these liminal imageries and scenes, 
Montaigne proves the impossible possible, especially since he has opted for the image 
of the monstrous, which allows him to surpass these human limitations of an 
exchange. By providing examples that exceed seemingly reasonable and common 
circumstances, notably, the monstrous, Montaigne is capable of “proving” the purity 
of his disinterested friendship and consequently resolving the dilemma of living 
without the friend, by taking from the dead friend, instead of attempting to give to 
him, as in Derrida’s account.  
By confusing and reordering the giving/taking dynamic (here we can be 
reminded again of the “chaotic ordering” of the Melancolia I scene), Montaigne offers 
that his friend give what one would normally take: goods, pleasure, life, while taking 
                                                
31 Ibid., ibid.  
32 Jacques Derrida, Donner la mort (Paris: Galilée, 1999). 
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is redefined as “giving giving” — allowing the friend to give, which is, according to 
Montaigne, the greatest gift one can give his friend, even at the friend’s own self-
sacrifice and his giving up of his life and his share.  
In another digression and anecdote, Montaigne gives the example of the 
philosopher Diogenes, who, instead of asking his friends for money when he needed 
some, reclaimed it from them, as if it were his money — it is his, Montaigne writes, 
with the same consubstantiality that defines his friendship: “Quand le Philosophe 
Diogenes avoit faute d’argent, il disoit, qu’il le redemandoit à ses amis, non qu’il le 
demandoit.” Again we see how these extreme examples, extreme behaviors, and what 
could seem like “folly,” are strategically reversed in order to generate the values and 
ethics that Montaigne needs, and which the particular “moment” requires.  
Still using “folly” as a critical representation of the world, Montaigne poses 
himself with another preposterous question, in another melancholic digression that 
fully reverses the logic presented in De l’affection des peres aux enfans. In De 
l’amitie, he does not digress into a confession of the death of his children, as he did 
there, but instead claims that he would happily be willing to kill his only surviving 
daughter, if that were his friend’s request: 
à qui s’enquerroit à moy de cette façon: “Si vostre volonté vous commandoit de tuer 
vostre fille, la tueriez vous?” et que je l’accordasse. […] par ce que je ne suis point en 
doute de ma volonté, et tout aussi peu de celle d’un tel amy.33 
 
[if someone questioned me in this fashion: “if your will commanded you to kill your 
daughter, would you kill her?” and I said yes […] because I have no doubt at all about 
my will, and just as little about that of such a friend.]34 
 
                                                
33 Montaigne, Essais, I, XXVIII, 188.  
34 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, I, 28, 140.  
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His ethical justification for this murderous act lies in the absolute union of his 
will with that of his friend’s, such that it would be as if he, Montaigne, had asked 
himself to kill his own daughter, and one does not doubt their own will… another 
confession that we should find quite shocking, but that hides behind these images and 
conceptual personaes that speak for Montaigne, producing a rhetorical distance that 
seems to absolve him of “getting caught.” Or rather, which preserve his internal 
integrity and the impenetrability of the interior to the outside, to which the self as the 
monster will allude.   
Further exploring the shifts and contradictions between the two essays, De 
l’affections des peres aux enfans in Chapter 3, and De l’amitie in the present chapter, 
the imperfections, or rather, foolish and extreme “faults” that were attributed to fathers 
in relation to their sons in De l’affection des peres aux enfans, are in De l’amitie 
depicted as natural and necessary, not at the fault of either party, but structural and 
cultural. In some places, Montaigne writes, it is customary for children and fathers to 
murder each other, in order to prevent the mutual threat or competition. In stark 
contrast to the horror he expressed of this kind of relationship in De l’affection des 
peres aux enfans, here he even suggests that their mutual destruction is only natural: 
“et naturellement l’un depend de la ruine de l’autre.”35 Under this light, in this essay, 
trial, tasting, experience, there is nothing to marvel at, ridicule or critique in the acts of 
parricide, competition and avarice on each side, it is mere custom, and understandably 
so, as fathers and sons are “natural” contenders.  
 Fathers and sons, like husband and wife, like master and servant, like brothers, 
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and like all other friendships (“common and familiar,” not genuine and true), with the 
exception of “this one,” are bound and dictated by law and convention, by needs and 
economic exchanges: laws of marriage, civic laws, family law, as opposed to freewill.  
The freewill that Montaigne granted to the fathers in De l’affection des peres 
aux enfans, which they alas failed to live up to in their folly and avarice, the freewill 
that was a necessary condition for them to “err” and commit these tragic follies, is no 
longer portrayed as a flaw of blindness, but rather as a structural and defining 
condition.  
 While in De l’affection des peres aux enfans, the smelly and frightening fathers 
were the examples against which Montaigne modeled memento mori, honesty and 
gratuitous generosity, these flawed father-son relationships now serve to avert and 
warn against a different and opposite phenomena: believing to have a true friendship 
and honest communication when one does not, and when such a friendship cannot 
exist, for lack of freewill which can only derive, paradoxically, from an involuntary 
and mystic mixture of wills and desires, as exemplified by his friendship.  
 More specifically, these inherently dishonest relationships, like those between 
fathers and children, now warn us against the tyrannical, forceful nature of civil 
society, which only a true friendship can transcend, and to which the only antidote is 
such a friendship.  
L’amitié se nourrit de communication qui ne peut se trouver entre eux [entre enfans et 
peres], pour la trop grande disparité, et offenceroit à l’adventure les devoirs de nature. 
Car ny toutes les secrettes pensées des peres ne se peuvent communiquer aux enfans 
pour n’y engendrer une messeante private, ny les advertissemens et corrections, qui 
est un des premiers offices d’amitié, ne se pourroient exercer des enfans aux peres.36 
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[Friendship feeds on communication, which cannot exist between them [fathers and 
sons] because of their too great inequality, and might perhaps interfere with the duties 
of nature. For neither can all the secret thoughts of fathers be communicated to 
children, lest this beget an unbecoming intimacy, nor could the admonitions and 
corrections, which are one of the chief duties of friendship, be administered by 
children to fathers.]37  
 
 This same full, and honest communication, this deep familiarity and friendship 
that Montaigne deplores with Monluc in De l’affection des peres aux enfans, whose 
most significant heartbreak according to Montaigne was not having been able to fully 
communicate with him and declare the deep friendship he felt for him, is in De 
l’amitie only reserved for the rare friendships from which family relations are 
excluded, and even constitute a violation of nature (“offenserait a l’aventure les 
devoirs de nature”38).  
 In De l’amitie, Montaigne even argues, that such a communication between 
fathers and sons would involve an inappropriate intimacy, a familiarity that unsuitable 
for this kind of relationship: “pour n’y engendrer une messeante privaute” (“not to 
create an inappropriate intimacy”). That is, the very value that was lost to the fathers 
in De l’affection des peres aux enfans, and that deemed their lives wasteful and 
shameful in Montaigne’s eyes, is now deemed impossible and even inappropriate to 
begin with.  
II.  THE MONSTER AND MELANCHOLY  
 
While the subject of Burton’s poem expresses rapid and inexplicable 
oscillations, it also expresses an attachment and commitment on the part of the subject 
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to each and every changing subjective position, as a unique and rare experience that 
cannot be shared or understood by anyone else.  
The repeating contrasting positions: “I’ll not change life with any king,” / “I'll 
change my state with any wretch,” have shown to express not only an extreme shift, 
but also a “unique” feeling of being “higher” and “lower” than everyone else — the 
feeling of an incomparable feeling. This “unique” position, even as it is expressed in 
suffering, as the absolute worst, or lowest (“I’ll change my state with any wretch”), is 
another figure of early-modern ambiguity and internal movements held in one.  
Similarly, and even more hyperbolically, the “monstrous friendship” of De 
l’amitie, expresses a oneness, an indivisibility so perfect, and so unique, that it 
precludes any outside access, any understanding, and any comparison to any other 
relations experienced by anyone else. It is, or feels like, the “rarest thing in the world,” 
“la chose la plus une et unie, et dequoy une seule est encore la plus rare à trouver au 
monde,”39 of which nothing similar can even be read about: “si entiere et si parfaite 
que certainement il ne s’en lit guiere de pareilles,”40 and of which not even a trace of 
such a perfection can be found in society, “et entre nos hommes il ne s’en voit aucune 
trace en usage.”41 
The relationship between this construction of a truly monstrous and rare 
attachment and Montaigne’s melancholic position is further reinforced in its stark 
opposition to Montaigne’s general theory of the monstrous as a rarity and otherness to 
be familiarized with and admonished.  
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Early-modern humanism maintained both later medieval views of the monsters 
as wonders and miracles of Nature that do not fit into systems of knowledge, and as 
portents for divinations or allegorical interpretations, along with more scientific 
approaches which classified the monstrous within these systems, thereby neutralizing 
their rarity.42   
Most critics tend to see Montaigne’s monstrous in line with this second 
approach.  As Regosin notes:  
Montaigne’s commentaries have the effect of neutralizing the monstrous, of removing 
the stigma of aberrance, and of eliminating its conventional referential value as a 
meaningful sign that points beyond itself (as prophecy, prediction, omen).43  
 
But, as Long points out, Montaigne in a sense mocks both approaches: the 
monster as marvel, and the systematizing and medical neutralizing of the monstrous. 
Both approaches ascribe a certain level of pathology and abnormality to the 
monstrous, whereas Montaigne sees the monstrous as the “simple fact” of diversity 
found everywhere. Instead, Montaigne employs the term monstrous critically, as one 
that points to the human presumption to know all things, and master the world, and 
therefore, for Montaigne, the term becomes a sign of human limitation, of the 
“deformity” of human knowledge itself.44   
Similarly, Daston and Park describe the pre-scientific endeavors of 
preternatural philosophy at the ordering the natural world, into the very edges of its 
                                                
42 Kathleen Long, “Montaigne on Monsters and Monstrosity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Montaigne,  
ed. Philippe Desan, 715-731 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 720. 
43 Regosin, Montaigne’s Unruly Brood: Textual Engendering and the Challenge to Paternal Authority,  
164. 
44 The “deforming aspect of human cognition” is central to the chapter: Long, “Montaigne on Monsters 
and Monstrosity.” 
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marvels and occult forces,45 as a challenge at the heart of human presumption itself, 
such that wonders became:  
a gauntlet thrown down to the man who could explain not only particulars, but 
extraordinary particular, thus proving himself a wonder in his own wright. In this way, 
wonder became a reflection of virtuosity and connoisseurship […]46 
 
Montaigne, of course, is at odds with this excitement into the occult, and views it as an 
“impudent desire to know inessentials and secrets.”47 
These views are consistent with Montaigne’s essay D’un enfan monstrueux, 
where the case of the “monstrous child” is both an opportunity to familiarize oneself 
with what appears as monstrous — to observe its body and difference, and as a result, 
to dispel its rarity and otherness. It is also an opportunity for Montaigne, to point once 
more to the human presumption to know “all forms,” which, according to this essay, is 
responsible for producing the monstrous sight.  
In this essay, monstrosity is placed in the context of a novelty presented to the 
limited scope of human knowledge and experience, as it is for someone who upon 
seeing a “river” for the first time, would mistake it for an “ocean”: “Celuy qui n’avoit 
jamais veu de riviere, à la premiere qu’il rencontra, il pensa que ce fust l’Ocean”48 
[“He who has never before seen a river, will, upon the first one he will meet, think it 
was the Ocean”].  
This error resulting from the human limitation of knowledge and experience is 
a reflection of the human limitation in regards to the entirety of forms, and the entirety 
                                                
45 Lorraine J. Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature: 1150-1750 (New York: 
Zone Books, 1998), 160. 
46 Ibid., 179.  
47 Ibid., 306. 
48 Montaigne, Essais, I, XXVI. 
  
166 
of Nature, to which human sight will always be blind or impaired. Being unaware, i.e., 
being blind to this limitation, however, produces feelings of wonder and astonishment 
(“cette figure qui nous estonne”), and thus an illusion of the monster:  
Et est à croire, que cette figure qui nous estonne, se rapporte et tient, à quelque autre 
figure de mesme genre, incognu à l’homme49 
 
If we postpone judgment, Montaigne may be implying, and learn to adjust our sight to 
the novel and different that at first astonish us, we would become as accustomed to the 
monster as to anything else, and its novelty would fade away, along with its 
astonishing otherness, which is nothing less than a human error:  
Nous appellons contre nature, ce qui advient contre la coustume. Rien n’est que selon 
elle, quel qu’il soit. Que cette raison universelle et naturelle, chasse de nous l’erreur et 
l'estonnement que la nouvelleté nous apporte.50 
 
[We call contrary to nature what happens contrary to custom; nothing is anything but 
according to nature, whatever it may be. Let this universal and natural reason drive 
out of us the error and astonishment that novelty brings us.]51  
 
Self-awareness towards the ways in which custom and culture familiarize us 
with certain things versus others, which has far reaching ethical and political 
implications. Montaigne expresses concern with the prejudice and othering involved 
in judgments of the monstrous, which lead to forms of tyranny, colonization and 
killing. This is Montaigne’s argument in C’est folie de rapporter le vrai et le faux a 
notre suffisance, as its title suggests. Judging the other, non-European as “savage,” 
prosecuting witches due to a presumption to know the “possible” from the 
“impossible,” is a greater folly than the practices of witchcraft or magic themselves.  
This understanding of human limitation is applied to Montaigne’s approach 
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regarding a “monstrous child” he witnesses and reports on in D’un enfan monstrueux, 
who having another child attached to him [conjoined twins], was being put on display 
by his parents in hopes of  “making a penny off his strangeness” (“pour tirer quelque 
soul de le monstrer, à cause de son estrangeté”52).   
A matter-of-fact, straightforward, depiction of the child he observes (“Ce 
comte s’en ira tout simple”), noting that the two are attached only in one limited area, 
which is easily observable (“La joincture et l’espace par où ils se tenoient n’estoit que 
de quatre doigts”), and that despite being conjoined, both infants are intact, looking 
almost as if “one smaller infant was trying to hold onto a larger one,” and finally, as 
Montaigne is sure to report to us — each infant has an independent and functioning 
urination system, “La nourrice nous adjoustoit, qu’il urinoit par tous les deux 
endroicts.” A matter-of-fact observation of the monstrous, without any allegorizing 
interpretation, or any interpretation at all for that matter, constitutes Montaigne’s 
“departure from the dominant mode of presenting the monstrous”.53  
The notion of Montaigne’s “monster” as a critical term and as a critique, 
specifically of human presumption and the fundamental limitation or “blindness” it 
expresses, is therefore not unlike folly, and not unlike melancholy, as they have been 
discussed in Chapter 3, through the folly of the fathers in their blindness and 
presumption to reign, and through Monluc’s blindness to the force of death while 
living in ignorance and dishonestly. Like the concept of the monstrous, folly also 
relates primarily to human presumption, to false or misperceived pursuits, which entail 
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similar dangers of self-sabotaging and violence, as we have seen through Pascal’s 
“diversion.”  In response, through its literary representations, like folly it calls for a 
reflective, critical gaze at oneself, much like finding oneself in the fool’s head, finding 
one’s own kind and label of folly as in the Ship of Fools — finding the flaws and 
weaknesses from within oneself, as Foucault notes. 
Thus, as was the case with folly, the monstrous variations will be found and 
represented in accordance with Montaigne’s own subjective (“distorted”) views and 
needs, taking advantage of the “endlessly varied” application of the term itself, in “a 
defiance of order and understanding as the notion it aims to represent.”54 
 
III.  THREE KINDS OF MONSTERS:  
 DE L’AMITIE, D’UN ENFAN MONSTRUEUX, MONTAIGNE 
 
 
In contrast to the “monstrous child” of D’un enfan monstrueux, presented as an 
opportunity to observe a physical otherness that the act of witnessing and storytelling 
would normalize, my reading of the “monstrous friendship” in De l’amitie, 
problematizes the conventional readings of the monstrous in Montaigne as normal and 
natural, as he coopts and preserves the more traditional characteristics of the 
monstrous for himself: rarity, exceptionality, singularity (“one of a kind”), hybridity, 
even portraying it as a miracle. Montaigne’s monstrous friendship lies, in fact, outside 
our systems of knowledge, resulting in a kind of mega-monster. This distinction, 
between the monsters to be normalized, and those to be preserved, reveals 
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Montaigne’s double standard, or rather radical shift, when the ethical questions or 
critique may be directed at him.  
The image of the monstrous friendship parallels in many ways that of the 
monstrous child from De l’enfan monstrueux: the image of conjoined twins, tightened 
by a “seam,” which joins the two together — “la cousture qui les a joinctes” (De 
l’amitie) / “La joincture”… “par où ils se tenoient” (D’un enfan monstrueux).  
The first term (cousture) suggests a more intentional, violent attachment, 
which could also mean “suture,”  — a suture in the place of a preexisting wound? But 
also a more monstrous term suggesting hybridity, the attachment of two foreign 
entities, compared to the latter (joincture) which suggests a more straightforward, 
physical attachment.  In De l’enfan monstrueux, the two bodies are joined together, in 
De l’amitie — it is the two souls that are bound by this stich/seam:    
En l’amitié dequoy je parle, elles [les ames] se meslent et confondent l’une en l’autre, 
d’un meslange si universel, qu'elles effacent, et ne retrouvent plus la cousture qui les a 
joinctes.55 
[In the friendship I speak of, our souls mingle and blend with each other so 
completely that they effect the seam that joined them, and cannot find it again.]56  
 
The adjoining seam, the monstrous bind, gets lost in a mixture so complete 
[“meslange si universel”], that no trace of their attachment, of their hybridity can be 
found or rendered visible to the outside: “qu’elles effacent, et ne retrouvent plus la 
cousture qui les a joinctes,” preventing a priori any individuation and preventing 
Montaigne from facing not only the “reality principle” of the lost object, but more 
importantly, allowing him to maintain his (monstrous) singularity against the banality, 
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boredom, and painfully compromising nature of the outside.  
Unlike the phantasmatic preservation or devouring, the “narcissistic 
cannibalism” of melancholy, and its denial of loss in Freudian terms, Montaigne 
denies that there was any divide to be had in the first place — it is all plenitude 
without the markings and delineations of a “je.”  The self-differentiated subject 
described by Melehy, whereby monstrosity is a reflection of this self-difference over 
time, is in fact an undifferentiated subject mixed in, and folded with, external forces 
and others, mixed in with experience — forming a “perfect” mixture in the sense that 
no “parts” will have survived.    
While the monstrous child was shown, after a non-prejudiced scrutiny, to in 
fact be two independent children, with the exception of some physical points of 
attachment, Montaigne’s absolute lack of individuation in the monstrous friendship 
precludes even an individuation of experience, including grief.  
In addition to the absolving of grief and guilt, Montaigne’s “monster” provides 
him a “shield” from within which he can refuse to partake in anything that is less than 
perfect. That is, anything lesser than what is fully himself. The absolute giving to the 
other, the absolute mixture with no outside, prevents, so he claims, any other forms of 
generosity and giving, any other partaking or sharing: “chacun se donne si entier à son 
amy, qu’il ne luy reste rien à departir ailleurs.”  
Compared with this stitch/seam that is confounded within the perfect 
monstrous mixture, other “connections,” other “ties” and “knots” are weak and loose, 
and therefore incomplete and undesirable to Montaigne:   
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Au demeurant, ce que nous appellons ordinairement amis et amitiez, ce ne sont 
qu’accoinctances et familiaritez nouées par quelque occasion ou commodité, par le 
moyen de laquelle nos ames s’entretiennent.57  
 
[For the rest, what we ordinarily call friends and friendships are nothing but 
acquaintanceships and familiarities formed by some chance or convenience, by means 
of which our souls are bound to each other.]58  
 
The notion of the “cousture” is, within “ordinary” friendships, represented with 
the word nouer, “nouees par quelque occasion,” a liaison, a tie, implying a more 
external connection, one that is visible, easy to find and therefore perhaps one that can 
easily be undone. Nouer also suggests a weaker attachment, as well as a sense of 
artificiality and interestedness, in the sense of an alliance (as in the expression “noüer 
amitié,” meaning, “to make alliance”), with which Montaigne is trying to portray all 
“commonplace” and ordinary relationships (i.e., all relationships but this one) — all 
others are tied by a particular circumstance or benefit: “par quelque occasion ou 
commodité,” and not by the supreme, voluntary and absolute mixture of the souls.  
While the seams of the monstrous child can be observed, even accurately 
measured at a “four finger breadth” [“l’espace par où ils se tenoient n’estoit que de 
quatre doigts”], and while the different parts and members of their attachments can be 
distinguished and looked at, i.e., familiarized with, this current mixture of souls is 
opaque to the human eye and cognition, which as Montaigne has suggested, do not 
have insight into all forms and all of Nature.  
In contrast to the physical and visible body parts of the “monstrous child,” the 
parts that form the friendship are themselves singular and monstrous and cannot be 
                                                
57 Ibid., 186 (my emphasis).  
58 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, I, 28, 139 (my emphasis). The translation to 
“formed” loses all the connotations of monstrosities, mixtures, and ties I am alluding to, so a better 
option would be “tied by some chance.” 
  
172 
explained except in reference to themselves, the “membres” being him (luy) and me 
(moy) — “Par ce que c’estoit luy, par ce que c’estoit moy.” 
Si on me presse de dire59 pourquoy je l’aymoys, je sens que cela ne se peut exprimer, 
qu'en respondant : Par ce que c’estoit luy, par ce que c’estoit moy.60 
 
[If a man should importune me to give a reason why I loved him, I find it could no 
otherwise be expressed, than by making answer: because it was he, because it was I.]61  
 
In this line, “Par ce que c’estoit luy, par ce que c’estoit moy,” famous for the 
expression of an indescribable love, an inexplicable je ne sais quoi that binds them 
together, I also read a sense of deterrence and avoidance of the outside. This evasion 
or closure to the outside is conveyed through the rare and singular position of the 
monstrous that leaves no room for any others, nor for interpretation and intervention 
upon the singular experience, which resonates with the melancholic position of a 
removal and self-distinction from anything or anyone else.   
While the “monstrous child” was in fact not such a miraculous sight, as one 
could become accustomed to it and understand it after observation and familiarization, 
adjusting to the “optical illusion” of the monstrous novelty, the monstrous unity of 
which Montaigne speaks in De l’amitie cannot grow familiar and normal, especially 
not to others — outsiders: the readers, the public.  
So opaque and distant it is from view and from understanding (of those 
ordinary people in ordinary relationships), that Montaigne must emphasize this once 
more, by adding that not only can the traces of the seam not be found, but also no trace 
of such a perfect friendship can be found in society in its entirety, nor even in the 
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writings of the ancients:  
si entiere et si parfaicte [cette amitié], que certainement il ne s’en lit guere de 
pareilles : et entre nos hommes il ne s’en voit aucune trace en usage. Il faut tant de 
rencontre à la bastir, que c’est beaucoup si la fortune y arrive une fois en trois 
siecles.62 
 
[a friendship so perfect and so entire that certainly you will hardly read of the like, and 
among men of today you see no trace of it in practice. So many coincidences are 
needed to build up such a friendship that it is a lot if fortune can do it once in three 
centuries.]63 
 
So exceptional is Montaigne’s experience, that anything in comparison is weak 
and dreary (“lasches”), so much that he believes a friendship like his must only come 
by, to the entire human race… only once every three decades!  
Due to the lack of melancholic affect and expression of suffering and woe-ing 
(“No pain is like thy pain / no pleasure too like thine”64), we are not likely to associate 
Montaigne with a melancholy experience. And yet, his arguments and reasoning 
express this very position.  
In De l’amitie, Montaigne, through his melancholic gaze, depicts another 
negative and sterile world: a world with no friends. “O mes amys, il n’y a nul amy,” 
quoting Aristotle. Again, as the melancholic spectator, he depicts a world with only 
artificial pursuits, and impure, interested relations. Like his position in De l’affection 
des peres aux enfans, and contrary to his seemingly “diverse” essaying, and diverse 
opinions, he positions himself as the only (true) friend here, and the only (true) father 
there.  
His monster theory and melancholy converge as the absolute rarity and opacity 
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of the monstrous friendship and experience (“la plus rare à trouver au monde”) serve a 
melancholic agenda — to at once be able to continue living in face of the death of the 
“other half,” via a monstrous attachment, and at the same time preserving his 
singularity against the demands of the outside, conceived as the “impure” and 
unwanted “mixture” upon the singular individual.  
The fact that Montaigne’s greatest monstrosity is himself, as he claims, is 
typically understood as an extreme version of this human limitation to mastery and 
knowledge, a form of skepticism, applied to the self. 
Je n’ai vu monstre et miracle au monde, plus exprès, que moi-même. On s’apprivoise 
à toute étrangeté par l’usage et le temps. Mais plus je me hante et me connais, plus ma 
difformité m’étonne : moins je m’entends en moi.65  
 
[I have seen no more evident monstrosity and miracle in the world than myself. We 
become habituated to anything strange by use and time; but the more I frequent 
myself and know myself, the more my deformity astonishes me, and the less I 
understand myself.]66 
 
Melehy, for example, explains the monstrous self as an extension of the self-difference 
of the writing subject over time: “The more Montaigne’s ‘I’ writes, reads its own 
writing, rewrites it, moves toward the plenitude of the expression of the self in the 
book, the more foreign it becomes to itself.”67 But, in addition to the monstrous as an 
expression of difference and human limitation, or the fragmented subject, we also read 
that the other, “original” monster, the one who is exceptionally rare, miraculous and 
unique, is also still alive and well.  
The self as the “greatest monster and miracle” should also be seen in direct 
opposition to the familiarizing and normalizing of the other as monster, and of the 
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physical or bodily otherness as monster. By presenting Montaigne’s “double standard” 
regarding the monstrous, it appears that Montaigne also argues for the presence of a 
true, rare, miraculous monster, even, and especially as he reverses the “things” to 
which the term applies.  
The differing views about what counts as monstrous are part of what comprise 
the contrasts, the radical shifts and oscillations in subjective views and perspectives, 
representing significant reflections of subject. A subject, who, is not so much 
postmodern, subject to language and alterity, as much as early-modern — subject to 
internal and humoral fluctuations, the expressions of which we find in these varying 
literary figurations and representations of imagery, conceptual personaes, and finally, 
monsters.  
In this regards, it is important to note that the above passage, Montaigne’s 
famous confession of his own monstrosity, engages directly with his other views, as 
expressed in D’un enfan mosntrueux, and C’est folie de rapporter le vrai et le faux a 
notre suffisance. The first line, “On s’apprivoise à toute étrangeté par l’usage et le 
temps,” is an exact articulation of his general approach to the monstrous. That it is a 
result of novelty, that it can be overcome through custom and familiarization, 
corresponding with the observation he made through the monstrous child, writing that 
“Nous appellons contre nature, ce qui advient contre la coustume,” and accordingly, 
that understanding this can admonish the astonishing effect of novelty: “Que cette 
raison universelle et naturelle, chasse de nous l’erreur et l’estonnement que la 
nouvelleté nous apporte.” Yet the continuation to this phrase represents the polar 
opposite view as it applies to himself: that the more he tries to shake off his own 
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novelty, and the more he gets to know himself (“plus je me hante et me connais”), the 
greater the deformity appears, and greater its effects of astonishment, “plus ma 
difformité m’étonne.”  
Montaigne, the author and also “subject matter” of his own book, and 
moreover, the book’s sole and unique topic, and the only thing of which he knows and 
claims to speak of, despite the supposed range of diverse topics, now reserves the right 
to coopt the monstrous all for himself and anything that concerns him. Notably, his 
book, his friendship, and of course, himself — all deemed to be “one of a kind,” while 
asking others — the readers, the public — to reflect on how our relativism and 
blindness produces the monster, in light of our limitation in regards to the totality of 
forms and Nature. 
This “double standard,” therefore, is consistent from the perspective of a life 
and a project wholly devoted to the self, and whose objective is not to presume to 
know or speak of anything outside the self. What’s more, Montaigne’s project even 
asks to set a model for this “double standard” — investigating and speaking of oneself, 
and not of others — which as a result becomes the greatest form of honesty against the 
norms by which people always presume to judge and speak of others: “Si le monde se 
plaint dequoy je parle trop de moy, je me plains dequoy il ne pense seulement pas à 
soy,”68 (“If the world complains that I speak too much of myself, I complain that it 
does not even think of itself”69). 
The project of speaking uniquely, and only about the self, that is the Essais, 
has something to do with this “double standard.” If Montaigne speaks only of himself, 
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it is also because he does not presume to speak of anything or anyone else. Seen in this 
way, his unique autobiographical project is a project of “no presumption,” more than it 
is a project of establishing selfhood. To reread the passage again in this new light:  
Je n’ai vu monstre et miracle au monde, plus exprès, que moi-même. On s’apprivoise 
à toute étrangeté par l’usage et le temps. Mais plus je me hante et me connais, plus ma 
difformité m’étonne : moins je m’entends en moi70  
 
Montaigne is not just saying that he is the greatest and most manifest miracle.  
He is also saying that he is the greatest and most manifest miracle that he has ever 
seen: “Je n’ai vu monstre et miracle au monde, plus exprès, que moi-même.” Meaning, 
inversely, that he has not seen anything else as manifestly, as clearly monstrous, in 
anyone or anything else… and his deformity, is only astonishing to him, “plus ma 
difformité m’étonne.” Therefore, when it comes to all other ‘monsters,’ he remains 
unpresumptuous and also un-inquisitive in the same way. He does not ‘haunt them’ 
obsessively as he does himself (“plus je me hante et me connais”), making room for 
them to vanish over time and become familiar, which still remains consistent with his 
ethics of otherness. And, as Montaigne would suggest, everyone should concern 
themselves only with themselves to this extent (the process of “hanter” and 
“connaitre”), where they would become their greatest monsters, and the only monsters 
they should presume to see.    
 
IV.  THE MONSTER AS AN ANTI-SOCIAL SHIELD  
 
 
But the “double standard” of the monstrous is not just an ethical and moral 
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position. It is also a figure for anti-social values and a shield against the judgment of 
others, which is, I believe one of Montaigne’s deepest concerns, not just morally, but 
from a personal fear of being judged. If Montaigne finds the judgment of others, the 
judgment of the ‘monstrous’ to be presumptuous, foolish and even immoral, it is also 
because he wants to make the argument that one cannot rightfully or accurately judge 
him or his work.  
The ‘genuine,’ or traditional monster that Montaigne claims as his ‘propre,’ 
also conceals anti-social values, or melancholic values as suggested earlier, in the 
form of a feeling of an utter differentiation from ‘the crowd,’ the position of the 
genius, and the subject of Burton’s poem. 
The early-modern melancholic position, as a position of radical subjectivity 
and uniqueness, allows Montaigne to evade ‘common’ judgment, which he is anyways 
highly wary of specifically due to this human presumption, which demonizes anything 
“different,” and would also likely include himself. On this note, the concerns of being 
or feeling judged are inherent to the Essais, and are echoed in many of Montaigne’s 
warnings, and self-deprecations concerning his work as “vain,” “frivolous,” “without 
aim” and “deformed,” and likely not worth his reader’s time, and finally, in his distrust 
in the reader’s (mis)interpretations: “C’est l’indiligent lecteur, qui perd mon subject; 
non pas moy”71 [“Tis the indiligent reader who loses my subject, and not I”].  
De l’amitie “digresses” from a “pure” relationship of the friendship to 
discussing “impure” commonplace relationships like family, work, marriage, and so 
on, and from there it digresses to the broader notion of “judgment.” Arguing 
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specifically, that these “common,” practical and interested relationships cannot or 
should not be based in the “judgment” of the other party, but only in the “end” or 
“purpose” around which the impure relationship revolves. In short, the cook should 
only be judged by his food. 
Since the relationship is “impure,” involving an exchange of sorts, then by 
definition, so Montaigne argues, there can be no grounds on which to judge the other 
on matters outside of that exchange, i.e., as a person, as a whole. Rather, only within 
the monster (whether the monstrous friendship or self), can one be seen and judged as 
“whole.” Except that the absolute mixture obscures and precludes any access to such 
judgment, except from within.  
In these other, lesser relationships, which are the face of all relationships as 
Montaigne argues — each person can only be judged based on the specific quality that 
is by definition involved in the exchange: the cook may only be judged based on his 
cooking, not his religion, his sexual practices, not even his ignorance, whether he is a 
gambler, and so on (more ignoring of folly?).  “I’ve done it this way, do it however it 
suits you,” quoting Terence, Montaigne ensures that his essaying, his actions, his 
friendship, his grief or pleasures, will be free of external judgment, since he has 
already sufficiently proven that no one else has access to this “one of a kind” and 
“indivisible” union.  
This digression to the topic of “judgment” is again telling of Montaigne’s own 
melancholic vulnerability and sense of uniqueness often concealed behind his 
philosophy and more explicit morals. On the one hand, premature and prejudiced 
judgment is dangerous, and responsible in Montaigne’s eyes for the religious wars and 
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massacres during his time, and even early-colonialism as the indigenous people were 
seen and treated by the Europeans as “savages.” At the same time, his persistent 
digressions to this topic of “judgment” when only very tangentially related, expose his 
personal fears and concerns. Not only fears of being judged, but also of being 
compared to anyone or anything, and even fears of being involved in anything outside 
of himself. Thus, Montaigne’s subjective fears — of judgment — play into his 
political tolerance, and philosophical values as this critique of human presumption 
through the monstrous.  
The new monstrous figure, like the unique melancholic position, also allows 
Montaigne to avoid mixing and mingling with common obligations, duties, and other 
relationships. Instead of positioning Montaigne as a Stoic who desires solitude out of a 
desire to achieve ataraxia (tranquility and ease), and as a means to practice self-
mastery and self-care, this reading reveals his “exile” or “retirement” from public life 
also as a form of contemptus mundi: his distaste for the “art” of social life and 
manipulation, the plagues of dishonesty, ambition, and greed as he defines them. 
Montaigne’s seeming philosophical affiliation with the Stoic practice of “self-
possession,” which in the classical sense also went hand in hand with civic life and 
duty, and political ambitions, seems to serve more as a guise for his personal desire to 
remain “unmixed” and untainted by these social “games.” This was also evidenced 
through his confessions in De la solitude and De l’oisivete, which I hinted at in 
Chapter 2 in relation to Montaigne’s true agenda behind his “busy mind,” as a way to 
keep busy (writing) without being bothered.   
His personal letters reveal more explicitly some of his less mediated disdain 
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for social affairs and obligations, where he confesses, after inheriting his family estate 
and domestic responsibilities with the death of his father, that he “would rather do 
anything than read through a contract”… and that he would prefer to descend into 
poverty in exchange for being freed from the “relentless encroachment of business 
affairs.”72 In other words, Montaigne preferred the management of the self to the 
management of the house or of government — roles he was often thrust into against 
his will.73  
Here, in De l’amitie, Montaigne writes that the “tie” to the one true friend, 
undoes, “unties” [descoust] all other ties: “L’unique et principale amitié descoust 
toutes autres obligations,” expressing an ethical priority perhaps, but also certainly a 
preference for the true and the “propre” of selfhood over social life with all its 
masquerading and vigilant calculations, and perhaps also an opportunity/excuse to 
evade it — through this monstrosity, and finally perhaps through the act of writing 
itself as a monstrous “shield,” rather than a compensatory device.  
In this respect, against the usual interpretations of writing as a means to cope 
with loss, or writing as a result of the idle mind or a melancholy humor, I would argue 
that writing serves as a kind of private labor that postpones social judgment and social 
engagement, especially in the endless form with which Montaigne approaches it, 
claiming that he will writing “as long as there is ink and paper in the world,” (De la 
                                                
72 Montaigne quoted in Stefan Zweig, Montaigne, trans. Will Stone (London: Pushkin Collection, 
2015), 81-82.  
73 This subjective preference and melancholic state would suggest an alternative to reading Montaigne 
as an exemplary figure for Foucault’s “care of the self,” and subjective yet political resistance to 
governmentality as Schachter describes it, since the driving factor would be even more subjective and 
private and less intentionally political in this sense, Schachter, “Qu’est-ce que la critique: La Boétie, 
Montaigne, Foucault.” 
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vanite), a kind of tactic reminiscent of Penelope’s infinite weaving/unweaving, which 
she deploys in order to postpone the “reality principle” of responding to her suitors.74  
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, it is also important to 
remember that the essay itself was originally written in order to publish La Boétie’s 
treatise, La Servitude Volontaire, and that at the very end of the essay Montaigne 
confesses that he went back on his decision to publish this treatise. Contrary to the 
justifications provided by critics, my justification follows the argument of the 
monstrous as a defiance of, and disbelief in the outside, expressed as a fear of 
“impurity” and “mixture” with it, i.e., the wrong kind of mixture that would 
contaminate the perfect union and perfect self. De l’amitie conveys a clear fear of 
contamination, and to use again the monstrous term that frequently appears in the 
essay — a fear of mixture (meslange) — with other relationships and other 
experiences that are not of “the one” he enjoyed with the “only friend,” La Boétie.   
In addition, Montaigne mentions that the omission is due to the fact that he 
found the treatise was being used with “evil intent” by those who brought it forth, who 
he blames for “mixing his work up with some of their own concoctions,” other 
thoughts, other intentions (“qu’ils ont meslé à d’autres escrits de leur farine”), and 
therefore wanting to protect the “purity” of the work, essentially, from being 
contaminated by public opinion. The figure of the monstrous friendship therefore 
becomes a metaphor for intentional omissions, evasions, and obliqueness, yet one that 
is not “political” as Cornell-Reynolds and Desan suggest, but personal and self-
                                                
74 See Bertolín, R. (2008) “The Mast and the Loom: Signifiers of Separation and Authority.” Phoenix, 
62, (1/2): 92-108, for a discussion on Penelope’s tactic of exploiting private, feminine, labor, within the 
public and political sphere.  
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defensive — protective of the interiority of experience, and its uniqueness.  
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A CONCLUSION TO MONTAIGNE: 
ESSAYING AND MELANCHOLY 
 
 Finally, I would like to consider the very significant term of the essay itself in 
relation to the monsters and singularity discussed here in this chapter, which I 
portrayed as melancholic strategies, or at least paralleling the melancholic position in 
important ways. In almost every Montaigne study the form of the essay is noted in 
relation to Montaigne’s diverse, vagrant, or rather formless and monstrous writing 
style.  
Outside of Montaigne’s many descriptions of his own Essais as a monstrous 
writing and project, we find this very interesting and, as I will argue, melancholic 
explanation of the essay form:  
Si mon ame pouvait prendre pied, je ne m’essaierais pas, je me resouldrois;75 
 
[If my soul could take footing, I would not essay, but resolve.]76 
 
Here, the essay is not framed in terms of the human instability and wandering nature 
of the “esprit vagabond,” the “idle mind” or “imagination,” but in terms of the 
negative outcome of a personal inability to rest and find peace. This failure is very 
different from the failure of “idleness” in De l’oisivete, a natural failure of tranquility 
caused by the “idle mind,” which surprisingly started to work ten times harder the 
second it had nothing to be employed with. In De l’oisivete, the essay and writing are 
the natural results of the natural workings of the mind. Here, the essay is framed as an 
almost explicit failure, one that is personally felt — of an inability to find a “footing,” 
to find the rest yearned for: “je ne m’essaireais pas,” “I would not have essayed,” “je 
                                                
75  Montaigne, Essais, III, VIII.  
76  Montaigne, The Complete Essays, III, 13.  
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me resouldrois,” “I would have resolved” which could also mean, “I would have been 
cured,” as in “solved,” the kind of cure that comes from being “decided” and 
“resolute” perhaps.77   
One must ask, therefore, if this experience of one’s soul not even having the 
capacity to rest and settle, this image of being able to slip or fall off… this experience 
of swaying like the “wind,” is indeed a pleasant or comfortable one, as Montaigne 
often makes it seem. And furthermore, if being or feeling oneself entirely different 
from one moment to the next, is not also painful in the melancholic sense conveyed in 
Burton’s poem, rather than just a natural diversity and self-difference where “chaque 
piece, chaque moment, faict son jeu.”  
Montaigne often treats this “volubilité et discordance”78 as a merely natural 
and universal human trait, despite the fact that he everywhere observes and angers at 
the very opposite behavior: opiniâtreté, presumption, and dogmatism, suggesting that 
these contrarieties and swayings may not be as natural and commonplace, and are 
more reflective of his own nature, which he aspires others could adopt too — another 
social critique that stems from his melancholic otherness. 
 In De l’experience and De l’inconstance de nos actions, Montaigne will go so 
far as to compare himself, and this variability, with the wind: with being swayed in 
whichever direction the wind blows: 
Non seulement le vent des accidens me remue selon son inclination : mais en outre, je 
me remue et trouble moy mesme par l’instabilité de ma posture79 
                                                
77 Etymologically, resouldre could also mean the exact opposite, “dissolved” or essentially annihilated, 
which of course would reverse the dynamic and suggest that essaying in fact saved Montaigne from 
disintegrating.  
78 Montaigne, Essais, II, I.  
79 Montaigne, Essais, II.I.  
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[Not only does the wind of accident move me at will, but, besides, I am moved and 
disturbed as a result merely of my own unstable posture]80  
 
 This imagery, conveying instability and fragility, the “instability of posture,” 
vital to the essay project, despite the portrayal of variability and essaying as 
empowering and certainly truthful and honest,81 makes me think nonetheless of the 
motif of brittleness and fragility of melancholy, evoking some of the common fears 
and phobias of breaking, cracking, shattering mentioned in the Anatomy.  
 The “glass delusion” or phobia associated with melancholy made famous by 
the French king, Charles VI, who refused to allow people to touch him, and wore 
reinforced clothing to protect himself,82 is one of many such fears pertaining to 
brittleness and fragility and fear of the penetration of the outside: fear of ceilings and 
sky collapsing, fear of being made of glass or cork, which are but a few of such 
phenomena listed in the Anatomy.  
 Montaigne of course might not be blown accidentally by the wind, hither and 
tither as he suggests, from moment to moment, but certainly might be adapting to 
melancholic or subjective vicissitudes and fears associated with inconstancy and 
fragility.  
Montaigne’s final line of defense, as I will display it here, is his aptitude at 
structured and meaningful (literary) variability, the generation of conceptual personaes 
and figures through which an alternative view and mindset would mitigate the painful 
                                                
80 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, II, I, 242.  
81 As mentioned in chapter 2, psychoanalytic readings of the essay present the essay form to “match” 
the ruptured self, in the preclusion of a totality, and other readings highlight it as the “natural” form and 
operation of the imagination and the mind, to digress and wander in this way (see for example Bernard 
Sève in Montaigne: des regles pour l’esprit).   
82 Gill Speak, “An Odd Kind of Melancholy: Reflections on the Glass Delusion in Europe (1440–
1680),” History of Psychiatry, 2 (2) (1990): 193.  
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vicissitudes, an alternative pathos serving the healthy “overcoming of norms.” 
Alternatively, phrased in terms of the capacity pertaining to the melancholy 
and folly positions — his aptitude for the Dürerian re-ordering and re-presenting, 
which I find a confession of in his “private dictionary that is all [his] own,” in De 
l’experience: “J’ay un dictionaire tout à part moy.” That is, his figurative, linguistic 
and literary prowess can be seen to mitigate or render his melancholy operative and 
meaningful: to attribute new meanings to old words and concepts, to give and reassign 
words and meanings to experiences and things, of which the reversal of the expression 
“Il ne faut pas se depouiller avant de se coucher,” from Chapter 3 was most symbolic.  
 In the passage that follows this “private dictionary” confession of singularity, 
but also of intentional strategizing, Montaigne will expose another melancholic 
digression, another memento mori similar to the many we have already seen. Using the 
example of the conventional, proverbial expression “passer le temps” (“passing 
time”), Montaigne again demonstrates his strength in deconstructing a common 
expression by which he gains personal value and meaning, and in a sense even, 
overcomes a certain death by preemptively folding it within his own life and 
experiences.  
An expression of diversion, he says, people experience their lives in this 
wasteful way, to evoke again this notion of waste from a melancholic/subjective 
viewpoint. “Passing the time,” letting life pass them by, Montaigne, like Pascal, again 
criticizes these “ordinary people” (contemptus mundi), of treating life as some boring 
and unpleasant event that they are waiting to be over. But Montaigne can reinterpret 
this expression and this experience, and use it for his (shifting needs), with the help of 
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his “private dictionary”:  
je passe le temps, quand il est mauvais et incommode ; quand il est bon, je ne le veux 
pas passer, je le retaste, je m’y tiens.83 
 
I ‘pass the time,’ when it is rainy and disagreeable; when it is good, I do not want to 
pass it; I savor it, I cling to it.84 
 
When time is painful or unpleasant, he indeed “passes the time,” or lets it go to 
waste, not paying attention to it, not savoring it. When it is pleasurable, on the 
contrary, he makes it last, and holds on to it. By making the good last, and the bad go 
to waste, he makes a small victory over death and nature, by assigning his own 
singular, internal meaning to them rather than by ignorance and blindness to mortality 
and the “one thousand and one accidents” that await, in Pascal’s terms.  
 Once more the values of waste and avarice, of holding on, letting go, are 
shifting. Not in the direction the wind blows, but in relation to the shifting needs and 
viewpoints of melancholy. The melancholic digression which follows Montaigne’s 
“dictionary” play, is his confession of always being in a position to savor life, because 
he is always preparing for, or on the verge of losing it (“Je me compose pourtant à la 
perdre sans regret”), consistently considering life as “inherently wasting away,” 
(“perdable de sa condition”), again voicing his obsessive memento mori:  
Je me compose pourtant à la perdre sans regret : Mais comme perdable de sa 
condition, non comme moleste et importune.85 
 
However, I am reconciling myself to the thought of losing it, without regret, but as 
something that by its nature must be lost; not as something annoying and 
troublesome.86 
 
 Montaigne’s ability and need to produce a “private dictionary,” to creatively 
                                                
83 Montaigne, Essais, III, XIII.  
84 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, III, 13, 853.  
85 Montaigne, Essais, III, XIII. 
86 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, III, 13, 853. 
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assign and reassign meaning to words, stems from his melancholy — from shifting 
experiences of pain and pleasure, from living a life on the verge of death that render 
each moment crucial, from a sense of distinction from others whose words and 
expressions (“passer le temps”), but also relationships, obligations, and finally ties, do 
not apply to him.  
In confessing that “if his soul could take footing, he would not essay but 
resolve,” Montaigne leaves room for us to believe that essaying might not have been 
his preferred form of living. Perhaps Montaigne would have wanted to enjoy the 
normativity of custom, of banal ties and occupations which he condemns — “the 
comfort and warmth of a world one has already taken in,” the comforts of “fitting 
in.”87 But since rest, and stability, which norms provide but also require, are not 
available experiences to him, he essays — so as to at least “find footing” for each 
changing moment, each day and the shifts it springs upon him, in his humors and 
experiences alike.  
  
  
 
                                                
87 This is how Sara Ahmed describes the comfortable feelings of heteronormativity in Sara, Ahmed,  
The Cultural Politics of Emotion. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 148.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In Madness and Civilization, Foucault had famously noted Descartes’s exclusion of 
madness from the domain of reason. That while dreams, error, or the misperceptions 
of the senses, such as bad eyesight, should be considered and overcome by the 
doubting subject, the very possibility of madness should be excluded from thought 
itself, and prior to continuing the investigation for ascertaining truth, which requires 
absolute certainty.1 The passage this reading relates to most explicitly is from 
Descartes’s First Meditation:  
How could it be denied that these hands or this whole body are mine? Unless perhaps 
I were to liken myself to a madman, whose brains are so damaged by the persistent 
vapours of melancholia that they firmly maintain they are kings when they are 
paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are naked, or that their heads are 
made of earthenware, or that they are pumpkins, or made of glass.2 
 
This description of the “persistent vapours of melancholia,” which “damage 
the brain,” such that the investigation must stop if this were to be the case, signals a 
symbolic moment after which “melancholy vapors,” as a “disease,” will forever taint 
the assertions and truths expressed by that “damaged” subject.  
The goal of this dissertation was to explore a selection of early-modern works 
and theories before the vapors had clouded the mind in such a way that its 
philosophies and “truths” were tossed aside, and while they were considered integral 
to subjectivity: to its perceptions, to its feeling, and finally to its production of a 
viewpoint and a critique that culminated in the literary writing of Montaigne’s Essais.  
                                                
1 “In the economy of doubt, there is an imbalance between madness, on the one hand, and dream and 
error, on the other. Their situation in relation to the truth and to him who seeks it is different; dreams or 
illusions are surmounted within the structure of truth; but madness is inadmissible for the doubting 
subject,” Michel, Foucault, Madness and Civilization.  
2 René Descartes, “Meditation I”, Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by Donald A. Cress. 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993). 
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In opposition to Descartes’s exclusion of melancholy from the domain of 
thought, the early-modern theories and writings I have explored throughout this 
dissertation raised the “pathological vision” of the clouded mind to the privileged 
status of subjectivity as such, with an astute capacity for philosophy and critique, and 
the personal ability to survive the motions of a “mad world,” by holding on to these 
shifts from within, even as this might bring on a vicious internal rupture.  
As such, early-modern melancholy, as this unification of difference, becomes 
most equipped to deal with the melancholy of the world, where a renunciation of these 
internal ruptures would mean a denial of a diverse and changing world, and would 
mean settling for the fixity of norms and custom, which would mean wasting away 
that one and only life we each have.  
In this way, an ironic overlap between the Cartesian point of view and the 
early-modern point of view is revealed. Early-modern subjectivity and early-modern 
melancholy as explored here, would agree with Descartes that melancholy would 
indeed cast doubt over the most basic certainties, for example even that “these hands 
or this whole body are mine,” a doubt which for Descartes, if it existed, would be a 
sign that he had gone mad. Except that, it is not melancholy as a condition, its 
“damaged brains,” that would cast doubt, but rather melancholy as a subjectivity and 
as a critique, that would cast doubt over even these seemingly basic certainties, as 
each moment, each humor, each occasion of the “one thousand and one” play their 
part, without a “footing” in which to find rest.  
Even “death,” as we have seen, is not a “certainty” but rather a subjective 
occupation, a subjective staging and representation, in the way that, memento mori 
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was shown to thoroughly structure a variety of worlds and world views: Dürer’s scene, 
with the various vanitas and their particular arrangements, the map inside the Fool’s 
head, the philosophers crying and laughing over the world globe, Montaigne’s miserly 
fathers as a memento mori for us all, and so on.  
Descartes’s manipulation of melancholy here, Descartes’s own “melancholic 
slip,” so to speak, is that it is not so much that the “pauper maintains firmly that he is 
king,” but rather that “firmly maintaining” something is a projection of Descartes’s 
own language and his own needs from life and how to live which correspond to what 
level of certainty he, Descartes, needs, what he can and cannot tolerate in his mind, in 
his vicinity, what life has to be about for him.  
Perhaps, anecdotally, had Descartes and Montaigne met, they would have 
hated each other, not for their diverging philosophies, that one asserts a “je” and one 
asserts nothing but difference, but for their clashing worldviews that would be hurtful 
to the other’s subjectivity and needs. If the melancholic we have met within the course 
of this dissertation does in fact “firmly maintain” he is king, it is the lot of everyone in 
this “world of folly” to feel, behave, and believe in singular ways, which are, if we go 
along with Descartes’s interest in truth, always “erroneous” and always distorted, 
because they are, at all times, subjective.  
Instead of a concern for truth, for early-modern melancholy and folly, it is all 
about perspective: finding new perspectives and angles, new contemptus mundis, new 
follies, new madnesses, whether presenting us with a story about animals who live for 
only one day to make us feel less bad about our human lifespan, whether it finds the 
waste in avarice, whether it sees war as a diversion, whether it makes us see babies as 
  
193 
less developed humans, whether it allows us to compare debt to a disease, or relate 
poverty to suicide.  
As extremely malleable concepts and subjective positions, this dissertation 
argues for the value and relevance of early-modern melancholy and folly in 
contemporary criticism. Their critical capacity, both despite, and in light of their 
openness and malleability, force us to question our insatiable need for classifications, 
definitions and identities, clouding our access to general shared notions that pertain to 
the “human condition,” which is essentially and continuously variable. To argue with 
these early-modern concepts is to argue with this truth.  
Do we want or need to view the king as powerful or wretched? This answer 
cannot and should not be provided except by an individual, subjective, representation. 
In this vein, this dissertation hopes that the answer, “it depends,” can gain more 
respect and value, and can — despite its lack of “ornamentation,” to evoke Montaigne 
— be used and applied nonetheless for the purposes of understanding this “human 
condition,” a concept that has itself been stigmatized, in part, for the very same 
reasons that classifications are adored.  
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